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 This thesis explores the grounds for justifying the ascription of mentality to non-
human agents. In the first  part, I set my research within the framework of scientific 
naturalism and the computational theory of mind. Then I argue that while the behaviour 
of certain agents demands a computational explanation, there is no justification for 
attributing mentality to them. I use these examples to backup my claim that  some 
authors indulge in unnecessary ascription of mentality to certain animals (e.g. insects) 
on the main grounds that they possess computational capacities.
 The second part  of my  thesis takes up  recent literature exploring the line that 
divides computational agents with and without mentality. More precisely, I criticise the 
proposals put forward by  Fodor, Dretske, Burge, Bermúdez and Carruthers. My main 
argument takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum by  showing that their criteria apply 
to artefacts to which the attribution of mentality is unjustified. Overall, I conclude that 
even though the views advanced by the mentioned authors help  to elucidate the 
computational grounds that could make the emergence of a mind possible, they do not 
offer a satisfactory  criterion for the ascription of mentality  to some computational 
agents but not others.
 In the final part I develop my own proposal for grounding the attribution of 
mentality. My strategy consists in drawing upon the distinction between personal and 
subpersonal levels of explanation, according to which properly psychological 
descriptions have whole-agents as their subject matter, use a distinctive theoretical 
vocabulary, and are constrained by norms of rationality. After showing that the 
personal-subpersonal distinction is compatible with a naturalistic framework, I adapt the 
distinction so that it can be applied to non-human agents, and conclude that it imposes 
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 One of the most important distinctions we make in our everyday  lives is that 
between minded and non-minded creatures. We describe and explain human behaviour 
by appeal to mental states, and in virtue of this we approach minded creatures in a way 
that is notably different from the way we approach non-minded creatures or entities 
(e.g. with respect  to their moral status). Traditionally, having a mind has been regarded 
as a privilege of human beings and perhaps a few other members of the animal 
kingdom. Many philosophers followed Descartes’s view that non-human animal 
behaviour can be explained in terms of the same (merely) mechanistic principles that 
govern mindless machines. It was normally taken as proof of these animal’s lack of 
mentality their incapacity to do things people readily associate with human intelligence: 
making arithmetic calculations, showing non-associative learning, holding a 
conversation, etc.
 But by the second half of the last  century, this view began to change 
considerably. An important factor behind this change has to do with the advent of 
computation theory. Through the pioneering work of mathematicians such as Alan 
Turing and John Von Neumann, computing machines emerged—first in theory  and later 
in fact—as being capable of performing intelligent behaviour1. These machines can fly 
airplanes, carry out surgical procedures, and even outperform human beings in tasks 
such as arithmetic calculation and chess playing (to name just two somewhat dated 
examples).
 Computation theory has indeed contributed a great deal in our understanding of 
the mind. For the first time, there was a plausible theory about how intelligent 
behaviour could be explained in physicalist terms. It soon became widely  acknowledged 
that important aspects of mentality—at least with regards to thinking and reasoning—
could be explained by appeal to computation. This wide consensus gave rise to the so-
called computational theory of mind (explained in chapter 1), which, according to 
1
1  I leave aside for the moment whether the intelligence of a machine is intrinsic or derived from its 
designer. The point here is just that some (embodied) machines can do things—by themselves—we 
normally qualify as intelligent.
perhaps the most influential current philosopher in the field, is “by far the best theory of 
cognition we’ve got that’s worth the bother of a serious discussion” (Fodor, 2000, p. 1).
 Part of the progress made by good theories is that they give rise to new and 
interesting questions. What kind of computer is the mind? How do we tell whether a 
certain computing machine can think? If we accept that the mind is a real and objective 
natural phenomenon (as I do in this thesis), we should expect concrete answers to these 
questions. And posing these questions is important, for at least two reasons. One is that 
technology advances fast, which means that sooner or later we will have to face the 
question of whether or not a certain robot can be said to have mentality. Secondly, 
research on animal cognition has shown that even animals (such as insects) that were 
previously  considered simple, do complex computation. Given that we have a mind by 
virtue of being some kind of computer, this opens up  the question of what is special 
about us, such that we have mentality  while other computing animals do not. The main 
goal of this thesis is to tackle this issue, and work towards determining the minimum 
conditions for possessing a mind.
 In this respect, one common way to proceed is by following what Lurz (2009) 
calls a bottom-up approach, which begins with taking what looks to be an intuitively 
plausible ascription of mentality  at  face value, and then proceeds with the development 
of a theory of behavioural explanation for non-human agents that includes 
psychological terms. This is the case (or so I argue in chapter 2) of philosophers who 
have considered it plausible to ascribe “simple minds” to animals on the basis of their 
possession of rather complex computational mechanisms linking their information-
gathering and action systems together. However, I contend that this approach is 
problematic, since it rests on questionable assumptions about what distinguishes mere 
computational agents from genuine mental agents. 
 My strategy (put forward in chapter 7) is based on what we might  call a top-
down approach. Instead of furnishing computational explanations of animal behaviour 
with psychological notions, I take psychological explanations of human behaviour as 
the paradigm for judging whether other computational agents have minds. More 
precisely, I spell out my approach in terms of what is known as personal-level 
explanation. To avoid anthropomorphic concerns related to defining the mind in terms 
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of persons, I develop an agent level of explanation, which attempts to abstract from 
human-specific features by focusing just on the essential aspects of the personal-level 
approach, so as to adapt them to explaining the behaviour of animals and even 
machines. By  means of this agent-level approach I attempt to justify the ascription of 
mentality to agents that can be properly described within this explanatory framework, 
and reveal the minimum conditions a computing system requires for possessing a mind.
 Before going into an overview of my thesis, I find it important to make a 
clarification regarding the notion of mentality at stake here. In addition to thought and 
reason, the mind is normally understood as involving conscious states, viz. states that 
have a distinctive qualitative character, in the sense that there is something that “it is 
like” to have them. However, I set these states aside from the present inquiry. This does 
not mean to say  that consciousness is not an important aspect of mentality, and I admit 
that (arguably) any complete account of the nature of the mind has to somehow address 
this issue. Nevertheless, following many philosophers persuaded by the computational 
theory  of mind, I assume that consciousness is not an essential aspect of thought, and 
that important progress can be made on the nature of mental representation and thinking 
without addressing what it is like to have conscious states. 
 Here is how I proceed. Chapter 1 sets forth some assumptions and theoretical 
background relevant to this thesis. It introduces a naturalistic framework according to 
which we are ontologically committed to the entities described by  our best scientific 
theories. I assume that amongst  those theories is the computational theory of mind. This 
opening chapter also elaborates the idea that complex phenomena such as the mind can 
be described from the viewpoint of hierarchical levels of explanation. Following a 
common tripartite distinction, I characterise them as the physical, the computational, 
and the psychological level.
 Chapter 2 develops and defends the idea that the computational level of 
explanation picks up  an autonomous natural domain—a domain of computational 
agents which are not necessarily  endowed with mentality. Then I take issue with some 
authors who defend the thesis that some animals have mentality on the basis that they 
possess certain complex computational abilities. I contend that these authors overlook 
the autonomy of the computational level, and fall into the false dilemma of assuming 
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that behaviour has to be explained either from the physical or the psychological level. 
Instead, I propose that it is possible to regard some animals and machines as mere non-
mental computational agents.
 Chapters 3 to 6 take up recent literature exploring the line that divides 
computational agents with and without mentality. Chapters 3 & 4 tackle the 
informational approaches advocated by Jerry Fodor and Fred Dretske, which have put 
forward conditions under which information coded by  computing systems could 
become genuine mental symbols. My main arguments against them take the form of a 
reductio, by showing that their criteria apply to artefacts to which the attribution of 
mentality is unjustified. In addition to discussing the particular views of the mentioned 
philosophers, these two chapters provide an overview of the standard computational 
account of perception, to which I return in subsequent chapters. 
 Chapter 5 critically  reviews Tyler Burge’s recent proposal about the minimum 
conditions for having mental symbols. Burge develops a teleological approach to 
perceptual systems, as a way to account for their capacity of generating basic symbolic 
structures that demand a psychological explanation. I object to his proposal that its 
overall teleological picture of the mind is problematic, and that it ends up drawing the 
line for having mentality too low. 
 Chapter 6 addresses the views of José Luis Bermúdez and Peter Carruthers. 
They  advance forms of symbolic processing and cognitive architecture that, according 
to them, deserve to be described in psychological terms. I contend, on different grounds, 
that their views do not offer a satisfactory criterion for distinguishing computational 
from mental symbols, and neither for telling apart mental from non-mental 
computational architectures.
 Chapter 7 is where I present my own hypothesis on the correct way  to draw the 
line that separates computational agents with and without mentality. It draws upon the 
distinction between personal and subpersonal levels of explanation, according to which 
properly  psychological descriptions have whole-agents as their subject matter, use a 
distinctive theoretical vocabulary, and are constrained by norms of rationality. After 
showing that the personal-subpersonal distinction is compatible with a naturalistic 
framework, I adapt the distinction so that it can be applied to non-human agents, with 
4






 The main goal of this thesis is to explore the minimum conditions for having 
mentality and articulate a way  to draw a line between those agents that have a mind and 
those that lack it. For the purposes of this thesis I shall take for granted three tenets that 
underlie the debate over the nature of the mind: scientific realism, the computational 
theory  of mind, and informational approaches to representation. My goal in this opening 
chapter is to introduce those tenets and set up the theoretical background for the rest of 
this thesis.
 I begin by introducing the related views of naturalism and scientific realism, as a 
way to establish the general metaphysical and epistemological foundations of the 
computational theory  of mind. I then present the computational theory of mind itself, 
discussing first its computational and then its representational component. Finally, I 
elaborate the idea that explanations of behaviour can be formulated from different 
explanatory levels. 
 This chapter is mainly introductory and devoted to discussing some relevant 
background. In the second chapter I will present my first positive view, which is that the 
computational level of explanation maps onto an autonomous natural domain. 
1.1 The Place of the Mind in our Scientific Worldview
 Our modern understanding of the world has been deeply shaped by the 
emergence of science in the seventeenth century. Since then, everything in the universe 
began to be understood as part of a common natural order governed by deterministic 
laws and science became the dominant method for unveiling this natural order. Among 
the natural phenomena in need of explanation lies behaviour. Humans and other 
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animals, plants, and even robots move and perform a variety  of behaviours2. But it is 
clear that  not any  movement counts as behaviour. It would be odd to describe the 
movement of a rock that sinks in water, or the motion of a planet through its orbit, as 
behaviour since these entities are not actually doing those actions. They  are just passive 
respondents to external forces and nothing inside them plays an active causal role in 
determining their movements. Thus, I will follow Dretske (1988) in defining behaviour 
as the sort of activity that can be classified as the result  of internal processes, given that 
those internal factors can be credited as primary causes of an agent’s actions. 
 Psychology is one of the sciences that study behaviour, however it  is concerned 
with the particular class of agents which have minds. In those agents at least some of 
their behaviours are caused by inner mental states such as beliefs, desires and intentions, 
and are governed by reasons. This sort of behaviour—often called intentional behaviour
—is the proper domain of psychological explanation. So, if we take seriously the 
common slogan that science strives to “carve nature at its joints” then we could argue 
that psychology would correspond to the science that attempts to carve the natural 
domain of mental agents at  its joints; the way it does so is by identifying mental states 
and putting forward explanations that describe them as the internal causes of their 
actions.
 In order to be recognised as a scientific discipline one of the most pressing 
issues for psychology  is to vindicate the use of mental states as part  of its theoretical 
apparatus. After all, we cannot directly  observe or measure the mental states of others, 
and talk about the mind has historically been linked to religious and dualistic 
conceptions that are of dubious scientific import. So, it  will be important for our 
characterisation of psychology  to explain how it can be compatible with two viewpoints 
that lie at the metaphysical and epistemological foundations of contemporary 
psychology: naturalism and realism. For the purposes of this thesis and following the 
prevalent viewpoint in philosophy  of psychology, I will take both principles for granted 
(though in the second chapter I address some antirealist positions regarding 
computational states). I present those in turn.
7
2 But as Dretske (1988) notes movement is not a necessary condition for having behaviour; even staying 
still can count as behaviour insofar as it is the product of inner processes. See the rest of the paragraph for 
a more precise definition of behaviour.
1.1.1 Naturalism
 Naturalism is the view that an adequate philosophical account of the world has 
to be given in terms of states and processes occurring in the natural causal order. This 
view is normally  committed to the ontological claim that everything in the world is 
physically constituted and that only  physical entities can participate in causal relations 
or affect the natural world (Papineau, 2009). Most contemporary philosophers and 
scientists consider themselves naturalists and regard psychology  as the discipline that 
studies the place of the mind in nature. For example, in their textbook on philosophy  of 
psychology, Botterill and Carruthers (1999) write:
According to naturalism  human beings are complex biological organisms and as such are 
part of the natural order, being subject to the same laws of nature as everything else in the 
world. If we are going to stick to a naturalistic approach, then we cannot  allow that  there is 
anything to the mind which needs to be accounted for by invoking vital spirits, incorporeal 
souls, astral planes, or anything else that cannot be integrated with natural science. (p. 1)
 As the quote suggests, naturalists also pursue the aims and methods of science to 
obtain knowledge of the world. They see the study of mental states as the outcome of 
scientific research in the same way as biology  studies the structure of the cell or physics 
reveals the constitution of atoms, and exclude from the vocabulary of psychology any 
states that cannot be accounted for through the methods of science. As a consequence of 
its commitment to science, naturalism also recognises physics as the most fundamental 
of the sciences and includes the view that physics is causally complete within its 
domain, viz. that every physical event has a physical cause and is subject to explanation 
in terms of basic physics (hereafter, just “physics”). 
 But the completeness of physics has to be distinguished from the stronger claim 
that physics can explain everything. It has become customary  in science to accept that 
some sciences other than physics—often called special sciences—can have their own 
explanatory  domains, which describe states and processes in a way that cannot be 
reduced to explanations of physics (Fodor, 1974). This is because their explanations are 
formulated at a higher level of abstraction, which captures generalisations that range 
over many  different physical descriptions and therefore would otherwise be missed 
from the viewpoint of physics. But the special sciences are still compatible with the 
completeness of physics insofar as their explanations invoke states which have a 
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physical constitution and its processes are not in conflict with the principles of physics. 
Typical examples of special sciences are biology and psychology (see Sterelny, 1990; 
Crane, 2001).
 The way psychology  qua special science relates to physics is a complex issue. 
The basic idea, however, is that all facts described by psychology are somehow 
determined by  facts that fall under the domain of physics. This is normally  put forward 
by appeal to the term supervenience. Psychology is supposed to supervene on physics in 
the sense that two people cannot differ in their psychological states without also having 
a difference in certain relevant physical states involving them3. How the notion of 
mental state can be articulated in a way that does not refer to physical properties but at 
the same time supervenes on them will be explained in section 1.2.1, when presenting 
functionalism.
1.1.2 Scientific Realism
 As noted in the previous discussion, naturalists give an authoritative role to 
science. This is often associated to scientific realism which is the metaphysical position 
that the states and processes described by our scientific theories do exist and that  the 
theories themselves are at  least approximately true (Fine, 1999). According to scientific 
realism, the authoritative role of science is also epistemological, in the sense that we are 
justified to adopt a positive epistemic attitude towards the theoretical elements of our 
best scientific theories. So provided the success of psychology  as a science, through 
scientific realism we can justify the belief that there is an objective, observer-
independent domain of mental agents. 
 But then it is natural to wonder how we should measure the success of 
psychology and be justified to choose it  from alternative theories that explain behaviour. 
The best way  scientific realism has to deal with this issue is to focus on their 
explanatory  virtues. The idea is that explanation can provide an additional evidential 
9
3  It should be noted that strictly speaking supervenience only implies that mental states covary with 
physical states and not that the existence of the former depends on the latter, which makes supervenience 
compatible with property dualism (Kim, 2006). But following the standard usage of the term in the 
philosophy of psychology, I will understand supervenience as entailing physicalism and then assume that 
supervenience involves a relation of dependence of psychology on physics. 
standard for choosing between alternative theories, a view that is often called inference 
to the best explanation (Day & Kinkaid, 1994; Lipton, 2004). Then the belief in 
psychological theories is warranted because they provide greater predictions and 
understanding of human behaviour, and scientists argue for the existence of mental 
states in the same way  as with other unobservable entities such as electrons or black 
holes. The argument for stating that those entities are really out there in the world is that 
they  are part of the ontology implied by  our most successful theories. Returning to the 
context of psychology, psychological explanations involving mentalistic concepts 
prevailed over alternative theories precisely because it proved to a be more successful 
explanation of human behaviour. Let me illustrate this with an example.
 From an historical viewpoint, psychology only became consolidated as a 
scientific discipline in the 1950s after what became known as the “cognitive 
revolution” (Miller, 2003). As it is normally  presented in textbooks of psychology  and 
cognitive science, before that time the dominant  approach to explain behaviour was 
non-mentalisitic and known as behaviourism (Bechtel, Graham & Abrahamsen, 1998). 
Behaviouristic explanations are typically restricted to observable patterns of stimuli and 
behavioural responses, and deem talk about mental states unscientific due to their 
subjective and unverifiable source in introspective reports. For example, behavioursitic 
theories of language claimed that children learn their language basically  through a 
process of operant conditioning, where their spontaneous linguistic behaviour is 
positively or negatively reinforced by adults. 
 In a famous review of Skinner’s version of this theory, Chomsky (1959) pointed 
out to the insufficiency  of this behaviouristic model to explain the children’s ability  to 
understand and produce an indefinite number of sentences on first  acquaintance. Since 
many of the sentences children understand and produce had never been uttered or heard 
before, there is no way to explain their linguistic capacities by  appeal to prior 
reinforcement. Chomsky (1965) then put forward an alternative psychological theory 
that appeals to inner mental mechanisms, in particular the possession of innate linguistic 
rules that restrict the possible grammatical structures the child could learn and produce. 
In this way, Chomsky was able to explain how children could acquire the ability  to 
generate new grammatical sentences in the language they are learning. This is not the 
place to get into the details of Chomsky’s theory of language acquisition, but to present 
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it as an example of how mentalistic theories prevailed over previous ones due to their 
explanatory virtues.
1.2 The Computational Theory of Mind
 So in the course of the above mentioned cognitive revolution psychologists 
began to study  and explain the behaviour of human agents by appeal to theories 
involving inner mental states and processes, and showed how this could be carried out 
in a scientifically respectable way. A key  aspect  of this cognitive turn has been the 
interdisciplinary  approach to the study  of the mind. Psychology began to absorb 
developments made by  philosophy, computer science and information theory, among 
other disciplines. All this gave shape to the computational theory of mind (henceforth 
just “CTM”) which can be regarded as the received view in current theorising about the 
mind and the scientific explanation of human behaviour. 
 According to CTM the mind is a kind of digital computer, which is to say, a 
discrete-state device that stores symbolic structures and manipulates them according to 
syntactic rules (Horst, 2009). As a preliminary description computers typically have an 
input layer and a memory, from where symbolic structures can be encoded or retrieved 
respectively, and the machinery required for performing certain fundamental operations 
over them. These operations can produce an output as a function of its inputs, a function 
that can be specified by an algorithm which is a sort of recipe that specifies step by step 
how to manipulate the symbols in order to obtain the desired output. For expository 
reasons it is useful to present  CTM  as having two parts, a syntactic and a 
representational component, however when it comes to real computers both parts are 
not totally independent as I will explain later. The syntactic component consists in the 
functional architecture of the system that determines how operations over symbols can 
be performed. The representational component is concerned with the content of those 
symbolic structures, i.e. what makes possible for them to represent or stand for other 
things. In the following sections I present them in turn.
 An important  assumption behind CTM is that a significant part of mental 
processes consist in carrying out inferences. This is important  because it is by 
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implementing the logical structure of inferences4 that computers are normally regarded 
as an appropriate model of how the mind works5 as I will explain with more detail in 
section 1.2.2. The assumption that the mind is inferential is plain for the case of 
practical reasoning. For example, imagine that when Peter is about to leave his house he 
looks at the window and finds out that it is raining outside and then picks up an 
umbrella. A natural way to explain his behaviour would be to ascribe him the belief that 
it is raining outside, the desire to keep dry, and the capacity to carry out a practical 
syllogism where the belief and the desire act as premises for the practical conclusion of 
picking up his umbrella. Importantly, according to CTM the mind is also supposed to be 
inferential at the level of deeply unconscious processes such as those involved in 
language learning or perceptual processing. For example, according to Chomsky’s 
theory  sketched above, children are supposed to infer the right linguistic constructions 
they  can use in their language by  taking both the linguistic expressions they hear and 
their inner knowledge of grammar as premises. 
1.2.1 The Role and Realiser Distinction
 To understand how computation theory applies to psychology it is important to 
see how the mind can be described from a functionalist viewpoint. Broadly construed, a 
functionalist approach to psychology says that mental states are constituted by their 
function, or causal role in the overall cognitive system in which they are part, in 
particular their causal relations to sensory  inputs, other mental states and behaviour 
outputs (Putnam, 1975; Fodor, 1968). Through this functionalist framework psychology 
can formulate causal generalisations relating mental states and their effects in 
behaviour, in a way compatible with the standard model of scientific explanation. 
 The causal role of a mental state is also called its job description since what 
individuates the state is the causal work it is supposed to do in the system, instead of 
12
4 It should be noted that CTM does not require all the inferences carried out by the mind to have a logical 
form, i.e. it allows them to be non-demonstrative, inductive-like, inferences. The basic point is, though, 
that they have a structure and that this structure can be implemented in the functional architecture of a 
computer.
5 Searle (1992) calls “strong AI” the view that all that there is to having a mind is having a program that 
mirrors the inferential structure of the mind. CTM need not be strong AI, though, insofar as it could admit 
that some important part of behaviour is not mediated by inferential processes. These behaviours might be 
explained by non-computational explanatory frameworks, such as the physical level (see section 1.4.3). 
how it is physically  constituted. The fact  that  causal role of mental states can be 
formulated with relative independence from its physical constitution gives rise to the 
distinction between the causal role of a mental state (i.e. the cognitive job it performs) 
and its realiser (i.e. the physical structure that actually  occupies that role, typically a 
state of the brain) (Levin, 2010).
 To illustrate this functionalist approach to psychology, let us return to the case of 
Chomsky’s theory sketched above. The author argued that explanations of language 
learning and comprehension involve the possession of inner knowledge of grammar. 
Among them are phrase structure rules that govern how the constituents of a sentence 
such as noun phrase and verb phrase are structured. They perform the job of 
categorising the linguistic input a child hears in order to restrict the class of possible 
languages the child could learn. According to the functionalist, those rules are realised 
by mental states defined in terms of their causal role in causally mediating between 
linguistic stimuli  and behaviour, viz. the role of categorising the linguistic input and 
constraining the grammatical constructions that could be produced.
 As happens with other sciences, the non-logical vocabulary  of psychological 
theories refers to natural kinds, which correspond to the natural entities in virtue of 
which scientific theories describe law-like regularities. They are part of the language, so 
to speak, couched by scientific predicates. In many sciences, natural kinds can be 
identified with some physical property, such as a certain molecular or atomic 
configuration. However, since psychology is a functional theory its predicates are about 
entities individuated by their causal roles and not  by their physical realisers. Therefore, 
psychological theories refer to functional kinds, which can in principle be realised in an 
indefinite number of physical substances insofar as they occupy their characteristic 
causal roles (Sterelny, 1990). For example, the causal role performed by the linguistic 
rules alluded to in the last paragraph could in principle be implemented in a computing 
machine distinct from the brain, insofar as the machine is capable of reproducing the 
complex network of input and output relations that characterises the child’s cognitive 
system. If that is possible, then the computer would really instantiate the same mental 
states of the child and be capable of learning a language, even though its physical 
constitution is radically different from the child’s brain. 
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 The fact that the roles of mental states can be multiply realised has the advantage 
for psychology that makes it  relatively independent from more fundamental sciences 
such as neuroscience or physics. Psychologists can then focus on the functional 
architecture of the mind and study mental states as functional kinds, defined in terms of 
their casual roles in psychological theories and not in terms of their intrinsic physical 
properties. This is a crucial step towards the vindication of psychology as a special 
science, with its own vocabulary  and generalisations, which cannot be reduced to the 
vocabulary of more basic sciences.
1.2.2 The Syntactic Component
 The most characteristic aspect of computer systems is that they have a syntactic 
structure, which basically consists in a functional description of the inferential processes 
that mediate between the inputs and outputs of the system. In fact, computers can be 
defined as automatons that can map  transitions between its inputs, outputs and internal 
functional states. When focusing on the syntactic component of the mind CTM abstracts 
from the representational component of symbols and develops a purely  functional or 
formal description of the inferential operations performed over them. There are two 
aspects of the syntactic component of computer systems that make them suitable for 
implementing the inferential architecture of the mind. One is that computers are 
universal machines and the other that they have actually been realised in physical 
devices. I explain these in turn, and then discuss some implications they  have for 
theorising about the mind.
 As mentioned in 1.2, a significant part of the mental processes that explain 
behaviour have the characteristic that they  are inferential. Another typical aspect of 
mental processes (at least for the case of intelligent creatures) is that they are flexible 
and adaptable, in the sense that  they can deploy different inferential procedures to deal 
with new environmental circumstances. After all, the main  reason why chess-playing 
machines are not very intelligent is that they cannot do anything beyond playing chess. 
In contrast, the mind is—at least to some degree—a multi-purpose system of inference, 
or as is normally put, they are universal machines. This idea can be tracked back to 
Alan Turing’s seminal work on computation. In his words:
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[The] special property of digital computers, that  they can mimic any discrete state machine, 
is described by saying that they are universal machines. The existence of machines with this 
property has the important consequence that, considerations of speed apart, it is unnecessary 
to design various new machines to do various computing processes. They can all be done 
with one digital computer, suitable programmed for each case. It  will be seen that  as a 
consequence of this all digital computers are in a sense equivalent (Turing, 1950, pp. 
441-442)
 I shall say  more about  what precisely is understood by a universal machine 
below and in the next chapter, but for present  purposes the important idea is that 
computers are universal machines in the sense that they can in principle be programmed 
to compute any algorithm (Pylyshyn, 1980; Haugeland, 1981; Copeland, 1993). This is 
possible because computers have the machinery required to perform a fundamental set 
of operations over its inner symbolic structures, such as to copy, write or delete them, 
and to automatically carry out series of operations as specified by a program (which is a 
series of instructions or algorithms stored in the memory of the computer). Turing 
himself is responsible of making this claim of universality plausible by creating what 
has become the paradigm of a computer: the Turing machine (Turing, 1937). Briefly, 
this is a mathematically characterised computing machine consisting in an input layer 
from where it can recognise symbolic structures, and capable to perform two types of 
operations depending on its initial state and the input symbol it recognises. Those 
operations correspond to the output of the device and are (a) move into a new state and/
or (b) erase the existing symbol (if any) and write a new one (on an imaginary  tape). 
Which of those operations the machine actually  performs will depend on the program it 
has stored in its memory (called the machine table). 
 It is easy  to show how a Turing machine can perform simple arithmetic 
procedures such as addition using a binary  symbolic system (see e.g. Crane, 1995). But 
the essential point behind Turing machines is that they can serve as proof of the 
universality  of computer systems since any  algorithmic procedure can in principle be 
executed by a computer, given enough time, tape and memory to it.6 And since mental 
processes have the logical structure of inferences and the syntax of those structures can 
be specified by an algorithm (i.e. translated into a program), it becomes clear that 
computer systems are then capable of implementing the inferential structure that 
characterises the mental processes of intelligent creatures. 
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6 This is also known as the Turing-Church thesis, after Alonzo Church made an equivalent proposal.
 The second aspect of computer systems that make them suitable for 
implementing the inferential architecture of cognition is the well-established fact that 
their syntactic component can be realised by physical entities. For example, computing 
artefacts can perform the fundamental operations of a universal computer and 
mechanically pass through one physical state to another mirroring the steps of an 
algorithm. And the realisation of computers is of course not restricted to electrical 
circuits, since an indefinite amount of physical devices such as pipes of water or mice in 
traps could in principle be used for making a computer. Indeed, groups of neurones have 
also been described as instantiations of basic computational operations (McCulloch & 
Pitts, 1943). This makes plausible the claim that the syntactic or functional organisation 
of computers can be studied in abstraction from their physical constitution but at the 
same time can be implemented in concrete physical systems such as the brain.
 The idea that the inferential structure of mental processes capture the core of 
human intelligence and that this can be decomposed into algorithms and implemented in 
a computer was forcibly put forward by Newell and Simon (1981) with their symbol 
system hypothesis:
The Symbol System Hypothesis: A physical symbol system has the necessary and sufficient 
means for intelligent action. (p. 41).
 The authors talk of “physical” symbols to emphasise the idea that they are 
focusing on the syntactic component of CTM, which corresponds to the shape or form 
of the symbols. Symbols are supposed to be manipulated purely  in terms of their formal 
dimension, in the same sense as the shape of a key  determines what lock it will open. As 
I will discuss in the next section, the representational properties of the symbol are left 
aside to focus on the logical structure of intelligence, however they are assumed to be 
present in real autonomous computing systems.
 The modal claim implied by the symbol system hypothesis should be noted, viz. 
that any  possible form of intelligent action has to be based on algorithmic processing 
over symbols. This can be challenged, however, by proposing that  some intelligent 
human behaviour is generated by mental processes that do not have the structure of an 
algorithm and therefore cannot be run by  a Turing machine. It can also be argued that 
some mental processes are actually carried out over analogue information that thus lack 
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the discrete digital structure typical of computational symbols. But for present  purposes 
we do not need to deal with these controversies. We can just characterise the symbol 
system hypothesis as stating sufficient means for intelligent action, and thus claim that 
at least a significant part of the mind corresponds to the sort of symbolic processes that 
computers actually can implement. The point is just that a computing device, if properly 
programmed, can in principle reproduce the logical structures that underlie 
characteristic human mental processes.
 Before passing to the next section, a brief note about the universality  of 
computers. As I mentioned above, computers like Turing machines have the basic 
machinery  required to execute any algorithm and in this sense simulate the functional 
architecture of any other computer machine. This makes computers universal, general-
purpose, devices. But even though this is true from a theoretical viewpoint, when it 
comes to concrete computers instantiated in the real world their universality is 
constrained in many ways (Newell, 1960). An obvious constraint relates to the physical 
capacities of the machine itself. For example, a machine may lack the memory, velocity, 
and output mechanisms required for performing any  task. Another is concerned with the 
way computers interact  with their environment. Even though from a purely  syntactical 
of formal viewpoint many computers can be regarded as performing the same 
algorithm, they might actually  be processing different kinds of information and 
performing different tasks. Computers capable of behaving in the world in an 
autonomous way are constrained by the nature of their input-output layers. And the 
same happens with the brain. Its different  regions are specialised to process domain-
specific information and solve problems proper to that domain (Churchland & 
Sejnowski, 1999). Thus it is useful to distinguish between abstract, syntactically 
specified computers such as Turing machines, which are genuinely universal, from 
instances of computation in computing machines that perform tasks in the real world. I 
shall return to this issue in the second chapter.
1.2.3 The Representational Component
 Computing machines have a syntactic component that can mirror the logical 
architecture of inferential mental processes. But as mentioned earlier, computation also 
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involves the manipulation of symbolic structures, which have a representational or 
semantic dimension that goes beyond their syntactic structure. The point is nicely put  by 
Haugeland (1981) in the following passage:
So, formal (symbol) tokens can lead two lives: syntactical (formal) lives, in which they are 
meaningless markers, moved according to the rules of some self-contained game; and (if the 
system is interpreted) semantic lives, in which they have meanings and significant relations 
to the outside world. (p. 22)
 As the quote says, symbols have a semantic dimension since symbols are 
essentially  entities that bear reference relations to something else. Imagine you are 
driving a car aiming to get to the airport and at some point you find a signpost in the 
route showing an airplane. The airplane is a symbol that is referring to an airport, and in 
the present context we might even say that means “airport nearby”. But what the 
signpost means is, of course, conventional. It  depends on us—participants of a symbolic 
community—to be interpreted as a symbol that represents anything at all. In contrast, 
the symbols we possess in our minds (thereafter “mental symbols”) do not depend on 
anyone else, apart from us, to have meanings. As it is often put, they  have intrinsic 
content, viz. one that is not derived from the minds of others. Mental symbols are those 
that have their contents intrinsically, and to explain how they get their contents is 
perhaps the central project in the philosophy of mind.
 However CTM is sometimes labeled the “symbolic approach” to the mind, CTM  
theorists often abstract from the representational dimension of the mind and focus on its 
syntactic component, mainly  for methodological reasons. Their central motivation is 
that the syntactic structure of mental processes can straightforwardly be implemented on 
computer devices and in this way the algorithmic architecture of the mind can be 
explored and tested empirically, without dealing with the complexities related to what 
symbolic structures actually represent. However, most  defenders of CTM  recognise that 
a complete account of cognition also has to deal with its representational or semantic 
component. This is because computational models are supposed to mirror inferences, 
and inferences are by definition carried out over symbols with representational 
properties. As Fodor (1975) notes:
To use this sort of [CTM] model is, then, to presuppose that the agent  has access to a 
representational system of very considerable richness. For, according to the model, deciding 
is a computational process; the act the agent performs is the consequence of computations 
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defined over representations of possible actions. No representations, no computations. No 
computations, no model. (p. 31)
 Therefore, apart from specifying the syntactic architecture of the mind CTM 
needs an account of how mental symbols could bear reference relations to things other 
than themselves. But this is not an easy  task for CTM for the reason that computation 
theory  itself, as can be deduced from the abstract notion of a Turing machine, takes 
symbols as formal structures and therefore is essentially  silent or agnostic about the 
contents of symbols (Cummins, 1983). In other words, it presupposes that symbols do 
have an interpretation, but  does little to explain how symbols could be endowed with 
intrinsic representational contents. Computation theory  has to be supplemented with 
something else.
 A convenient way of spelling out what is this “something else” is in terms of 
causal relations with the environment. As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, 
symbols are essentially entities that bear reference relations to something other than 
themselves. This suggests that, for example, a symbolic structure used to think about 
rabbits should bear some sort  of relation to rabbits, or as Fodor (1990) says, for there to 
be a relation “something has to happen in the world” (p. 99). And the most common 
way to specify this relation is by saying that it  is causal. This should come as no 
surprise at  this point, given our commitment to scientific realism. Since what justifies 
the postulation of any theoretical entity is that it plays a role in our scientific theories, 
and given that scientific explanations basically consist in specifying the causal relations 
the govern the natural order, to be a realist  about representational relations is close to 
saying that those relations have to be causal. In the next section, I explain a casual 
account of referential relations called informational approach to representation.
1.3 Informational Approaches to Representation
 Informational approaches to representation can be regarded as stemming from 
the empiricist tradition in philosophy, which starts from the rather obvious premise that 
we obtain knowledge about the world by getting information about external objects 
through our senses. Information theory has attempted to refine the notion of information 
in the way of an objective commodity that can be generated and transmitted. It  has 
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developed along with computation theory offering ways of understanding how 
computing systems such as the mind can pick up and process information about the 
environment (Adams, 2003).
 A central claim of information theory in the present context is that information is 
a more fundamental notion than representation, and a precursor of semantic content. 
One way to see the link between information and representation is by  following Grice 
(1957) in noting that  there is a sense of “mean” used in expressions that describe a 
natural relation between two states. For example, in “tree rings mean the age of the tree” 
the tree rings are supposed to be a natural sign or indicator of the age of the tree. Grice 
saw that there is relation between this sense of the term “mean” and the sense normally 
used to describe the semantic properties of natural language, as in the expression “with 
‘tree’ he meant the perennial woody plant”. To distinguish it from the former, the author 
called this second sense non-natural meaning. For present purposes, what is important 
of this distinction is that natural meaning can be regarded as an objective phenomenon 
that does not depend on people’s thoughts or conventions to exist, and thus can serve as 
a precursor of non-natural meaning without presupposing it. 
 But what is precisely  natural meaning? An influential way to deal with this 
question has been through the notion of environmental information (Floridi, 2011). 
According to Dretske (1981) a system carries information (i.e. environmental 
information or natural meaning) about another when there is a nomic relation between 
them, in the sense that  physical differences present in the former reliably covary with 
physical patterns of the latter7. So in a way analogous to natural meaning, a system is 
said to bear information about certain environmental property  when some property  of 
the system covaries or responds selectively  to stimuli with that environmental property. 
Importantly, environmental information is not restricted to natural systems but also 
applies to artefacts. For example, the mercury  column of a thermometer carries 
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7 The causal connection is important since it makes information compatible with the naturalist constraint 
that everything that exist must be engaged in causal interactions with other entities of the natural order. 
And reliability is important since it rules out accidental correlations. It might turn out that the only person 
that rings my bell is the postman, but that would not make the ring about the postman. The relation 
between the postman and the ring is accidental, and nothing ensures its reliability. Environmental 
information, instead, is reliably caused by the entities it bears information about. On its strongest form, 
this reliable relation is nomological, i.e. mediated by a natural law, however more modest forms of 
reliability have been proposed.
information about the temperature in the room, and the end of a compass needle carries 
information about where is the north magnetic pole.
 This is a fundamentally relational definition of information, where one system 
can be regarded as the source that generates the information and the other as the 
receiver of it. This connects with information theory  that  traditionally  defined 
information in quantitative terms as a measure of the reduction of possibilities, viz. 
when we got more information about a source we then become less uncertain about how 
the source is (Floridi, 2011). This is why Dretske (1981) also characterises the 
possession of information—such as that certain source is F—as the conditional 
probability  that the source being F is 1, thus excluding the possibility of the source 
being non-F.
 But as Dretske himself notes, information theory  thus understood is more 
concerned with the transmission and quantification of information but not with its 
content, let  alone with figuring out how information-bearing states could become 
symbols with representational properties. A natural suggestion that comes from CTM  is 
that there is a flow of information from the environment to cognitive systems, and that 
information can become symbolic representation through a process of encoding 
algorithmic processing that ends up with information packed in a format suitable for 
computation (see Dretske, 1981; Stalnaker, 1984; Fodor, 1987, for alternative proposals 
of how this process could take place). 
 This is not  the place to review the different informational approaches of 
representation. In this thesis I shall rather assume the basic framework of informational 
approaches (presented in more detail in chapters 3 & 4) and explore how different 
notions of symbolic representation could be distinguished by adopting different 
explanatory  levels. An important thing to note in this respect is that not all information-
processing systems need to have the capacity  to compute symbolic structures. Simple 
thermostats do not, for example (see chapters 3 and 4 for discussion). But furthermore, I 
shall argue that not all computers have the capacity to compute mental symbols. There 
are robots which can be described as genuine computers and autonomous information 
processing devices, even though these lack any form of mentality. But to discuss these 
topics we will have to wait until the next chapter. I will now finish this chapter by 
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explaining how behaviour can be explained from different explanatory levels, and in 
this way the mind be conceived as having multiple levels of organisation. 
1.4 Levels of Explanation and the Scientific Study of the Mind
 According to a standard conception (Glymour, 1999), scientific theories consist 
in a group  of predicates formulated in the vocabulary  of the respective science, that 
describe generalisations or law-like regularities concerning certain natural phenomenon. 
This is normally framed in terms of the deductive-nomological model of explanation, 
where explanations consist in subsumption of events under natural laws, and 
supplemented by  a causal account of explanation, which specifies the causal 
mechanisms that  contribute in bringing about the phenomena under study (Salmon, 
1989). Additionally, it has also become customary in science to study complex systems 
by appeal to multiple levels of analysis, each picking up natural domain. As Fodor and 
Pylyshyn (1988) observe:
It  seems certain that  the world has causal structure at  very many different levels of analysis, 
with the individuals recognized at  the lowest levels being, in general, very small and the 
individuals recognized at the highest levels being, in general, very large. Thus there is a 
scientific story to be told about quarks; and a scientific story to be told about  atoms; and a 
scientific story to be told about molecules .... ditto rocks and stones and rivers ... ditto 
galaxies. And the story that scientists tell about the causal structure that  the world has at  any 
one of these levels may be quite different from the story that they tell about  its causal 
structure at the next level up or down. (p.5)
 Each “story” corresponds to a scientific level of analysis, with its own 
explanatory  vocabulary and laws. In principle, explanations at each level are supposed 
to be autonomous because they  capture a genuine level or organisation in nature, which 
would be missed if described from lower levels. It is in this sense that psychology is an 
autonomous science, given that its functional characterisation of the mind can be 
formulated with rather independence from its physical constitution, as I explained in the 
previous sections. So according to the standard model of multiple levels of analysis, 
complex systems such as the mind are members of many natural domains, each 
describable from a particular explanatory level. Furthermore, levels are hierarchically 
structured, in the sense that the processes of each ascending level are being 
implemented or realised by the processes of the next level down (McClamrock, 1991).   
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 Since the advent  of cognitive revolution the mind has begun to be analysed in 
terms of levels of organisation (Marr, 1982; Pylyshyn, 1984; Sterelny, 1990). Though 
using different terminologies, theorists generally distinguish three levels of explanation 
for the mind. At the top there is a psychological level at which we describe the mental 
representations and reasoning processes that  cause behaviour. The next level down is 
the computational level, at which we specify the data-structures and computations that 
underlie mental processes, and at  the base we have a physical level which describes the 
mind directly  in terms its physical structure (I shall describe each level with more detail 
below). Behind this analysis of levels is the assumption that the mind can be studied by 
postulating internal functional states, that mediate between perception and action. Both 
the psychological and the computational levels adopt a functional characterisation of the 
mind, and thus formulate their explanations at a higher level of abstraction that is rather 
independent of the physical mechanisms that implement them. 
 This independence should not be overestimated, though. Each level is relatively  
autonomous in terms of their explanatory vocabularies and generalisations, but as 
previously  noted each describes a natural domain that depends on more fundamental 
domains to exist. So in the case of the mind, the domain described by the psychological 
level is realised by the domain of the computational level, and the computational 
domain is then realised by the physical domain. It is also important to note that  this 
ontology  of levels is compatible with a monist metaphysics as well as with the 
generality of physics as an account of the natural world. The fact that computational and 
psychological explanations treat their own explanatory domains by using concepts and 
generalisations that cannot be, or does not need to be, expressed by  the vocabulary of 
physics, is compatible with the generality of physics insofar as they  denote entities 
which have a physical constitution and its processes are not in conflict  with the 
principles of physics (Crane, 2001). 
1.4.1 The Psychological Level
 For both commonsensical and scientific psychology there is a level of 
explanation that applies to creatures endowed with minds, and describes them as 
rational thinkers capable of engaging in purposeful behaviour. Let us return to our 
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previous example of intelligent human behaviour. Peter is about to leave his house, he 
looks at the window and finds out that it is raining outside and then picks up an 
umbrella. A psychological explanation makes it intelligible why Peter acts in this way 
by ascribing to him mental states with the form of propositional attitudes, such as 
beliefs and desires, constrained by principles of rationality. This typically starts by 
attributing to him the desire to keep dry, beliefs about the environment acquired though 
perception (such as the belief that it is raining) and instrumental beliefs about how the 
desire might  be satisfied. In the present example, the psychological law that underlies 
Peter’s behaviour would be: if someone wants p and believes that by doing q he will get 
p, he will, ceteris paribus, do q (Haselager, 1997).  
 Since this sort of psychological explanation roughy resembles the way ordinary 
people interpret  and predict the behaviour of others it is often called commonsense or 
folk psychology. This association with ordinary talk has led some authors to consider 
psychology unscientific, by comparing it with other folk theories that are overtly  false, 
such as astrology (Churchland, 1979). This is not the place to enter the debate about the 
status of commonsense psychology, but it is important to note that the pairing between 
commonsense psychology and (scientific) psychology is not precise, though. 
Psychological explanations need not be strictly matched with the theorising ordinary 
people use to explain behaviour. The central idea appears to be that  psychology shares 
with commonsense psychology  some of its fundamental vocabulary  and principles. As 
Haselager (1997) says:
At a minimum, folk psychology is characterised by the use of a vocabulary in which 
mentalistic concepts like “belief”, “desire”, “fear”, “hope”, etc., might play a major part. As 
such, folk psychology plays a major part in scientific psychology. (p. 9).
 Therefore the way psychology uses mentalistic notions to explain behaviour 
does not need to conform the same formulas used by  the folk. The point is that 
mentalistic vocabulary is not eliminable if we want to capture generalisations. An 
example of mentalistic explanations grounded in scientific methodology has been put 
forward by Rey (1997). He argues that  there are some “standardised regularities” that 
can objectively be found in the results exhibited by common standardised tests of 
mental abilities. Those regularities correspond to patterns of response (e.g. marks in a 
paper) common among millions of answer sheets for those tests. Rey  argues that there is 
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no alternative way to account for the objective fact  of those regularities in the way 
people respond to those tests if our explanations are not  couched in terms of people’s 
seeing and understanding the questions in the sheets, representing the sentences in a 
certain way, believing that some answers are correct, having the desire to respond them 
correctly, and so on. Therefore, and following scientific realism, the use of mentalistic 
explanations in psychological level explanations is then vindicated due to their 
explanatory and predictive power.
 As must be apparent at this point, I am taking for granted that psychology—
understood as the scientific study of the mind and behaviour of minded agents—is 
possible. So in the following I shall assume that there is a higher-level explanation of 
the behaviour of minded agents, which is characteristically psychological in the sense 
described above, and that  can support law-like, counterfactually supporting, 
generalisations.
1.4.2 The Computational Level
 Explanations framed at a computational level are at the very heart of the 
scientific study of the mind after the cognitive revolution (see 1.1.2 for this term). The 
basic idea is that beneath psychological-level explanations, there is an intricate level of 
symbolic structures and computational processing that implements the mentalistic 
capacities described by the level above. For example, when we describe Peter as 
looking through the window and generating the belief that it is raining outside, we are 
omitting many details about how the cognitive capacities perform that job. Let us focus 
on visual perception. When someone perceives an object, psychological explanations 
say that she can represent it, often consciously, and think about its properties and 
relations. But at a deeper level of description, the starting point is not  the perception of 
the object as such but a complex process that starts from the encoding of information 
about the light reflected by  the object  on the retina, and a series of transformations 
carried out over that information. Marr (1982) was one of the first researches to focus 
on the computational processes that underlie perception. He offers a glimpse to his 
account in the following passage:
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First, suitable representations are obtained of the changes and structures in the image. This 
involves things like the detection of intensity changes, the representation and analysis of 
local geometrical structure, and the detection of illuminating effects like light sources, 
highlights, and transparency. The result of this first  stage is a representation called the primal 
sketch. Second, a number of processes operate on the primal sketch to derive a representation
—still retinocentric—of the geometry of the visible surfaces. This second representation, that 
of the visible surfaces, is called the 2! dimensional (2!-D) sketch. Both the primal sketch 
and the 2!-D sketch are constructed in a viewer-centered coordinate frame, and this is the 
aspect of their structures denoted by the term sketch. (p. 42)
 The transition between one of the representational stages to another is mediated 
by computational processes, that transform informational structures into increasingly 
complex representations of aspects of the visual array such as blobs (closed curves), 
zero-crossings (changes in light intensity), boundaries, etc. At the end of this process 
the system is able to integrate this information and construct a 3-D representation of an 
object in the environment. Marr proposed that in order to understand these complex 
processes it was important to focus on a computational level of description devoted to 
specifying the representational structures and the algorithms involved (he in fact calls 
this level algorithmic).
 An important aspect  of computational explanations is that they usually work by 
decomposing mental capacities into a series of subsystems or interconnected 
components that carry  out more specific algorithmic processes and contribute to the 
functioning of the system as a whole (Dennett, 1979; Lycan, 1995). According to CTM 
those subsystems are also often regarded as modular, in the sense that their 
computational operations run in relative isolation from other subsystems (Fodor, 1983). 
These characteristics of the computational level show why it constitutes a distinctive 
level of description situated below explanations about  the behaviour of a person as a 
whole, which is why it is sometimes called the subpersonal level (see chapter 7 for a 
detailed account of this term). So for example, instead of focusing on an object a person 
perceives and the impact it has on its behaviour, a computational explanation goes deep 
into a functional analysis of the different computational stages that make possible the 
perception of an object in the first place. Illustrative of the distinctiveness of the 
computational level is the nature of its symbolic structures. While psychological mental 
symbols normally denote objects or properties that are familiar to commonsense (e.g. an 
apple, or the colour red), the symbols that figure in computational level explanations are 
26
rather disparate. For example, symbols processed at the stage of primal sketch are what 
Marr calls zero-crossings, which carry information about discontinuity in image 
brightness. These symbols are part  of the coding of multiple information about the 
visual array that in further stages will give form to a mental symbol with (what we 
might call) full-fledged representational content8.
 But this last point can also help us to see that the computational and 
psychological levels also have a common inferential and symbolic nature. In both cases, 
computational explanations can be formulated, and the appeal to symbolic structures is 
mandatory. For this reason, it  seems appropriate to call both levels “cognitive”. 
However, as suggested in the previous paragraphs, it is scientifically useful to 
characterise the computational level as a level of description distinct form the 
psychological level, given its analysis in terms of subsystems and the disparate nature of 
its symbolic structures (I will delve into the distinction between both levels in the last 
chapter of this thesis). Furthermore, in the following chapter I will argue that an 
additional reason for keeping computational explanations separate is that they map onto 
a distinctive natural domain which is independent from the psychological.  
1.4.3 The Physical Level
 Physical-level explanations of behaviour are formulated in terms of the physical 
sciences broadly conceived, encompassing not just physics but also sciences such as 
biology  and neuroscience. They characteristically describe the causal events that 
underlie behaviour by appeal to their physical properties. It is important to note that in 
principle any behaviour can be described by appeal to the physical level, insofar as 
every  causal event in nature involves physical structures. However, as noted above 
when describing the behaviour of some complex agents there are generalisations that 
correspond to arbitrarily  large disjunctions of physical structures. They are thus couched 
in a functional vocabulary that  quantifies over multiple physical descriptions, as 
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8 Some authors have found it appropriate to characterise the content of some computational states as non-
conceptual as a way to account for their difference with the content of paradigmatic mental states such as 
beliefs (Bermúdez, 1995; Stalnaker,  2003). Even though I prefer to stay neutral about the conceptual/non-
conceptual debate, it should be noted that what motivates those authors to make that distinction is the 
same as mine for singling out the symbolic structures described by the computational level, namely, to 
determine whether (at least some of) those structures have a different nature than mental symbols.
happens with computational and psychological level explanations. Overall, we have 
complex agents such as human beings whose behaviour can be analysed in terms of 
different levels of organisation, each adequate for capturing generalisations that would 
otherwise be missed from the viewpoint of the other levels.
 In some agents, though, their behaviours can be straightforwardly explained by 
the physical level without there being any justification for ascribing computational or 
psychological states of any  sort. A straightforward example can be seen in reflexive 
behaviours. For example, when some animals are exposed to an abrupt, intense sound, 
they  respond with a contraction of skeletal and facial muscles known as startle reflex. 
The basic neural circuit underlying this reflex has been well studied in rats, and consists 
of four synapses running from the auditory  nerve to a spinal motor neurone (Swerdlow, 
Caine, Braff & Geyer, 1992). A physical explanation attempts to describe this sequence 
of causal interactions with more or less detail about the physicochemical processes 
involved. It is worth noting that reflexive behaviours can be quite elaborated and 
comprise a chain of automatic responses rather than a single reflexive reaction. They are 
sometimes called fixed action patterns and like simple reflexes are characteristically 
innately constrained and invariable.
 A second form of behavioural explanation that does not require going beyond the 
physical level corresponds to associative conditioning, whether classical or 
instrumental. Take for example a simple form of conditioning called habituation that  has 
been extensively  studied in a sea slug called Aplysia. A tactile stimulus to the siphon of 
this animal (a tubular structure on the dorsal surface of the animal) normally causes a 
withdrawal effect of the siphon and gill. After repeated stimulation of the siphon, this 
response shows a decrement known as habituation. Significant progress has been made 
in elucidating the neural and molecular mechanisms underlying the habituated response 
of Aplysia (Byrne, 1990). After repeated stimulation of the siphon, its sensory neurones 
release progressively less neurotransmitter to their presynaptic terminals, due to internal 
molecular changes. This results in a less activation of the motor neurones and a 
diminished motor response. But beyond the case of habituation, the neuronal 
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mechanisms that underlie associative conditioning are well understood and can be 
spelled out in proper physical level terms9 (see e.g. Hawkins & Kandel, 1984).
 An important thing to remark is that physical level explanations sometimes 
suffice by themselves to account for behaviour, and no better explanation couched in 
computational or psychological levels is justified. For instance, the habituation response 
of Aplysia consists on single cells that diminish their neurotransmitter release to motor 
neurones, and there is no place for a mapping of abstract properties of the environment 
to generate symbolic structures, and less for the instantiation of fundamental 
computational operations such as storing of transforming symbols. As I will explain 
with more detail in the next chapter, computational-level explanations (and so 
psychological-level  explanations as well) are typically flexible and adaptable, and 
cannot be spelled out in terms of reactions to physical properties of the stimulus or 
direct associations between stimuli and responses. 
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9 Gallistel has made a case against explanations of learning based on associative conditioning by arguing 
that they can be better formulated by appeal to symbolic structures and computation (see e.g. Gallistel & 
Gibbon, 2001). This is because some learning behaviour exhibits complex features (such as time scale 
invariance) that do not fit into the framework of associative conditioning but are naturally described from 
a computational viewpoint. For present purposes, it should be noted that Gallistel’s proposal is 
compatible with the ideas discussed in this section. All it would imply is that some behaviours previously 
explained just by the physical level (because they involve associative learning) should be explained by 
the computational level.
Chapter Two 
The Autonomy of the Computational Domain
2.0 Introduction
 In the present chapter I argue that the computational level of explanation picks 
up an autonomous natural domain: a domain of computation and information processing 
that is common to many computing systems but is autonomous from the domain of 
psychology. This has important consequences for the purposes of drawing a line 
between minded and non-minded agents. One is that many authors who defend the 
mental capacities of animals indulge in unnecessary ascription of mentality to some 
animals (e.g. insects) on the main grounds that they possess certain complex 
computational capacities. I contend that these authors overlook the autonomy of the 
computational domain, and fall into the false dilemma of assuming that behaviour has to 
be explained either from the physical or the psychological level. Instead, I propose that 
it is possible to conceive some animals as, say, marvelous biological computers without 
having to ascribe mentality to them.
 A second consequence I draw from the claim that the computational domain is 
autonomous will be matter for the remainder of this thesis, but it is worth mentioning at 
this point. It is that given that we have a mind by virtue of being some kind of computer, 
while it is possible to conceive some animals as non-minded computers, we can wonder 
what is special about us, such that we have mentality  while other computing animals do 
not. This opens the negative side of my thesis, where I critically review—through 
chapters 3 to 6—recent literature exploring the line that divides computational agents 
with and without mentality, until we get to the last  chapter where I put forward my own 
proposal.
30
2.1 The Reality of the Computational Domain
 Cognitive science normally takes the computational level to be central for 
understanding the behaviour of mental creatures. However, to some extent it is the least 
intuitive of the three levels of behavioural explanation I presented in the previous 
chapter. The physical level describes behaviour by appeal to the physical constitution of 
the brain in a way that  is not substantially different from physiological explanations of 
the functioning of other parts of the body. The psychological level, for its part, explains 
behaviour in terms that do not differ much from the vocabulary  of commonsense 
psychology. But with regard to computational explanations, they are couched in a 
vocabulary and describe generations in a way  far less familiar to commonsense. This is 
partly due to the fact that  they generally describe subpersonal processes not accessible 
to introspection and because they involve functional states that cannot be identified with 
physical structures of the brain. Moreover, sometimes it  is not clear under what 
circumstances a machine implements a computer, or what we have in common with 
them on this respect. For these reasons I devote most of this chapter to clarifying the 
nature of the computational domain.
 When we say  that an entity’s behaviour can be explained by the computational 
level we basically mean that it is a computer. But  what precisely is a computer? On first 
consideration, a computation is just a functional mapping between two domains (e.g. 
inputs and outputs). From this basic definition, however, computations are being 
realised in every entity whose behaviour can be described by appeal to mathematical 
function. For example, a planet would be computing its orbit, or an enzyme the 
chemical reaction it is catalysing. It soon becomes clear that in this broad sense a 
computation is nothing beyond physical-level descriptions that use mathematical 
models to explain their phenomena. As Crane (1995) points out, in cases like this we 
might describe the planet and the enzyme as instantiating mathematical functions, but 
not as computing them. To be a computer is, then, a more demanding notion.
 As I mentioned in the last chapter, a more precise definition of computing 
system was put forward by  Turing (1937) and later on synthesised by Newell & Simon 
(1981). They claim that (digital) computers are symbolic and universal. They are 
symbolic because computations act upon symbolic structures that can be interpreted as 
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bearing reference relations to something else. And computers are universal machines in 
the sense that they perform some basic set of fundamental operations10  (such as 
encoding, storing, deleting and transforming symbolic structures) required for 
computing any algorithm (see 1.2.2). This is not to say that any actual computer has to 
be a multi-purpose system, though. The point is just that it must have an internal 
structure that is flexible enough to be in principle programmed to run different 
algorithmic procedures (cf. Haugeland, 1981; Copeland, 1993; Pylyshyn, 1984).
 Some authors have challenged the idea that computational level explanations 
map onto a real and objective domain we can find in nature, and claimed that 
computation is essentially an observer-dependent phenomenon. I address two ways of 
posing this critique and present replies to them. In this way I hope to strengthen my 
positive claim that computing systems constitute a genuine and autonomous natural 
phenomenon.
2.1.1. Objection 1: Computation is not a Real Property of Entities
 In a series of writings, John Searle (1990, 1992) has attacked the metaphysical 
status of the computational domain. He starts by  stating that computational patterns can 
in principle be found in almost any physical entity. For example, Searle (1992) writes:
Thus for example the wall behind my back is right now implementing the Wordstar program, 
because there is some pattern of molecule movements that  is isomorphic with the formal 
structure of Wordstar. But if the wall is implementing Worldstar, then if it  is a big enough 
wall it  is implementing any program, including any program implemented in the brain. (p. 
208).
 The argument takes the form of a reductio ad absurdum: if something as simple 
and crude as a wall has the capacity to implement a computational program, then the 
ascription of computational states becomes trivial and uninteresting. In some passages 
Searle (1990) makes the stronger claim that even the programs (if any) run by the brain 
could be implemented in any physical entity given enough “free hand” for selecting the 
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10  Note that the list of fundamental operations can be flexible, given that different combinations of 
fundamental operations can be equivalent in terms of their capability to compute any algorithm. So, for 
example, two computing machines might carry out the same task by employing alternative sets of 
fundamental operations. See Copeland (1993, ch. 4) for discussion.
events in that entity that match the corresponding computational patterns stated by the 
program, since “such patterns are everywhere” (p. 636). Clearly  if any program is 
actually being implemented in any physical entity, the claim that  computation is an 
objective natural phenomenon becomes implausible. 
 Thus formulated, Searle’s argument is unconvincing for many reasons. First, he 
certainly overestimates the capacity  of a wall to implement a computational program. 
Consider Searle’s own example of Wordstar. This is a program—popular in the eighties
—that in some versions consists in around 137.000 lines of code. Now we might ask, on 
what grounds does Searle make his claim that an ordinary wall, even a very big one, 
could possibly  be capable of implementing 137.000 lines of a program? As Haugeland 
(2003) points out, to plausibly claim that some entity has certain program encoded or 
inscribed in it there must be some way, at least in principle, of reading or extracting the 
program from that entity. For example, if Wordstar is “inscribed” in a magnetic disc or a 
compact disc, there would be technological devices capable of recovering the program 
from those discs. But could any device, a “wall-reader” say, possibly recover precisely 
the 137.000 lines of code of Wordstar from Searle’s wall? It is certainly implausible to 
say that this is so and therefore the claim that a wall or any entity can implement any 
program is false.
 A second reason why Searle’s argument is flawed is that a computing system is 
not just a program. To see this point recall the definition of computation I gave in the 
last section. A genuine computing system has to be able to instantiate a universal 
machine and perform computational operations over symbolic structures. Therefore, a 
program instantiated by a computer is not a static script of instructions but a causal 
mapping of transition states that run according to those instructions. It  is not clear how 
the molecules of a wall, even a very big one, could ever have the causal structure 
required for mirroring the dynamics of the transition states of a program. 
 A possible rejoinder to this critique can be extracted from Putnam (1988) who, 
while putting forward an argument similar to Searle, argues that an ordinary object such 
as a wall is an open system in the sense of being affected by  external forces and 
therefore its internal structures are going through a series of changes over time. Since 
the evolution of such complex structures is dynamically changing over time, they could 
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then be described as the formal mapping between state transitions specified by a 
computational program such as Wordstar or any  other. But as Chalmers (1996) points 
out, this is still a deflationary account of what is to implement a computational program. 
The causal sequences performed by a computer are not rigid but flexible. Computers 
can perform operations such as storing, retrieving, transforming and generating new 
combinations of its inner components, and so have the potential to function in more than 
one way, something that the physical structure of a wall just lacks. Put in more precise 
terms, the causal sequence of state transitions run by a computer must support 
counterfactuals, that is, their inner structure must have a casual organisation that allows 
us to say  that if the system had been in a different state, it would had functioned in an 
interestingly different way. As Chalmers notes, only a small fraction of physical systems 
actually have the structural complexity required for implementing a computational 
program.
 Thus taken at face value, Searle’s critique rests on an overly simple notion of 
computation. But to be fair, Searle (1992) is aware of this and recognises that  after 
“tightening up our definition of computation” the problem of multiple realisability could 
vanish. He even outlines how that definition might be, pointing out that it  would 
emphasise the causal structure of the system, its programmability  and situatedness in the 
real world, therefore anticipating the response to his argument presented above. But 
Searle (1992) also unfolds a second argument: 
But  these further restrictions on the definition of computation are no help in the present 
discussion because the really deep problem is that  syntax is essentially an observer-relative 
notion. The multiple realizability of computationally equivalent  processes in different  media 
is not just  a sign that the processes are abstract, but  that  they are not  intrinsic to the system at 
all. They depend on an interpretation from outside. (p. 209, emphasis removed)
 The core of this second argument is that computation is not intrinsic to physics, 
in the sense that it is a property that finds no parallel in the physical structure of the 
world. Any attempt to characterise a physical entity  as having a computational structure 
is an observer-relative description that says nothing about what the entity intrinsically 
is. Searle (1992) compares, for example, the expression “computational program” with 
“chair” or “weed”, which arguably  “do not name intrinsic features of reality” but rather 
“name objects by specifying some feature that has been assigned to them, some feature 
that is relative to observers and users” (p. 211).
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 This point seems misguided, though, if we recall the notion of functional kind 
explained in the first  chapter. Contrary to chairs or pictures drawn in a paper, functional 
kinds correspond to abstract states that play a causal role in behaviour. Chairs and 
pictures do not enter into causal explanations by  virtue of being chairs and pictures, at 
least not in a way  independent of there being people capable of thinking about them. 
But more importantly, functional kinds are supposed to capture generalisations that are 
of scientific import and according to scientific realism this is what vindicates them as 
genuinely existing. Chairs and pictures on the other hand, do not take part in scientific 
predicates and the law-like regularities they describe.
 But Searle makes a further distinction that might evade that critique. For him, 
computers are functional systems in a way different from other functionally 
characterisable entities such as carburettors or digestive systems, since the latter but not 
the former are supposed to be linked with physical causes and effects. Computational 
processes, the argument goes, consist of purely abstract algorithms, similar to 
instructions written in a paper, which can only cause something as far as someone 
thinks of them as carrying out a certain job. Therefore, the same point is restated: 
computation is not an intrinsic property instantiated in the real world but an observer-
relative property that depends on people’s purposes and intentions.
 This argument works, however, only  for a purely  syntactical view of 
computation, one that characterises computing systems just in terms of the formal 
structure of the algorithms they perform (and which I will address later in 2.3.1). But as 
I explained in the previous chapter, this is only part of what makes something a 
computing system. Computers are embodied entities capable to enter into genuine 
causal commerce with their environments, and thus the internal symbolic structures that 
explain their behaviour have a physical dimension linked with causes and effects, which 
exist independently from observer-relative considerations. Therefore in this sense the 
functional description of a computational system is not so different from the description 
of a carburettor. In both cases we could have a functional description that abstracts from 
the particular context in which the system works, but that  description would not exhaust 
the nature of the system. I shall return to these ideas in section 2.3.
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2.1.1 Objection 2: The Computational Level is just an Interpretationist Stance
 A second objection to a realistic approach to the computational domain is also 
based on the assumption that the attribution of computational states is always observer-
dependent. However, the present objection recognises that computational states can play 
an important role in our explanations of behaviour and justifies their use for pragmatic 
reasons such as their predictive success. This view is often associated to 
interpretationist approaches regarding behavioural explanations and its most illustrious 
defender has been Daniel Dennett11. 
 For Dennett  (1979, 1987, 1991) what I call computational level corresponds to a 
system-design approach (or stance) to behavioural explanation that focuses on the 
computational mechanisms that underlie psychological capacities. This strategy, carried 
out mainly by artificial intelligence researchers, consists basically in successively 
breaking-down complex cognitive capacities into a set of simpler subcapacities until the 
algorithms performed by these subcapacities can be determined and then simulated in a 
computing machine (Dennett, 1979, p. 113). Dennett recommends the design stance as 
an insightful research programme capable of improving our understanding of how the 
mind works. But as I shall explain in more detail later, he regards this approach as an 
interpretative exercise where what is true about the system is the interpretational 
scheme in general but not its details. 
 Thus Dennett’s critique to a realistic approach to mental states can be also 
considered a critique to realistic approaches to the computational domain. But what 
distinguishes Dennett’s interpretativism from Searle’s scepticism about computation is 
that Dennett believes that the good predictive results obtained by computational 
explanations indicate that there is something true and objective about them, however he 
remains agnostic about the ultimate structure and contents of the computational states 
involved. Dennett (1991) defines his peculiar mixture of realism and interpretativism as 
a form of “mild realism”. Before going into his arguments, it  is pertinent to note that the 
present view is not uncommon among cognitive scientists. For instance, in the 
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11  This view should not be confounded with general scepticism about scientific truth. Interpretativist 
authors such as Dennett, do believe that science can reveal to us what is out there. His view can be better 
understood as a moderate scepticism about scientific explanations based on the ascription of abstract 
functional states and processes.
introduction to their textbook on computational neuroscience, Churchland and 
Sejnowski (1999) point out: 
[W]hether something is a computer has an interest-relative component, in the sense that  it 
depends on whether someone has an interest  in the device’s abstract  properties and in 
interpreting its states as representing states or something else. (p. 48)
 But at the same time, they recognise that a computational approach to the 
functions performed by the brain has an objective side, at least to the extent that
discovering what the function [performed by a system] is reveals something important and 
perhaps unexpected about the real nature of the device and how it works. (p. 49)
 The idea that a computational description reveals something about the inner 
mechanisms that underlie behaviour makes this view less radical than the eliminativism 
about computation championed by Searle. In other words, the interpretativist finds 
somewhat justified the ascription of computational states in an “as if” fashion for the 
purposes of interpreting behaviour. 
 At this point it is important to note that Dennett’s concerns about realistic 
ascriptions of cognitive states are most of the time directed to what I call psychological 
level (for Dennett intentional stance) explanations. He claims that even though belief-
desire explanations are in some sense real, they do not neatly map onto specific inner 
mental states or mechanisms. But as commented earlier, he extends his concerns to the 
system-design stance (viz. computational-level explanations) and there are common 
motivations behind his scepticism towards both computational and psychological 
ascriptions. More precisely, according to Dennett when we ascribe a mental or 
computational state to some entity we are saying that it is in certain sort of functionally 
characterised inner state, both in the sense of being defined by  its causal role within the 
system and in having teleology, i.e. a role in the performance of certain cognitive 
capacity. As such, mental and computational states involve the ascription of whole sets 
of background information, rules and goals. As Dennett (1979) notes:
One predicts behaviour in such a case by ascribing to the system the possession of certain 
information and supposing it  to be directed by certain goals, and then by working out the 
most reasonable or appropriate action on the basis of these ascriptions and suppositions. It is 
a small step to calling the information possessed the computer’s beliefs, its goals and 
subgoals its desires. What  I mean by saying a small step is that  the notion of information or 
misinformation is just as intentional a notion as that of belief. (pp. 6-7).
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 Then similar principles apply to both psychological (i.e. intentional) and 
computational level explanations, and moreover both imply “interpreting an entity by 
adopting the presupposition that it  is an approximation of the ideal of an optimally 
designed (i.e. rational) self-regarding agent” (Dennett, 1994, p. 239). This is because for 
Dennett the only way to make intelligible a functional capacity is by assuming that the 
system has been optimally  designed or disposed to perform that capacity. And this 
appeal to optimality  amounts to idealisation: we have to assume that the system has 
been optimally  designed to fulfil its role and that it is operating under optimal 
conditions. The main reason for adopting this approach is, according to Dennett (1987), 
pragmatic. In his words:
The fact  that an object can be reliably expected to approximate optimality (or rationality) 
may be a deeper and more valuable fact  than any obtainable from a standpoint  of greater 
realism and detail. (p. 79)
 But this appeal to optimality is very  puzzling. Certainly the assumption of 
optimal design would reveal deeper and valuable information about human cognitive 
capacities if they really were optimal, but as Stich (1981) notes, this is just not the case. 
Breakdowns and shortcomings in human cognitive performances are common. People 
often perform below standards of full rationality  on psychological tasks, and this is not 
attributable to a lack of cognitive capacities to perform those tasks, but to the fact that 
human capacities are sub-optimal. Let me explain with an example from computational-
level explanations. 
 Wasps have complex navigational abilities that make them capable of foraging 
over long distances and then finding their way home. In order to orientate themselves, 
wasps can memorise visual properties of landmarks present  near their nests and during 
their displacements and rely  on them to determine the direction of their flight back. In 
addition, wasps can also navigate by keeping record of the distance and direction 
travelled, through a process known as path integration. They appear to shift  to this 
second mode of navigation when landmarks are not available, as for example when 
flying in unfamiliar terrain (Healy, 1998). If we adopt a design stance, we could 
describe the wasp’s path integration system as a computational device with the function 
of orienting the insect towards food and then back to its hive. Now, suppose we are 
adopting Dennett’s interpretationist approach to explain the behaviour of a wasp that 
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soon after departing starts to fly in apparently  random directions and never gets back to 
the hive. Since we would be assuming that the navigation system of the wasp has an 
optimal design, we would be unable to keep ascribing that system to the insect and have 
instead to find some other optimal system that could explain its behaviour or just 
assume that it is random and deserves no explanation at all. But it certainly would be 
more natural to suppose that the wasp does have a navigation system, but that it simply 
got lost. The navigational system might have malfunctioned, or perhaps have a less than 
optimal design, but this is no reason for denying its existence. 
 The same idea can be extended to almost all cognitive functions, since it seems 
likely that they are almost never optimally designed, in particular if we look at their 
evolutionary  origins. The selective processes that explain their design show that in order 
to be evolved by natural selection functional systems need not necessarily  be optimal, 
even not very efficient or precise. All they need to get  passed through generations is that 
they  make their possessors better adapted to their environment than their local 
competitors. Therefore Dennett’s strategy  of assuming that cognitive functions are 
(approximately) optimal would lead us to either deny that entities have functions or to 
impose multiple post-hoc amendments to ensure that our interpretation of the behaviour 
fits some notion of optimal function. But even if we take the design stance as a kind of 
heuristic strategy for guiding our study into the sub-systems or an entity, it would 
clearly  lead us nowhere in our attempt to reveal the real nature of the functional systems 
under study.
 However, Dennett (1987) puts forward another reason for sticking to optimality 
which derives from an arguably  unavoidable degree of indeterminacy in our behavioural 
explanations. According to him, when scientific theories deal with abstract theoretical 
states and processes, possible explanations are underdetermined by  the observational 
data. In the case of explaining behaviour, an indefinite number of alternative 
computational or intentional interpretative schemes may be equally compatible with the 
behaviour under study, but without sufficient empirical grounds to prevail over the 
others. And note that  this lack of objective evidence becomes more critical for the case 
of animals, were we do not have the data from introspection that, arguably, provides 
humans with additional evidence about their internal workings.
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 Nonetheless, it is not  clear that indeterminacy is unavoidable. As it is customary 
in any science that deals with abstract entities, it  is possible to formulate hypotheses 
about possible states and processes that cause behaviour and to test them empirically. 
Indeterminacy can then in principle be reduced in so far as we collect adequate and 
enough empirical data. To illustrate this idea let us return to the example of insect 
navigation, this time focused on honeybees. There is strong evidence that honeybees are 
capable of navigating long distances and rarely get lost  in their way, and also that they 
can communicate the others about the location of rich sources of food (Menzel et al., 
2000). Imagine we are studying their navigational capacities and thus we are interested 
in the information and algorithms involved in their computational operations. From the 
viewpoint of the interpretativist, though, due to her characteristic pessimism about 
finding out reliable details about inner states we would have to stick to a broad 
functional characterisation, perhaps adding some intentional qualities such as beliefs 
about landmarks in the environment and desires about reaching sources of pollen, etc. 
But at the end we would not be able to say much about the inner states of the insect. 
 However, careful observation of the behaviour of honeybees has provided 
researchers with enough evidence for supporting hypothesis about the inner states of 
those insects. For example, it is well known which sorts of information of the 
environment are transmitted by the different movements of their dance, and thanks to 
the use of harmonic radar it has become possible to track the flying-paths of individual 
bees (Menzel et al., 2005). Then it would come as no surprise that the kinds of 
information being processed and the algorithms that control the navigation of the 
honeybees are gradually discovered and that  progress is made in the understanding of 
their navigational systems. On the contrary, it  is hard to see how the instrumentalist 
could make a good job predicting behaviour just remaining neutral about which 
computational processes are going on inside the insect.
 These examples illustrate how the internal states and processes the govern 
behaviour are relevant and that the more precise we get into its details, the more 
accurate predictions we will obtain (cf. Rey, 1997; Carruthers, 2004). And even if it we 
concede to the instrumentalist that sometimes a certain degree of indeterminacy cannot 
be completely ruled out, this would be preferable over the massive amount of 
indeterminacy  proclaimed by  the interpretativist, indeterminacy that leads them to 
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refrain from ascribing any particular internal state to organisms. This would make 
impossible to identify  patterns of internal states that could be generalised among 
individuals, challenging the very possibility of a scientific explanation of complex 
behaviour. And this is, arguably, too high a price to pay for embracing this position (cf. 
Margolis & Laurence, 2007).
2.2 The False Dilemma
 Before the advent of cognitive science, standard forms of explanation for animal 
behaviour came from what I have called the physical level, viz. reflexes, fixed action 
patterns and associative conditioning. But since cognitive science emerged philosophers 
and cognitive ethologists have become optimistic about the prospects of ascribing 
internal functional states to animals (e.g. Fodor, 1975; Gallistel, 1990). This has also 
been encouraged by  ethological studies that show that many animals appear to possess 
complex computational capacities. 
 A good case-study of this shift of perspective comes again from the behaviour of 
the wasp. As many insect behaviour, the wasp’s was generally considered the result of 
fixed action patterns or at best basic forms of associative conditioning. For example, 
when it comes to lay its eggs the digger wasp Sphex brings food to its burrow nest, 
leaves the food near its opening, and proceeds to check inside the burrow for the 
presence of intruders. If nothing is found disturbed, then the wasp  emerges from its 
burrow and drags in the food. Interestingly, if an experimenter moves the food while the 
wasp  is still inside the burrow, it will invariably  repeat the same routine of leaving the 
food near the burrow and going into it for inspection. This procedure can be repeated 
again and again, without the wasp altering its behaviour (Wooldridge, 1971). 
 The example of the digger wasp is often put forward as a case of a rigid, 
stereotyped behaviour, that does not deserve to be explained in psychological terms 
(e.g. Dennett, 1984; Sterelny, 1990). However, recently some philosophers have argued 
that some insects such as bees and ants do have mentality, on the basis that they exhibit 
behaviours that are much more complex and flexible than the one observed in the digger 
wasp  (Carruthers, 2004a, 2006; Fitzpatrick. 2008). Indeed, as I mentioned in the last 
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section even the wasp itself has been described as possessing complex navigation 
systems such as path integration that demand a computational explanation. In sum, it 
has been argued that some behaviours of insects have to be explained by appeal to 
capacities of computation and information processing that far outstrip fixed innate 
patterns or associative conditioning. Therefore, the argument goes, we are justified in 
shifting to psychological explanations and in ascribing  mentality to those insects.
 As a consequence, it has become common for cognitive ethologists to use the 
psychological level to account for those complex behaviours, often behind the 
assumption that without the availability of mental vocabulary they would be left without 
alternative ways of explaining them (Jamieson & Beckoff, 1996). Staying with the case 
of insects, the argument put forward to ascribe mentality to them normally takes the 
following form:
P1: We are justified in placing animals within the psychological domain iff their behaviours 
 cannot be best explained in terms of other explanatory domains
P2: Certain behaviours of insects cannot be best explained in terms of the physical domain
__________________________________________________________________________
C: Insects that exhibit those behaviours can be placed within the psychological domain
 Let me briefly  comment the premises. P1 is an assumption about the epistemic 
grounds that justify  the description of animal behaviour in terms of certain explanatory 
domain. It states the common idea that the same animal behaviour can normally  be 
explained at different levels, but that we should only  adopt a positive epistemic attitude 
towards those explanations that are better than the others. How to precisely  spell out 
what makes an explanation better than another is not an easy  task, but most cognitive 
ethologists agree in that best  explanations are those that have more explanatory 
coverage and predictive power (Allen & Beckoff, 1997).
 P2 is a consequence of the well-established fact that some insect behaviour is far 
too complex to be explained at only the physical level. The most common example are 
their already  mentioned navigational abilities to which I shall return in section 2.4. 
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Others are communication and non-associative forms of learning (Gallistel, 1990; 
Carruthers, 2006). But even if we take both P1 and P2 as true, the argument is not sound 
insofar as it has a hidden premise, which I shall argue is false. It is the following:
P3: The physical domain is the only alternative to the psychological domain to explain 
animal behaviour
 By omitting this premise theorists have implicitly assumed that the behaviour of 
animals has to be described by using either of two explanatory levels: the physical or 
the psychological. But this is a false dilemma, since it ignores one alternative 
explanatory  level, viz. the one that describes the computational domain. To support this 
claim, though, it has to be argued that  computational level explanations are autonomous, 
which will be the task for the remainder of this chapter.
2.3 The Autonomy of the Computational Domain
 So far I have argued that the computational domain is a real, objective part of the 
natural order. As a consequence, it should be considered an alternative explanatory 
domain, on pain of falling into the false dilemma explained above. A possible rejoinder 
to this, however, is that the computational domain is only  instantiated when the 
psychological domain appears. That is, genuine computation is a mental phenomenon, 
and therefore any computation in the world either happens in entities with a mind or is 
derivative from them. In this section I will argue that this is wrong, and that 
computational level explanations pick up  a natural domain that supervenes on the 
physical domain, but is not dependent on the psychological domain. The key argument 
is that it is at least possible to conceive entities whose behaviour can be satisfactorily 
explained in terms of computational processing over symbolic structures, while there is 
no reason for adding psychological notions to explain them. Therefore, the 
computational level can be regarded as autonomous from other explanatory levels. But 
before arguing for the autonomy of the computational domain some words are in order 
on what is been understood by autonomy and computer. Below I address them in turn.
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 Autonomy is certainly  a thorny philosophical notion and a full discussion of its 
meaning goes beyond the purposes of this thesis, however it  shall be useful to set forth a 
basic idea of what is an autonomous agent. First, an autonomous agent is one that is 
self-governed in the sense that its behaviour results from the intrinsic character of the 
system12. This is a sense of autonomy commonly  used in artificial intelligence, where 
typical examples of autonomous agents are mobile robots that can navigate and execute 
their own actions, as opposed to teleoperated robots that are remotely controlled by a 
human operator (e.g. Brooks, 1991). Given that we are interested in entities that behave 
as part of the natural order, another important aspect  of autonomy is embodiment. 
Embodied organisms are supposed to cope with, and perform tasks effectively in, 
physical (real) environments. A more precise definition of embodied autonomy is given 
by Franklin and Graesser (1996) who claim that “an autonomous agent is a system 
situated within and as part of an environment that senses that environment and acts on 
it, over time, in pursuit of its own agenda and so as to effect what it  senses in the 
future” (p. 31). Therefore disembodied entities, such as virtual agents that figure in 
computational simulations, or physical entities the inputs and outputs of which are 
highly  dependent on human operators, would not count as autonomous in the present 
context. 
 As Franklin and Graesser note, this definition of an embodied autonomous agent 
is not  very  restrictive since it would include simple artefacts such as a thermostat. 
Indeed, some authors have characterised autonomy more strongly  by adding 
requirements that are characteristic of living creatures, such as self-organisation and 
self-regulation. For instance, Smithers (1997) claims that “autonomous systems must 
have some means of forming their own laws of regulation as well as the means to 
regulate their behavior with respect to them” (p. 94). This capacity of “self law-making” 
can be found in creatures that can adjust their responses according to their interaction 
with their environment, as is the case of learning13 . A complex issue that emerges at this 
point is whether life is a necessary condition for autonomy. Boden (2001) convincingly 
contends that this is not the case, for even though autonomy appears to be essential for 
life, it is at the same time a more fundamental notion. Nothing in principle prevents 
44
12 The point can indeed be viewed as a restatement of the notion of behaviour defined in section 1.1, viz. 
as the sort of activity that is primarily caused by some internal factors of the agent who is behaving.
13 The proposal of Dretske discussed in chapter 4 below can be interpreted along these lines.
some non-biological creatures from being autonomous insofar as they  govern and 
regulate themselves, and even evolve.
 Regarding the notion of computer (see 1.2), a crucial aspect of a computer is that 
it is a universal machine in the sense explained in 1.2.2 and 2.1. This universality 
constraint rules out all those entities that process information in a fixed functional 
architecture that  lacks the computational resources for performing the set  of 
fundamental computational operations required to run a program. For example, the first 
electronic calculators developed in the 1960s have in-built  logic circuits that can 
perform basic arithmetic operations, however they  are incapable of manipulating inner 
symbolic structures in a flexible way or of transforming them. As a consequence, even 
though those calculators can perform computation in the sense of doing functional 
mappings between their inputs and outputs, they  are not computers since they cannot be 
programmed to run a different algorithm. Genuine computers have the capacity  to 
perform a fundamental set  of operations such as having branching points in their 
sequence of states that allow them to jump onto alternative sequences of symbol 
manipulation.
 So if we agree that there is a more or less clear distinction between agents that 
are computers and those that are not, then we have that the computational level maps 
onto a natural domain, a domain of computation and information processing that is 
common to some computers. But can we say that this domain is also independent from 
the domain of mental agents? I believe the response is yes, and that the most 
straightforward way  of arguing for this is by showing that some entities can be 
considered genuine computers and that at  the same time there is no justification for 
ascribing minds to them. Let me elaborate this idea with an example.
 In the last chapter I explained that computers can mirror the inferential structure 
of mental processes and in this way exhibit what is one of the hallmarks of mentality. 
Besides, computers can be embodied creatures, equipped with transducers to pick up 
information from their environments and the algorithms required for processing that 
information in a way that leads to intelligent action. In those cases, I argue, it  is 
plausible to ascribe to a computer at least basic forms of symbolic algorithmic 
processing. A straightforward example of this are robotic computing machines that can 
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behave in natural environments without any help. Take the case of the two robotic 
rovers that are now exploring the surface of Mars (i.e. Opportunity and Curiosity). 
Among their multiple capacities are autonomous navigation, thermoregulation, and the 
capacity to collect detailed geological information from the planet and transmit it to the 
earth14. It appears highly  intuitive to say that these vehicles are fairly  intelligent 
computing machines, even though they lack mentality. But in any case, and this is the 
main point, they  exemplify how computational-level explanations can be autonomous, 
for in order to explain how the robot behaves in such a desolated place we have to 
appeal to the syntactic and symbolic components of its computational architecture. I 
will return to the case of these robotic rovers in the following sections when addressing 
objections to the idea that the computational domain is autonomous.
2.3.1 Objection 1: The Computational Level is just Syntax
 This first objection directly challenges the autonomy of the computational 
domain. It claims that when cognitive scientists describe the mind from the 
computational level they are not picking out any domain distinct  from the psychological 
domain. Instead, computational explanations are regarded as nothing beyond a formal 
characterisation, or a syntactic description, of the computational operations carried out 
by mental agents (Fodor, 1980; Egan, 1995). According to this objection the 
computational level describes the manipulation of symbolic structures, but from a 
perspective that focuses on their formal or syntactic properties, not their 
representational or informational properties. Therefore, the objection goes, the 
computational level does not describe any  particular ontological level of organisation 
but just “provides a formal, environment-independent, characterisation of a process”. 
(Egan, 1995, p. 199).
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14 Of course, the Mars rovers receive instructions from earth. But since those instructions take some time 
to reach the rover,  they are designed to carry out many tasks in a rather autonomous way, such as self-
monitoring, navigating and making some decisions without human intervention.
 One motivation15  behind this position is the formality condition, the view that 
computational explanations of the behaviour of mental agents can only  advert  to formal 
(nonrepresentational) properties of symbolic structures (Fodor, 1980). Given that 
psychological explanations do deploy mental symbols with representational properties, 
a consequence of the formality condition is that the computational domain can only be 
partially realised by the psychological domain, in particular that “syntactic processes at 
the computational level implement causal laws [situated] at  the intentional 
[psychological] level” (Fodor, 1991, p. 280), while the symbolic structures at  the 
computational level just cannot implement the representational properties of the 
psychological level. If this is the case, then the computational level cannot map  onto a 
separate—autonomous—domain in a hierarchy of supervenient levels of explanation.
 I believe the formality condition is too restrictive, though, and that 
computational-level explanations should do without it. First, this condition rests on an 
incomplete characterisation of computing systems, one that focuses on their syntactic 
architecture but abstracts from their behaviour as embodied agents in the real world. 
This distinction can be made clearer by reflecting on the idea that computers are 
universal machines. On the one hand, a computer has the potential to, in principle, run 
any algorithm, and on the other, a single algorithm can be used for performing many 
tasks (in the same sense as a single algebraic operation can be used for different 
purposes). However, when an algorithm is implemented in concrete computers 
instantiated in the real world, computational-level explanations do not describe them as 
abstract, universal formulas, but as inferential procedures engaged in genuine causal 
commerce with the environment. This factual, situated dimension of computational 
explanations makes algorithms something more than a formal abstraction. Even if two 
computers are running the same algorithm considered from a formal viewpoint, 
computational explanations of their behaviour might differ insofar as the information 
they process and the tasks they perform are different. 
 Secondly, it  should be noted that computational-level explanations do not lack 
the resources to account for the representational dimension of symbolic structures. As 
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15 A second motivation can be internalism,  the view that representational notions cannot play any genuine 
role in a scientific psychology (Kim, 1982; Stich, 1983). But for the purposes of this thesis—and in 
accordance to the background I set forth in the previous chapter—I assume externalism, according to 
which it is plausible to formulate psychological explanations that advert to representational contents.
explained in the previous chapter, informational approaches to representation can 
provide a framework for doing so. The basic idea is that computational symbols are 
information-bearing structures, and computational-level explanations normally deal 
with the coding and transformation of those structures. These computational processes 
are typically  subpersonal, that is, they  underlie psychological (belief-desire) 
explanations. So if information is an objective commodity that can be picked up from 
the environment, coded and transmitted through subpersonal—computational-level—
explanations, then there is nothing mysterious in assuming that computational symbols 
do possess contents (although distinct from the contents of mental symbols couched at 
the next level “up”, viz. the psychological level). In chapter 7, when spelling out the 
distinction between personal and subpersonal levels of explanation, I shall return to this 
point.
 Another motivation for conceiving the computational level as a distinct, 
autonomous level of description, is that  without it we would be left with no theoretical 
resources to explain the behaviour of non-mental computing agents. The existence of 
autonomous computing robots capable of engaging in informational transactions with 
their environment and behaving effectively on it, is undeniable. But if, as the view 
presented above contends, the computational level is just a formal description of the 
syntax of psychological processes, then how could we account for those robots’ 
successful negotiation with their environment? 
 By way of example, imagine that we want to study one of the Mars robotic 
rovers mentioned in the previous section, in particular its behaviour related with 
searching and examining a Martian stone. If we adopt a purely syntactic approach we 
would be able to describe the algorithms implemented by the robot throughout the 
process. But of course, this computational account would have to recognise that these 
algorithms are not just formal abstractions but effective procedures that actually 
manipulate symbolic structures that carry information from Mars. What could we do to 
account for these symbolic structures then? One way could be to shift to the 
psychological level and call those structures mental symbols. However, this would 
imply ascribing mentality to the robot, something that seems implausible. The only 
alternative appears to be, then, to simply  ascribe the robot with symbolic structures from 
an autonomous computational domain. This would suffice to explain how information 
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picked up from Mars is relevant to account from its behaviour, and also to account for 
counterfactual situations such as what algorithms would had been implemented if the 
stone it examined had a different  composition. Therefore there seems to be no reason 
for treating computational level explanations as purely formal, or as dependent on there 
being mentality  in those agents that implement a computer. They might just be non-
mental computing agents in their own right.
2.3.2 Objection 2: The Computational Level of Artefacts has Derived 
Representations
 The second objection to the autonomy of the computational domain can be 
formulated as a rejoinder to my  reply  to the first objection. According to this second 
objection, the case of the Mars rovers does not count  as a example of autonomous 
computation because they  are human-designed machines. The general idea behind this 
argument is clearly stated in the following quote from Haugeland (1981):
[symbolic structures] only have meaning because we give it  to them; their intentionality, like 
that of smoke signals and writing, is essentially borrowed, hence derivative. To put  it  bluntly: 
computers themselves don’t mean anything by their tokens (any more than books do)—they 
only mean what  we say they do. Genuine understanding, on the other hand, is intentional “in 
its own right” and not derivatively from something else. (pp. 32-33).
 The author uses the term intentionality to refer to the semantic or 
representational properties of symbolic structures. For present purposes the point is that 
any computational artefact, insofar as it is the product of the purposeful design of a 
human being, inherits its intelligence from the purposes and intentions of its creator. So, 
the objection goes, robots such as the Mars rovers have intelligence and other capacities 
only in a derived, non-original sense. This objection can be linked to theorists who 
defend teleological approaches to the mind and adopt a historical approach to cognitive 
functions. They  also make the positive claim that the only  way an entity could be 
endowed with intelligence or any kind of function is by have been designed by non-
purposeful mechanisms such as natural selection (Millikan, 1984; Papineau, 1987).
 One problem with this teleological objection is that it rests on controversial 
assumptions about how history determines the nature of functions and cognitive 
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capacities (Crane, 1995; Fodor, 2000). For instance, a creature that happens to lack an 
evolutionary  history of selection would be incapable of instantiating any function, 
regardless of how complex its current behaviour is. But even more problematic is the 
fact that a teleological approach would have to rule out, as a matter of conceptual 
analysis, the possibility that an artefact of the right sort could ever be capable of 
developing intelligent behaviour. On the contrary, it  seems likely that even if we have 
not created genuinely intelligent or cognitive machines so far, things might change as 
computational technology develops (Copeland, 1993).
 This is not the place to settle this issue, however. The idea that artefacts have 
intelligence or process information in a way  that does not depend on human beings 
might still be resisted by some authors. In any case, I believe that the objection that 
artefacts cannot count as instantiations of an autonomous computational domain can be 
overcome in a different way: by arguing that there are biological systems that instantiate 
computational capacities, but even though do not deserve to be ascribed with mentality. 
Note that since biological systems are the product of evolutionary  processes, they are 
invulnerable to the second objection. I elaborate this point with examples of real 
biological computers in the final section of this chapter.
2.4 The Case of Biological Computers
 So far in these first two chapters I have sketched the minimal requirements for 
instantiating a computing system. They  basically consist in having symbolic structures 
capable of engaging in informational relations with the environment and capable of 
performing the basic operations that characterise a universal computer. In the present 
section I present two examples of biological entities that appear to meet  these 
requirements for being a computing system, without there being a clear justification of 
ascribing mentality  to them. With this, I wish to finally  make the point that the 
computational domain is autonomous and independent of the psychological domain, and 
that theorists that ascribe mentality  to animals often make the mistake of ignoring the 
former as an alternative explanation of behaviour.
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 My first example is concerned again with the digger wasp. As I mentioned in 
section 2.2 the food-dragging behaviour of this insect has become a commonplace for 
showing how rigid and stereotypical insect behaviour could be. But as also noted, the 
wasp  also has some more clever facets such as sophisticated navigational abilities. 
Wasps can orientate themselves by using a range of navigational cues and also by  path 
integration, which involves the capacity to estimate their position by using information 
about their own speed and direction travelled (Healy, 1998). The navigational capacities 
of the wasp exhibit many of the hallmarks of a computational system. They can encode 
and store information about environmental cues and carry  out computational operations 
over that information, and those operations can be quite complex, notably  when doing 
path integration. In those cases the insect has to monitor its angular and linear 
displacements and continually update the current distance and direction from their 
present location to their starting point, and sometimes recalculate their vector flight, for 
instance when they find themselves lost. That  involves basic computational operations 
such as storing, deleting and transforming data-structures, as well as manipulating them 
through algorithmic steps that branch into alternative courses of action. 
 An important thing to note is that the navigational capacities of the wasp  are 
probably  modular and specific for that task (Carruthers, 2006). That explains why the 
remarkable intelligence exhibited when flying cannot be used for a different task, such 
as altering their food-dragging behaviour when fooled by an experimenter. So the wasp 
does exhibit  intelligent behaviour, however it is restricted to its navigational capacities. 
Should we ascribe psychological states to the wasp then? It  is at this point when some 
authors have fallen into the false dilemma of regarding the computational capacities of 
the wasp as suitable for psychological explanation. But why should we do this? Would 
it not be more plausible to just describe the wasp’s behaviour in terms of the 
computational domain and remain neutral about whether they  have minds or not? After 
all, they might just be, if you like, marvellous biological robots, that instantiate 
computation but not mentality (in chapter 7 I return to this case).
 It might be objected, however, that my scepticism about the ascription of 
mentality to the wasp is question-begging since I am just assuming that  the 
computational processes that control its navigational behaviour lack any form of 
mentality. Someone might claim, for instance, that  any creature that instantiates 
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computational processes in its brain deserves to be explained by the psychological level. 
I believe this objection does not work since it draws the line for instantiating mentality 
too low, reaching biological systems to which the ascription of mentality appears as 
totally  implausible. I will present a final example to illustrate how implausible it is to 
ascribe mentality solely on the grounds of biological computation.  
 My final example relates to the enteric nervous system. It consists in a large 
network of a hundred million neurones (ten times more than the wasp’s brain!) located 
in the wall of the human gastrointestinal tract. It  accomplishes a variety of functions 
such as regulating processes of secretion and absorption, blood flow, and controlling the 
motility of the intestine (Wood, 2011). This motility control involves coordinated 
patterns of contraction and relaxation at  different parts of the intestine, related with 
segmentation, peristalsis and motility cycles. The enteric nervous system has been 
shown to be quite complex and to operate rather autonomously from the brain, to the 
extent that it has become known as “the gut brain”. A remarkable aspect of this system 
is that it can receive and integrate information coming from different sources; in 
particular inputs from the brain and information about the mechanical and chemical 
conditions of the intestine. Then, the enteric nervous system can produce organised 
motor patterns that are generated, coordinated and modulated by the own system 
(Thomas, Sjövall & Bornstein, 2004).
 Arguably, capacities of the enteric nervous system such as encoding and 
integrating information, and modulating complex patterns of intestinal motility, make it 
a good candidate for instantiating computational processes. But whether the enteric 
nervous system should be regarded as a genuine digital computer or not is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. My purpose with this example is just  to illustrate how plausible is 
to conceive biological systems that even though they lack mentality, can instantiate the 
computational domain. If there is no impediment for the implementation of 
computational capacities by   non-mental creatures, then the claim that insects have 
minds cannot be grounded just  on the fact that they are computing systems. Something 
else should be said about what makes them part of the selected group of computing 
systems that possess minds.
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Chapter Three 
Informational Approaches: Fodor on Drawing the Line
3.0 Introduction
 In the first two chapters I put forward a distinction between computational and 
mental symbols, in the sense that their extension can be different, as happens when 
computational symbols are instantiated in non-mental agents. But what makes some 
animals or computing agents in general capable of developing mental symbols? If we 
were to draw a line between computer agents with and without mentality, where should 
we do so? 
 The overarching goal of the remainder of this thesis will be to address these 
questions, and in chapters 3 to 6 I take up recent literature exploring what makes a 
computing agent capable of developing mental symbols. In this chapter and the next  I 
will deal with informational approaches to mental symbols, starting in the present 
chapter with the work of Jerry Fodor. He develops an informational account of mental 
symbols, claiming that what is special about them is the nature of their contents, which 
is determined by their capacity to bear certain informational relations with entities in the 
environment. Roughly  speaking, the author claims that what matters for drawing a line 
between mental and merely  computing systems is the way in which those relations are 
fixed and the entities they can bear relations to.
 After critically presenting Fodor’s views at two moments of his work, I conclude 
that even though his account presents some problems it also constitutes a promising 
approach to the issue of telling what makes for mental symbols. However, it still needs 
to say more about the computational architecture that is required for those purposes, 
something that shall be explored in further chapters of this thesis.
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3.1 From the False Dilemma to the Slippery Slope
 In the previous chapter I argued that some defenders of animal cognition were at 
risk of falling into a false dilemma when justifying the attribution of mentality  to 
animals on the grounds that the physical level is not enough for explaining some of their 
behaviours. I suggested that in order to avoid this fallacy, authors dealing with 
behavioural explanation should take the computational level as mapping onto an 
autonomous natural domain that is independent from the domain of mental creatures. 
Put in a different way, animals that lack mental symbols might be possessors of 
computational symbols, and therefore should be considered as more sophisticated than 
non-computational creatures but at  the same time below the domain of creatures with 
mentality.
 But if we follow this suggestion and incorporate the computational domain to 
our metaphysical inventory, then we would have to face an additional problem when 
dealing with non-human cognition. It is that if we try  to justify  the attribution of 
mentality to certain agents by appeal to the framework of CTM, then it would appear as 
legitimate to ascribe mentality “all the way down” to entities that do computation but  do 
not appear to have a mind at  all, such as the human digestive system or the Mars rovers. 
The risk is real given that most proponents of CTM regard as likely  that the difference 
between us and other computer machines is, at least from the viewpoint of computation, 
largely quantitative. For example, Fodor (2003) writes:
If ... some sort  of inferentialism is likely to work for our minds, isn’t the least hypothesis that 
it  is also likely to work for the minds of other kinds of creatures? Surely it’s reasonable, 
absent contrary evidence, to suppose the differences between our minds and theirs are largely 
quantitative. (p.4)
 If what distinguishes us from other entities can be measured in terms of the 
quantity of inferential (i.e. computational) capacities, then where should we stop 
ascribing inferential thought to computer machines less complex than us? Not 
surprisingly, Fodor (1986) is aware of this sort of slippery slope objection and, as the 
following passage shows, he also hints at a possible way out:
[The] slippery slope argument that gets you from us to paramecia can also be made to get 
you from computers to thermostats or, for that matter, from us to thermostats. It will not, in 
short, do to take Descartes’s route and get  off the slippery slope by postulating that  lower 
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organisms are machines. For one would then need an argument for not attributing mental 
representations to machines; and if to any machines, why not to all of them? (p.4)
 As suggested at the end of the quote, on pain of falling in a slippery slope CTM 
needs to put forward some argument for not attributing mental representations (i.e. 
mental symbols16) to entities to which it is implausible to do so. It should be noted, 
though, that according to the conceptual framework advanced in the previous chapters 
the problem here is not with machines in general, but with computing machines in 
particular. For machines that do not instantiate a computer, i.e. not capable of running a 
program, are not candidates for mentality insofar as a minimum condition for having 
mental symbols is to have computational processes at its subvenient base. This certainly 
rules out paramecia and ordinary thermostats as candidates for mentality.
 But there is a vast  space of computing agents that might still fall into the 
slippery  slope, for example the human digestive system or the Mars Rovers discussed in 
the previous chapters, and we might even include programmable thermostats equipped 
with complex input-output systems. So for present purposes we will have to adjust 
Fodor’s proposal by claiming that what CTM needs is  not just  a principled way for not 
attributing mentality  to every  machine, but to every computing machine. In this chapter 
I examine how Fodor has attempted to develop this idea and how it could be used to 
draw a line between computers that do and do not implement mentality.
 To appreciate Fodor’s proposals it is important to keep in mind some of his 
previous work on perception and cognitive architecture, which I briefly review in the 
following section. Then I address how Fodor has dealt with the issue of drawing a line 
for mental representation in two stages of his work. First in his paper Why paramecia 
don’t have mental representations where he draws the line on the capacity to respond 
selectively to non-nomic properties, and secondly in relation to his more developed 
asymmetric dependence theory put forward in Fodor (1987, 1990). The example of 
paramecia might strike the reader as unsuitable for present purposes given that, as I 
explained above, they can be ruled out from the scope of mentality due to their non-
computational nature. However, Fodor’s proposal can still be useful for us since it can 
be applied to the case of ruling out non-mental computer agents as well.  
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16 To simplify the exposition I take Fodor’s preferred term mental representation as equivalent to the term 
mental symbol I introduced in chapter 1. I believe this is innocuous insofar as both terms refer to the 
fundamental symbolic structures used in psychological explanations to describe thought and reasoning.
3.2 Brief Overview of Fodor’s Account of Perception and Cognition
 Fodor’s view lies on the theoretical framework of CTM—of which he is one of 
the main contributors—, in particular in relation to perceptual systems (Fodor & 
Pylyshyn, 1981; Fodor, 1983). So it shall be useful to review some of this framework 
before going into the details of Fodor’s proposals. I focus on the case of vision because 
it has extensively been studied from the viewpoint of CTM, however the main tenets of 
this account are supposed to be applicable to other perceptual systems as well. Broadly 
speaking, in the context of CTM perception is a cognitive mechanism that encodes and 
transforms information about the world and delivers it to central cognition in a format 
appropriate for thought and reasoning. Perceptual processes are supposed to comprise 
three stages that involve the following systems:
1- Transducers
2- Input systems
3- Mechanisms for belief fixation
 Transducers constitute the first layer of perception and carry  out the task of 
converting energy  coming from the environmental stimulus into action potentials 
transmitted by neurones. In the case of vision, transducers are photoreceptors in the 
retina which transform luminous energy  into electric energy appropriate for nerve 
conduction and computational processing. They  do so by means of a purely physical 
process of encoding environmental information about distant objects conveyed by the 
light, a process normally described in terms nomic (or lawful) covariation (see 1.3). The 
information encoded by transducers is then processed by input systems, which can 
compute that information in order to infer properties about  the distal objects, as Fodor 
(1983) summarises:
The character of transducer outputs is determined, in some lawful way, by the character of 
impinging energy at the transducer surface; and the character of the energy at the transducer 
surface is itself lawfully determined by the character of the distal layout. Because there are 
regularities of this latter sort, it  is possible to infer properties of the distal layout from 
corresponding properties of the transducer output. Input analyzers are devices which perform 
inferences of this sort. (p. 45)
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 Input systems (called “input analyzers” in the quote) are special-purpose 
computational mechanisms of early visual processing that analyse and interpret the 
information about light reaching the retina. This stage of visual perception is important 
since the information encoded by  transducers is variable, relatively  fragmentary and 
mathematically insufficient to recover data about distal properties. So perceptual 
systems must constraint the possible interpretations that could be drawn from this 
information in order to generate the right representation of distal environmental objects. 
For example, if we are looking at a house and start moving towards it, our retinal image 
of the house gets bigger and bigger, and if we do so at different times of the day the 
intensity of light that reaches our retina might also change. However, we still seem to 
see the same house, with the same size and colours. That is possible thanks to the 
computational processes carried out  by input systems which have the function to extract 
information about environmental invariants.
 According to Fodor (1983), input systems work in rather isolation from the rest 
of cognition, which is the reason why they are often regarded as modular. They  can map 
from the information about a proximal stimulus that  the retina provides “to a 
representation of the distal stimuli as an array of objects in space” before that 
representation is coded as a perceptual belief (p. 53). This implies that input systems 
constitute the stage in visual perception where elements of the distal environment are 
first individuated or categorised, what happens before those representations meet 
background information (i.e. stored in memory) involved in central processes of belief 
fixation. As Fodor himself notes, processes carried out by input systems are compatible 
with the computational stages put forward by Marr’s theory of vision, who described 
the algorithms involved in the mapping of transducer information onto a representation 
of a three dimensional object in the distal layout (see 1.4.2). 
 Fodor calls the products of input systems perceptual categories or percepts since 
he regards them as representations of basic categories of objects and properties of the 
environment. These categories involve not just  properties of objects such as colour, 
shape, size and motion, but also sometimes the representation of whole objects such as a 
dog or a tree. What is notable about percepts is that they can be generated just by means 
of modular computational mechanisms that process information encoded by 
transducers. Therefore their production does not demand the possession of other 
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representations or the integration of percepts with previous beliefs about the world. In 
this sense it  seems clear that Fodor considers appropriate to characterise percepts as 
genuine representational states that denote basic categories, and to accept that beliefs 
(and propositional attitudes in general) are not the only form of representational state. 
More precisely, his idea suggested in 1983 is that representations are formed at the level 
of input  systems and later on “corrected” under the light of background knowledge at 
the level of belief fixation (p. 102). But can percepts, or information coded by 
mechanisms like input systems, be properly called mental representations? Do percepts 
have a content that is somewhat equivalent to that of mental representations in general?
 Considering Fodor’s early writings (at least until 1983) the author would have 
responded negatively to this last  question. That is because before that time he endorsed 
a view about content called functional-role semantics (Rives, 2010), and thus believed 
that the contents of mental representations are at least partially  determined by the 
functional relations they bear with other representations. Given the view about 
perception and cognition summarised above, this implies that the content of 
representations only become fixed at the level of belief fixation, viz. where they are 
integrated with other representations and thus acquire their particular functional role. In 
sum, according to this view percepts are considered precursors of, but not  already a kind 
of, mental representation.
 In later writings, though, Fodor has become convinced that functional role 
semantics leads to many problems and has developed an informational approach to 
representational content. This allows that some percepts, at  least those encoding certain 
environmental properties and bearing the right nomic relations to them, could count as 
mental representations. A clarification is in order, though. Fodor sees the nature of 
mental representations as distinct from the nature of the mind more generally. This is 
because he individuates mental representations by their contents, while he individuates 
the mind in terms of being a system of mental representations. To clarify this issue 
consider the following quote from Fodor (1987):
I’m leaving open that a good reconstruction of intentionality might recognise things that 
have intentional states but no propositional attitudes; hence, things that  have intentional 
states but  are not  intentional systems. For example, it doesn’t  seem to me to count against a 
theory of intentionality if it entails that the curvature of the bimetalic strip in a thermostat 
represents the temperature of the ambient  air. By contrast, a theory that  entails that 
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thermostats are intentional systems—that they have beliefs and desires—would thereby 
refute itself. (p. 163, n. 1; see also Fodor, 1986, p. 21, n. 3)
 So Fodor takes mental creatures to be intentional systems, viz. possessors of 
symbolic structures with causal roles that issue in behaviour, while when he talks about 
intentionality he is referring to content. Then since mental representations are 
individuated by their contents, and given that Fodor attempts to explain the content of 
mental representations by an informational theory that do without their causal roles, it 
turns out that mental representations can in principle be individuated in creatures that  do 
not have minds. For example, Fodor (1998) says:
[T]he content of propositional attitudes depends on the content of mental representations, 
and since the intended sense of ‘depends of’ is asymmetric, ... [my account] tolerates he 
metaphysical possibility of mental representation without thought. (p.9)
 Then it appears that according Fodor’s metaphysical picture it  is possible to 
conceive a creature having a mental representation without having a mind. This is 
certainly hard to swallow, but for present purposes I propose to bracket this issue and 
evaluate how Fodor accounts for mental representations in the first place. In any case, 
according to the author this is a crucial step towards explaining why some creatures 
have minds and why others do not, since mental representations are a necessary—
though perhaps not a sufficient—condition for having mentality. In the remainder of this 
chapter I discuss two stages of Fodor’s informational approach to mental 
representations, where he directly deals with the issue of what are the minimum 
conditions an information-bearing state coded by perceptual systems has to meet to be 
regarded as a genuine mental representation.
3.3 Fodor’s First Line: Selective Response to Non-nomic Properties
 As mentioned above, in his paper Why paramecia don’t have mental 
representations17 Fodor proposes a criterion to draw a line between creatures with and 
without mental representations. More precisely, he attempts to identify  a certain 
capacity or property that could make it plausible to ascribe mental representations to 
entities who posses it, and then he uses paramecia as an example of a species that 
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17 Unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to this paper.
clearly  lacks that capacity  and therefore does not meet the criterion for having mental 
representations. 
   The paramecium is a single-celled animal that lives in freshwater environments. 
It is also a photosensitive organism, what means that it  exhibits tropic behaviours in 
response to light intensity. Fodor starts conceding to paramecia the capacity to “see” 
light in the sense of instantiating a property that  covaries with certain property  of light, 
which causes a manifest behavioural response (e.g. movement in the direction of less 
intense illumination). Then Fodor makes an important distinction between nomic and 
non-nomic properties of objects. Nomic properties are those which enter into lawful 
relations with other properties of nature. For example, the frequency  of electromagnetic 
radiation is a nomic property of light since there are physical laws that relate this 
property  with others. Nomic properties are therefore also properties to which organisms 
can be sensitive in virtue of instantiating a nomological covariation between some 
property  of their transducers and a property of an external object. The capacity of the 
paramecia to “see” light falls into this category.
 On the other hand, non-nomic properties of things are those that cannot  enter 
into any lawful relation. For example, the property of being a left shoe or the property 
of being a house18. Even though Fodor concedes that these might be real properties, he 
claims that there are no laws that hold for left shoes or houses in virtue of being that 
property. He then draws attention to the fact that organisms which are sensitive to 
external properties just by means of nomological covariation cannot be sensitive to non-
nomic properties, since the latter cannot covary  in a lawful way with anything else. 
Fodor argues that this is the case of the paramecium: it is only capable of “seeing” the 
nomic properties of things, given that  its sensorium can only covary with properties that 
can enter into nomic relations with them. But non-nomic properties such as being a left 
shoe or being a house are out of the scope of the sensory systems of paramecia, because 
these properties cannot causally interact with their transducers.
 Then Fodor suggests a criterion to differentiate entities which can have mental 
representations from those that cannot:
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18 In this thesis I follow Fodor’s orthographic convention of using italics to denote properties and quoted 
formulas to express the contents of symbolic structures.
[A]ny system that  can respond selectively to non-nomic properties is, intuitively speaking, a 
plausible candidate for the ascription of mental representations; and any system that can’t, 
isn’t. (p. 11)
 A key expression of this quote is respond selectively, for in some way a 
paramecium may be able to, for instance, “see” a house when confronted to it, but it will 
not be capable of having a behavioural response attributable to the property  being a 
house since it cannot respond selectively to houses. All the paramecium can “see” are, 
say, levels of light  intensity and frequency, which are just nomic properties of light. 
Fodor claims that the paramecium is a bad candidate for having mental representations 
because it can only  react  to nomic properties. On the other hand, human beings are 
paradigmatic examples of entities who can represent and respond selectively to 
instantiations of non-nomic properties. We can see houses or left shoes and act in ways 
that are a direct consequence of representing these particular properties. Fodor claims 
that this capacity to respond selectively to non-nomic properties is the most distinctive 
feature of cognition and that it permits us to distinguish paramecia from organisms that 
possess mental representations:
[S]elective response to non-nomic properties is, on the present  view, the great evolutionary 
problem that  mental representation was intended to solve. And the solution to that problem 
was perhaps the crucial achievement in the phylogeny of cognition. (p. 14)
 Where precisely in the phylogenetic continuum mental representations emerged 
is taken by Fodor as an empirical matter that depends on which properties are nomic 
and on the psychological capacities given organisms actually have. In his paper he is not 
interested in specifying where the line must be drawn, but in providing a criterion for 
the attribution of mental representations that intuitively leaves paramecia out of its 
scope.
 At this point it can be useful to see Fodor’s proposal in the light of the three 
levels of perception explained in the previous section. According to his view, paramecia 
are just capable of reaching the first of the three levels of perception (i.e. they just  have 
transducer mechanisms) and thus can only respond to nomic properties of the 
environment. What they  lack, though, is the computational machinery  to map from the 
nomic properties detected by  transducers onto percepts that represent non-nomic 
properties. In the text Fodor emphasises this point by associating transducers with the 
detection of nomic properties:
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... in short, the point  about transducers is that  they respond selectively only to nomic 
properties. (p. 16) 
... And conversely, if a property is nomic it is always possible to build a transducer to it. (p. 
22, n. 10)
 Then it follows that the relevant distinction between us and paramecia is that 
“only  the former can respond selectively  to properties that are not transducer 
detectable” (p. 15). Fodor clarifies that he does not want to draw the line on transducers 
but on nomicness, because the latter is a more fundamental notion than the former, 
however from the above quote it is clear that he takes properties that are not transducer 
detectable as non-nomic. Then the crucial step  in the phylogeny of mental creatures 
appears to be the development of perceptual capacities (i.e. input systems) that can infer 
properties of objects that are not transducer detectable. This introduces a “semantic 
connection into the causal chain” that goes from information encoded by transducers to 
percepts (p. 14). Then the burden of the argument falls on having perceptual capacities, 
as Fodor makes clear in the following passage:
What  distinguishes intentional systems from the rest  is that, whereas we’ve got  perceptual 
categories, what they’ve got is, at most, sensory manifolds. (p. 20).
 In regard to the last  stage of perception (i.e. belief fixation), in the paper under 
discussion Fodor remains silent about what else beyond perceptual categories is 
required for having perceptual beliefs. For the purposes of his paper, however, it 
suffices for him to state that having representational states is a necessary, but not a 
sufficient, condition for having beliefs, which are just mental representations with 
characteristic functional roles. Since paramecia cannot respond selectively  to non-nomic 
properties and therefore cannot have mental representations, they are ipso facto 
incapable of having beliefs. In any case, it remains clear that for Fodor mental 
representations are a more fundamental aspect of mentality than beliefs.
3.3.1 Objection 1: The Line is Drawn too Low
 Certainly  Fodor is successful in making the point that paramecia cannot 
represent non-nomic properties and that appears to be a good reason for not ascribing 
mental representations to them. However, I believe that he overestimates the capacity to 
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respond selectively to non-nomic properties as a criterion for the attribution of mental 
representations and ends up situating the line for the attribution of mental representation 
too low, thus permitting us to ascribe them to entities to which it would be clearly 
implausible to ascribe mentality. I shall use the example of a vending machine to 
illustrate how under Fodor’s criterion, a mindless entity like this should be ascribed 
mental representations, making up an argument that takes the form of a reductio ad 
absurdum. Of course, the same argument could be extended to any other artefact or 
biological system equivalent to a vending machine from an information processing 
viewpoint. 
 First, a few words about the kind of vending machine I have in mind. It has an 
input system that consists in a coin acceptor, which can distinguish between coins of 
different value based on weight, size and magnetic content. It comprises an internal 
processing system that carries out computations over the amounts of money inserted 
into the machine, in order to validate the purchase of beverages and calculate the change 
to be dispensed. The machine also has an output mechanical system for dispensing 
beverages and another for dispensing change, and for the sake of the example let us 
imagine that this vending machine accepts only UK coins and that the only  beverage it 
dispenses is one that costs one pound. A critical aspect of this vending machine is that 
its internal processing system is actually a computer in the sense defined in the previous 
sections. Even though for practical reasons vending machines are normally  much 
simpler than this, I believe the example works since it is certainly plausible to conceive 
a vending machine equipped with a computer like the one just described.
 My argument against Fodor is that a vending machine like the one described 
above can have an informational-bearing state that can be described as denoting the 
non-nomic property of being one pound’s worth. To see the point it can be useful to 
compare the way the coin detection process works with the first two stages of a 
perceptual system described in 3.2. First, it has transducers that transform nomic 
properties of coins (viz. weight, size and magnetic content) into electric signals suitable 
for the internal processes of the machine. Then it  carries out calculations over these 
signals such as adding the values of the different coins, and produces outputs to the 
beverage dispenser and the coin changer device in an analogue way as perceptual 
modules output to central cognition. Since from an information processing viewpoint 
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the vending machine implements a process comparable to the first two stages of 
perception, it seems that according to Fodor’s criterion we would have to consider the 
machine’s capacity to respond to the property being one pound’s worth as one that 
yields a mental representation, a consequence I take to be unacceptable. Next, I address 
two possible replies Fodor could give to this argument, which are based on distinctions 
he makes in the paper under discussion.
 First, Fodor could object that the vending machine is really detecting a non-
nomic property (such as being one pound’s worth). Before unfolding this reply let us 
recall that the reason why  it is impossible for the paramecium to detect non-nomic 
properties is that those properties cannot covary lawfully with their transducers. In 
contrast, creatures capable of mental representation can detect non-nomic properties by 
means of their input systems. For example, to perceive a house a creature first has to 
detect nomic properties of the house reaching its retina (i.e. patterns of light intensity) to 
then infer the non-nomic property of being a house. As Fodor notes, this would not be 
achievable without the mediation of inferential processes because the set of nomic 
properties associated with non-nomic properties such as being a house is “vastly and 
open-endedly disjunctive” (p. 19). Houses can have an indefinite variety of  nomic 
properties in relation to their size, colour, shape, etc., and therefore no transducer can be 
tuned to respond to houses by means of a lawful relation.
 Similarly, the representation of the property of being one pound’s worth can also 
be generated by means of quantifying over an indefinite number of possible 
representations of nomic properties; just consider all the possible combinations of 
weights, sizes and magnetic contents of coins that could make for one pound. Then 
Fodor’s objection could be the following: when a vending machine responds to the 
insertion of coins that sum one pound, it  is not really responding to the property of 
being one pound’s worth, but  just to a conjunction of transducer detectable properties 
such as certain weight, size and magnetic content. After all, contrary  to what happens to 
genuine perceptual systems, the vending machine only has a limited capacity to detect 
particular nomic properties of coins, and is far from being able to infer the property 
being one pound’s worth from an open-ended disjunction of possible nomic properties 
because most of them are out of its scope.
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 I believe this reply  does not work because it overestimates the capacities of 
perceptual systems. As happens with the vending machine, the scope of nomic 
properties our perceptual systems can detect is limited, given their transducer and 
processing capacities (e.g. our visual system is insensitive to certain properties emitted 
by objects, such as ultrasonic sound waves and their magnetic field). Then to deny the 
vending machine’s capacity to respond selectively to non-nomic properties on the 
grounds that their transducer detectable properties are limited is misleading, given that 
our perceptual systems are constrained in a similar way. Furthermore, it should be noted 
that possible combinations of coins that could make the vending machine be loaded 
with one pound is considerable19, what shows that there is a significant variability  in the 
way nomic properties of coins could mediate in the instantiation of an information-
bearing state that corresponds to one pound’s worth. So even the vending machine has a 
restricted scope of physical properties it can extract from proximal stimulation, and the 
combinations of those properties it  can use to detect a non-nomic property is rather vast. 
It is not totally  open-ended, but in this respect the machine does not  differ from 
perceptual systems in general.
 A second rejoinder Fodor could put forward to deal with the counterexample of 
the vending machine is to concede that it  can have information-bearing states generated 
by inferential processes and that those states are not transducer detectable, but argue 
that those states still cannot count as mental representations because the actions carried 
out by the machine do not respond selectively to them. Imagine that you insert two 50 
pence coins and the machine dispenses a beverage. There is a configuration of nomic 
properties detected by  the coin detector, viz. two equal conjunctions of size, weight and 
magnetic field corresponding to a 50 pence coin. Let us call this configuration 
“2x50swm”. This corresponds to a transducer detectable information-bearing state that 
carries information about nomic properties of the two coins. When the machine 
dispenses a beverage it is responding to 2x50swm, which happens to be equivalent with 
the non-nomic property of being one pound’s worth. Fodor could then contend that the 
behaviour of the machine is not sophisticated enough to give us sufficient grounds to 
determine whether it is responding to one property or the other. Dispensing the beverage 
would not suffice to determine whether the machine is discriminating between these 
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19  Supposing that the machine accepts coins ranging from 1 penny to 1 pound, there are 4563 ways to 
make a pound.
two possible internal states, and we would not be justified in ascribing it a 
representation of being one pound’s worth to explain this action. Then Fodor could call 
us to be conservative and refrain from attributing a mental representation to the vending 
machine unless we have enough behavioural evidence to discriminate whether it is 
responding selectively  to the property being one pound’s worth or just to the 
conjunction of nomic properties 2x50swm. 
 In response to this rejoinder, I argue that the vending machine can respond to its 
input in a way  sophisticated enough to attribute to it an information-bearing state of the 
property  of being one pound’s worth, something that  according to Fodor’s account 
would lead to the implausible conclusion that it has a mental representation. As Fodor 
himself acknowledges (p. 5) at the end it is a matter of inference to the best explanation 
whether we are justified or not in attributing the representation of properties that are 
non-nomic. And the case of the vending machine appears to be just a case where this 
attribution is justified, for at least the following two reasons.
 First, the vending machine dispenses a beverage selectively  when loaded with 
one pound worth, even when it involves adding different kinds of coins. The fact that 
the machine produces the same response under a wide range of possible inputs allows 
us to generalise from the varying configurations of proximal stimuli and ascribe it an 
info-bearing state that covaries with being one pound’s worth. Instead, if we insist in 
explaining its actions in terms of responses to 2x50swm or any other particular 
configuration of nomic properties we would miss out this important generalisation that 
is relevant for explaining its behaviour.
  Secondly, the vending machine can dispense change that corresponds to the 
difference between the sum of the values of the inserted coins and one pound worth. To 
put it in algebraic terms, the machine carries out the following calculation:
      x - 1 = y
 Where x is the sum of the values of the coins inserted and y is the quantity to be 
given as change. There are many combinations of coins that can load the machine with 
more than one pound worth. For instance a two pound coin, 50 pence plus three 20 
pence coins, etc. In all these cases the machine reliably gives change that is worth 
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precisely the value that y represents in the equation above. In order to explain how the 
machine can produce this behaviour we need again to generalise from the particular 
processes carried out when each combination of coins is inserted, and ascribe the 
machine the capacity to compute this calculation. And since the fixed value in the 
equation is representing the property  of being one pound’s worth, we would be justified 
to attribute that information-bearing state to the machine.
3.3.2 Objection 2: Nomic / Non-nomic Distinction is Irrelevant
 Fodor’s proposal can be read as starting from the assumption that  the capacity to 
encode environmental information by means of transducers is not sufficient  for a 
creature to yield mental representations. This assumption is quite uncontroversial and 
normally regarded as the basic problem that any informational approach to 
representation has to deal with, for many non-mental entities do bear environmental 
information by virtue of having properties that covary lawfully with other properties. 
For example, three rings bear information about the age of a tree and thermometers bear 
information about the temperature in a room. On pain of having to ascribe mentality to 
entities such as trees or thermometers, informational accounts to representation have to 
spell out the processes required for transforming environmental information into a full-
fledged mental representation (see 1.3).
 According to Fodor, the main characteristic of perception is that it is equipped 
with input systems capable of taking information encoded by transducers as premisses 
and deriving perceptual categories as conclusions. Indeed, in the paper under discussion 
Fodor points out that the reason why paramecia cannot have mental representations is 
precisely because that  they lack those perceptual capacities, adding that the same 
argument can be made by appeal to the incapacity of paramecia to respond to non-
nomic properties—or properties that are not transducer detectable. However, I believe 
this last claim is ill-founded and at odds with his own view of psychological 
explanation. It  is simply a mistake to situate the capacity to yield perceptual categories 
as somewhat equivalent to the capacity to detect non-nomic properties, for most 
perceptual categories are, in fact, about nomic properties (i.e. about natural kinds in 
general). It  is possible, for instance, to imagine a creature whose perceptual systems are 
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only attuned to represent nomic properties (e.g. animals, plants, etc.). In this case, the 
creature would have perceptual categories even though cannot represent non-nomic 
properties, something at odds with to Fodor’s criterion.
 One way to avoid this objection could be to reformulate Fodor’s criterion by 
saying that it is not the capacity to respond to non-nomic properties what makes for 
mental representation, but the capacity to respond to distal environmental properties 
without at  the same time entering into nomic relations with them. Then perceptual 
categories, due to their inferential nature, would be capable of denoting environmental 
objects without being nomically related with them. But this way  of looking at  Fodor’s 
criterion cannot work if we take into consideration the viewpoint of CTM I presented 
the first chapter (which is compatible with Fodor’s own view, see Loewer & Rey, 1991), 
according to which the way mental representations enter into a sound metaphysical 
picture of the mind is through playing a causal role in scientific explanations of 
behaviour. Those explanations are typically nomological, involving laws that quantify 
over environmental objects, mental states and behaviour. For example, a psychological 
explanation of spider-avoidance behaviour would involve laws linking spiders to mental 
representations of spiders, and linking those representations with avoidance behaviour. 
But then, it makes no sense to claim that what characterises representational creatures is 
their capacity to respond to properties with which they cannot have lawful relations. For 
if there cannot be natural laws relating mental representations with their referents, then 
there simply cannot be psychological explanations based on those representations. And 
what is worst for Fodor, his proposal presently  addressed would be incompatible with 
his own more recent attempts to naturalise mental representation along informational 
lines, where he champions that “semantic facts are somehow constituted by nomic 
relations” (Fodor, 1998, p. 73). In the following sections I address his more recent 
informational approach.
 A final, alternative way to make Fodor’s proposal more plausible and to avoid 
the previous objections could be to follow his emphasis on non-nomicness and state that 
what matters for having mental representations is not to have perceptual categories in 
general, but  to have perceptual categories about non-nomic properties particular (such 
as being a left shoe or a crumpled shirt). Then, the line for mental representation would 
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not be drawn at the level creatures with perception, but those capable to produce 
percepts denoting non-nomic properties of the environment.  
 This seems arbitrary, though, since there is no clear reason to draw the line for 
having mental representations at the capacity to respond to non-nomic properties instead 
of nomic properties in general. After all, it seems plausible to suppose that some non-
human animals do have mental representations by virtue of perceiving natural kinds 
such as trees or horses, even if they lack the capacity to represent more abstract 
properties like the ones instantiated by left shoes or crumpled shirts. Then nomicness 
does not appear to be the main issue, but the inferential nature of perception and the 
capacity to go beyond mere responses to transducer detectable properties. In fact, later 
stages of Fodor’s work go along these lines by trying to account  for the informational 
relations percepts have to hold with the environment in order to become genuinely 
representational.
3.4 Fodor’s Second Line: Asymmetric Dependence Relations
 In later writings Fodor acknowledges that the relevant difference between 
paramecia and us is not the kind of property we can respond to (viz. nomic or non-
nomic) but that we have the capacity to respond to not transducer detectable properties. 
And given the background on perceptual theory given above, that amounts to saying 
that we can process information beyond the outputs of transducers and infer percepts 
through our input systems. As Fodor (1991) recognises, “the polemically  relevant point 
about transduction is not that it’s nomic but that it’s non-inferential” (p. 257). Then it 
turns out  that whether an animal can have nomic relations with its referents is not what 
is at  issue, but how those relations are grounded. As Antony and Levine (1991) put it 
when commenting on Fodor:
[T]he fundamental difference between representational systems and non-representational 
systems is to be found in the kind of nomic relationships into which the systems can enter. 
Thus, the defence of intentional realism need not depend upon the distinction between 
transducible and non-transducible properties, even if the distinction can be made. (p. 11)
 So the job for a causal or informational account of mental representation is to 
specify  which are the right causal/nomic relations these representations have to bear 
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with environmental properties in order to have genuine semantic content. As Fodor 
(1990) says:
If there’s going to be a causal theory of content, there has to be some way of picking out 
semantically relevant causal relations from all the other kinds of causal relations that  the 
tokens of a symbol can enter into. (p. 91)
 In a series of writings, Fodor (1987, 1990) discusses the kind of nomic 
relationships that might ground the generation of genuine mental representations, 
however I now focus on his initial discussion in Psychosemantics20. He again starts 
from the basic assumption that  the capacity to encode environmental information by 
means of transducers is not sufficient for a creature to yield mental representations. As 
commented in 3.3.2, environmental information can be borne by  non-mental entities 
and thus cannot be the whole story about the nature of mental representations. Then 
Fodor puts forward two ways in which nomic relationships have to constrained in order 
to establish a genuinely representational relation, which together conform his alternative 
informational approach to representation. Those constraints are presented as a means to 
solve two main problems that any  informational approach has to face. Below I briefly 
present those problems, to then explain how Fodor’s approach attempts to deal with 
them.
• The all-problem: If there is a law connecting A with B, then it is nomologically 
necessary  that if A is the case, then B. Therefore if ‘cow’ tokens carry  information 
about cows, then every  time a cow is instantiated in the world a corresponding 
tokening of ‘cow’ has to be instantiated. But this is not true of ordinary mental 
representations insofar as not every instantiation of a cow actually causes a ‘cow’ 
token. For instance, only a minimal fraction of the cows that exist in the world happen 
to cause tokenings of ‘cow’ in my mind, and moreover, cows that exist in isolated 
places might never be the cause of ‘cow’ tokenings at all. Therefore an informational 
approach has to be constrained in some way to explain how it  is that just some cows 
cause ‘cow’. And as Fodor remarks, to avoid being question-begging these constraints 
have to be specified without appeal to other mental representations.
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• The disjunction-problem: if the mental representation ‘A’ refers to B by virtue of being 
nomologically connected with Bs, then it cannot also be nomologically connected 
with non-Bs, such as Cs, since in that case ‘A’ would be referring to the disjunct (B or 
C). For example, it is plausible to conceive that some ‘cow’ tokens can sometimes be 
caused by  horses by virtue of some nomological relation holding between properties 
of horses and ‘cow’ tokens, but if that is the case then ‘cow’ would not refer just to 
cows but to (cows or horses). This is called the disjunction problem since mental 
representations are normally supposed to bear reference relations to some particular 
properties and not to a disjunct  (and less to an open disjunct as it turns out) of 
properties as the informational approach appears to imply.
3.4.1 The All-problem
 Fodor’s way of dealing with the all-problem is to specify certain sufficient 
conditions for the instantiation of ‘cow’ tokens such that when those conditions are met, 
cows cause ‘cow’. Since those conditions are supposed to be stated in non-
representational terms, they  would allow an informational approach to explain in a non-
question begging way why  not all cows actually cause ‘cow’ tokens. Fodor develops a 
twofold process to account for those conditions. The first corresponds to the encoding 
of information by transducers, which he describes as purely psychophysical. It starts 
from the physical process that happens every time our sensory  systems get in touch with 
energy coming from objects in the environment, and ends with the encoding of 
environmental information. For example, there are certain conditions under which red 
objects cause the tokening of an inner state carrying information about the redness of 
the object. In Fodor’s words:
Psychophysics purports to specify what  one might  call an ‘optimal’ point of view with 
respect to red things; viz., a viewpoint  with the peculiar property that  any intact  observer 
who occupies it must—nomologically must; must in point  of psychophysical law—have ‘red 
there’ occur to him. (p. 115)
 But of course, mental representations are not the output of transducers, and so 
this proposal needs to be accommodated for the case of representations that are 
generated by  inferential processes. Mental representations of distal environmental 
objects such as horses or trees cannot be generated just by means of transducers and so 
their representation cannot be explained by  mere appeal to psychophysical laws. 
Psychophysical circumstances can tell you when someone will “see” a horse, but not 
when she will “see as” a horse. As Fodor claims, “there are no psychophysically 
specifiable circumstances in which it is nomologically necessary that one sees horses as 
such” (p. 117).
 Here Fodor adds a second step  to the process, which corresponds to the 
mediation of inferences. Mental representations such as ‘horse’ or ‘tree’ are mediated by 
inferential processes drawn from the perceiver’s “background cognitive 
commitments” (p. 117). The idea is that after transducers encode environmental 
information, perceptual processes pick up that information and through computation and 
integration with stored information generate a mental representation. But as Fodor 
recognises, to appeal to inferences and background commitments is question-begging, 
since they presumably  involve previous representations and theories from which we 
draw the inferences that allow us to token ‘horse’ or ‘tree’. This is more clear of 
representations of more abstract kinds such as protons, which require certain scientific 
knowledge to be tokened. The author avoids this critique by saying that  the 
representational capacities involved in this process are not determinants of the content 
of a mental representation. As he says, “for the purposes of semantic naturalisation, it’s 
the existence of a reliable mind/world correlation that counts, not the mechanisms by 
which that correlation is effected” (p. 122). And since the mechanisms required to 
sustain the fixation of content are computational, they  can, according to the author, be 
specified in causal-syntactic terms, without appeal to representational notions. I will 
return to this issue in 3.5 when putting forward a critique to Fodor’s proposal.
3.4.2 The Disjunction-problem
 Concerning the disjunction-problem, Fodor attempts to distinguish between the 
nature of the nomic relations a mental representation holds with its referents, and the 
nomic relations it might establish with anything else distinct from them. So for 
example, in order to avoid ‘cow’ tokens being about a disjunct  such as (cows or horses), 
there must be some way to tell apart the nomic relation ‘cow’-cows from ‘cow’-horses. 
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Fodor’s suggestion is to state that the causal route between the mental representation 
and its referent is special in the sense that it does not depend on any other relation to 
exist. Hence ‘horse’ tokens are supposed to be caused by cows only  because ‘cow’ 
tokens are, and not vice versa. Put in Fodor’s terminology, the point is that:
the causal connection between cows and ‘horse’ tokenings is, as I shall say, asymmetrically 
dependent upon the causal connection between horses and ‘horse’ tokenings. (p. 108)
 The same idea can be framed in terms of counterfactuals. The nomic relations 
holding between ‘cow’-cows and ‘cow’-horses are different in their counterfactual 
properties, because while ‘cow’-cows can hold without there been ‘cow’-horses 
relations, the reverse is not the case. If there were no ‘cow’-cows relations, there could 
not be nomic relations between cow and any  environmental property  distinct from cows. 
In more simple words, any  nomic relation between non-cows and ‘cow’, is parasitic on 
there being a ‘cow’-cows relation. 
 Fodor claims that  his solution to the disjunction-problem is non-question 
begging because it is based on dependencies between nomic relations of properties, 
relations which are compatible with a naturalistic viewpoint and do not need to be 
formulated in representational terms. In sum, according  to Fodor what makes a token a 
mental representation is that it bears a nomic relation with a certain environmental 
property  which constitutes its referent, insofar as any  additional relation holding 
between the representation and properties of the environment depends asymmetrically 
on the relation with its referent.
 Taking together Fodor’s solutions to the all-problem and the disjunction-
problem, we can now sum up. According to the author, what distinguishes us from 
paramecia and other entities that lack mental representations, is that we can bear the 
right kind of nomic relations with certain environmental properties. Those relations are 
mediated by sustaining mechanisms that go far beyond perception, since they  involve 
background knowledge and theories we have about the world. But since for the 
purposes of fixing the mind/world relation those mechanisms can be specified in 
computational terms, no appeal to other representational contents is required. And 
importantly, not any nomic relation between symbols and referent will do for the 
purposes of fixing content. The relation has to be asymmetrical, in the sense that any 
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other relation between the mental representation and environmental properties must 
depend, or be parasitic, on the relation between the mental representation and its 
referent.
3.5 Problems with Fodor’s Second Line
 When dealing with the all-problem Fodor appeals to background commitments 
(i.e. stored theoretical knowledge) in order to account for what fixes the nomic relations 
mental representations bear with their referents. As commented in 3.4.1, the author 
anticipates the objection that this could be question begging by  arguing that it is not  the 
mental representations that make up the theory but its computational architecture what 
fixes the relation. In Fodor’s words:
the content of a theory does not determine the meanings of the terms whose connections to 
the world the theory mediates. What determines their meanings is which things in the world 
the theory connects them to. The unit of meaning is not the theory; it’s the symbol/world 
correlation however mediated. (p. 125)
 Then the structure of the theory that mediates the representation/world 
correlation is supposed to be somewhat separable from the contents of its 
representations, and to make this detachment plausible Fodor appeals to the distinction 
between the syntactic and semantic components of computer systems. He claims that 
the structure of theories responsible for establishing the representation/world 
correlations that fix representational contents can be specified in purely syntactic, 
computational terms. Thus Fodor:
The picture is that there’s, as it were, a computer between the sensorium and the belief box, 
and that the tokening of certain psychophysical concepts eventuates in the computer’s 
running through certain calculations that in turn lead to tokenings of ‘proton’ (or of ‘horse’ or 
whatever). (p. 123)
 These computations involve inferences drawn over true beliefs, but what fixes 
the belief’s contents is their relation with the world, not with other beliefs involved in 
the inferences. A consequence of this view is that even false theories would be capable 
of delivering mental representations, insofar as they ensure a reliable representation/
world correlation. Fodor sees this as an advantage of this theory since it makes possible 
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that different people—who might have disparate theories about the world—could share 
the contents of their mental representations. This idea of distinguishing between 
mechanisms that enable the fixation of content and those that determine the contents 
themselves, is further developed on Fodor’s later work (e.g. 1998). In sum, what fixes 
the content of a representation is the nomological relation it bears with the property of 
the environment it denotes, however mediated, even if that relation has never been 
instantiated in the actual world. Meanwhile, the mechanisms that sustain or fix that 
nomological relation are supposed to be required for having content, but not relevant  for 
determining the nature of the contents themselves. 
 However, I believe this alleged irrelevance of sustaining mechanisms for 
determining content is problematic, at least for our present purposes, because they seem 
to be as crucial as the nomic correlations themselves for explaining what makes genuine 
mental representations possible. Recall that we are trying to find out, in a naturalist 
context, is what it is for a computational symbol to have the content characteristic of 
mental symbols by its own right, without the need of an external interpreter. Fodor’s 
project of naturalising a theory of content pursues a similar objective, viz. to articulate, 
“in nonsemantic and nonintentional terms, sufficient conditions for one bit  of the world 
to be about (to express, represent, or be true about) another bit” (p. 98). His proposal is, 
in short, that the nature of mental symbols can be explained by appeal to their semantic 
relations with their referents, and gives an account of those relations in nomic and 
counterfactual terms. But is that response satisfactory?
 I believe it is not. Consider the following example21. Long before the time of 
Newton, mariners knew that there was a correlation between the rise and fall of the 
tides, and the position and phase of the moon. But a complete account of that correlation
—even if the account involves nomic regularities and counterfactuals—would be 
insufficient to explain the tides. The mariners had no knowledge of the causal 
connection between the moon and tides, and to whatever extent they thought they  had 
an explanation, it had probably  to do with Gods’ benevolence or some other sort of 
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21 I borrow this example from Salmon (1989, p. 47) who presents it as a counterexample to the deductive-
nomological model of explanation. Briefly, he attempts to show that scientific explanations based on 
nomic correlations are at best incomplete without an account of the causal mechanisms underlying these 
correlations.
supernatural mechanism. It was no until Newton elucidated the casual connection that 
we had a proper explanation of the tides. 
 The same moral can be extended to Fodor’s account of the nature of mental 
representations. He offers an explanation based on (asymmetrically dependent) 
representation/world nomic correlations. But as it happens with the tides, this 
explanation is poorly illuminating about what grounds these correlations. The sustaining 
mechanisms appear to be required to furnish them, but  since Fodor’s account quantifies 
over all the possible sustaining mechanisms that could fix those correlations, his 
explanation is left incomplete. Instead, it would be much more illuminating about the 
nature of mental representations to know the computational principles or limits under 
which the sustaining mechanisms operate. Let me illustrate why the omission of these 
mechanisms is problematic with another example.
 Imagine that in the future, scientists are able to build a robot that bears mental 
representations. Even though this is still science fiction, it  can be taken as a working 
hypothesis of CTM  that a robot endowed with a computational architecture and 
information processing capacities of the right complexity should be capable of thinking. 
Following Fodor’s view, the scientists should at least have equipped the robot with 
perceptual systems and central computational mechanisms capable of reliably 
connecting its inner symbolic structures with their referents, in a way  that fixes the 
appropriate nomological relations between them. So if the robot is able to think, say, 
about horses, it would need to possess computational mechanisms for sustaining a 
‘horse’-horse correlation. And in order to be genuinely  semantic, that correlation would 
have to be nomic and constrained in such a way that any non-horse property causing 
‘horse’ tokenings has to be asymmetrically dependent  on horses causing ‘horse’ 
tokenings.
 But as the example shows, what makes the robot capable of bearing mental 
representations is not just its capacity  to relate symbolic structures with its referents in 
the appropriate nomic way, but also that  it  has the right computational architecture, viz. 
the appropriate sustaining mechanisms. Fodor could contend that when it comes to the 
metaphysics of mental representations, what matters are the semantic relations and not 
the sustaining mechanism, which are just an “engineering” fact about the robot with no 
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implications for a theory of mental representation (1998, p. 78). However, I believe that 
the engineering problem is quite relevant for the purposes of drawing a line for mental 
representation. For consider counterfactual situations: if the sustaining mechanisms had 
not been within certain computational limits, then the robot’s symbolic structure could 
have had a different content or no content at all. There appears to be some minimum 
constraints in the computational architecture of a system that are crucial for its capacity 
to support semantic relations. And it  is interesting to point out that the importance of 
those constraints for understanding what  is distinctive of creatures seems to be a 
fundamental assumption of CTM. For if the mind is a sort of Turing machine, and given 
that not any implementation of a Turing machine is capable of instantiating a mind, it 
follows that what makes a mind possible is the implementation of a Turing machine of 
the appropriate complexity (see Kim, 2006, p.133). 
 It could be objected that  sustaining mechanisms do not constitute a 
metaphysically  necessary  condition for content, given it is conceivable that, say, angels, 
could bear semantic relations with properties in the world without the mediation of any 
sustaining mechanism. But certainly they  at least conform a nomologically  necessary 
condition; creatures in the earth as we know it cannot bear semantic relations unless 
their computational architectures satisfy some minimum complexity constraints. 
Therefore, when faced with the question of what are the minimum conditions for having 
mental representations in nomologically possible creatures (which is the question we are 
addressing in this thesis), the sustaining mechanisms (represented by computational 
constraints) become an essential part of the response. 
3.6. Conclusions
 Fodor’s proposals about what makes for mental representation are illuminating 
about the complex nomic relations computational symbols have to hold with their 
referents in order to count as mental representations. Indeed, the author might be correct 
when claiming that semantic content is determined by the sort of nomic relations he 
describes. However, his last and more plausible account says little about the 
computational and information processing means that are required for instantiating 
symbolic structures with the relevant nomic relations, and for this reason I believe 
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Fodor’s view is not very  useful for the present purposes, viz. what are the minimum 
conditions for possessing mental symbols. More has to be said regarding the 
“engineering problem”, viz. which is the computational architecture required for 
processing information and coding computer symbols in way that makes possible the 
emergence of mental representations. In the following section I will explore Dretske’s 
view which goes much further in this respect. 
78
Chapter Four 
Informational Approaches: Dretske on Drawing the Line
4.0 Introduction
 In the previous chapter I started discussing informational approaches to 
representation, by focusing on Fodor’s proposals. The upshot was even though his last 
proposal is on the right track, it  is not very  revealing of the computational and 
informational processing facts that make possible the possession of mental symbols. 
 In this chapter I discuss the view of Fred Dretske, who has also developed an 
informational approach that provides much more detail about the computational and 
information processing mechanisms that generate mental symbols. I critically  present 
Dretske’s proposals in two moments of his work. Basically, the author claims that in 
order to become mental symbols informational structures have to pass through a process 
of digitalisation and be coded as a cognitive structure. I also discuss his latter work, 
where he takes learning as the crucial aspect of coding that  makes possible to yield 
mental symbols.
 I conclude that even though Dretske makes significant progress towards 
understanding how informational structures could become mental symbols, he draws the 
line for mental symbols too low and cannot successfully  deal with some 
counterexamples. Again, more has to be said about the computational architecture of 
central cognition in order to state what is special about computational agent that possess 
mentality.
4.1 The Flow of Information: From Analog to Digital Form
 Dretske is responsible for one of the earlier and most complete informational 
approaches to representation. Even though his view has evolved thought the last three 
decades, the main tenets of what he put forward in his book Knowledge and the Flow of 
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Information22  remain current in his work. As most proponents of informational 
approaches, Dretske takes environmental information as the main precursor of mental 
representations, but at the same time recognises that it is not enough. Cognitive systems 
have to code or transform this “raw” information into symbolic structures in order to 
become genuinely representational. 
 The first stage in the flow of information from the environment to the mind is 
the sensory  system. At this stage transducers encode information about environmental 
properties and do so by  means of covarying with environmental properties in a 
nomological way (see 1.3). Recalling what we said in the previous chapter, what 
happens at the surface of sensory systems is not particularly distinctive of cognitive 
systems. The capacity  of the retina to covary  with light, or ear bones to covary with 
sound waves, is equivalent in terms of information encoding to what goes on in tree 
rings or fuel gauges. But even though those sensory states can be considered as the most 
basic manifestation of information-bearing state, Dretske claims that they are already 
instantiating a property that has traditionally been considered characteristic of mental 
representations: intentionality.
 More precisely, the idea is that  all informational structures are intentional 
because they can carry information about certain environmental objects without 
carrying all the information that can be extensionally attributed to them. For example, 
imagine that for unknown reasons all dogs happen to be infested with certain parasite; 
then every object that instantiates the property  is a dog will happen to instantiate the 
property  has a parasite. However, as Dretske points out a structure carrying the 
information ‘x is a dog’ does not necessarily contain the information ‘x is a parasite’, 
since the lawful correlation that grounds the flow of information is between the dog and 
the informational structure, and not between this structure and the parasite. Parasites are 
just contingently correlated with dogs, and so there is no nomic connection between 
them. To put  it in a more philosophical fashion, the intentional character of information-
bearing states is expressed in their being insensitive to extensionally  equivalent 
information, viz. extensional principles such as the intersubstitutivity of co-referring 
expressions are not always satisfied. Dretske claims that at this sensory  level we have 
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22 Unless otherwise indicated, all references from sections 4.1 to 4.3 are to this book.
what he calls first-order intentionality, since the information coded by  them appears to 
be directed to environmental objects in a way that is not fully extensional.
 This is a controversial aspect of Dretske’s account, mainly  because it draws the 
line for intentionality  quite below the level of mentality. However, at the same time he 
acknowledges that  to instantiate intentional properties is not sufficient for instantiating 
semantic properties and therefore mental representations. Entities that bear just 
environmental information have intentionality only  in its most primary, first-order, 
manifestation, while genuine mental symbols have what Dretske calls higher-order 
intentionality (p. 173; see also Dretske, 1980). Therefore, for present purposes let us 
explore where he draws the line between mere information-bearing states and internal 
states with that qualify as mental symbols.23
 According to the Dretske, the crucial difference is given by the capacity to 
process and transform information in the right way. The main part in this process 
happens through the digitalisation of raw information carried out by the sensory system. 
In Dretske’s words:
It  is the successful conversion of information into (appropriate) digital form that constitutes 
the essence of cognitive activity. If the information that s is F is never converted from a 
sensory (analog) to a cognitive (digital) form, the system in question has, perhaps, seen, 
heard, or smelled an s which is F, but  it  has not  seen that  it  is F—does not know that  it  is F. 
(p. 142)
 To unpack this quote is it useful to explain the notions of analog and digital 
form. At the sensory level, a continuous and massive amount of information is 
registered and only a fraction of it ends up encoded in a symbolic structure. The 
richness of sensory information is a result of the direct impact of energy  coming from 
environmental properties, which according to Dretske is coded in analog form. He 
compares analog information at this level with our phenomenal experience of the world, 
which is “informationally rich and profuse in a way that our cognitive utilization of it is 
not” (p. 150). He gives the example of visual experience. Imagine we are in front  of a 
scene of a crowd of youngsters at play. We see, say, 27 children, and many  details such 
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23  At this point it is appropriate to make a terminological remark. As mentioned in the paragraph, 
according to Dretske’s usage the term intentionality does not imply mentality. In fact, the author regards 
intentionality, meaning and representation as properties that even simple artefacts can instantiate by virtue 
of their information-processing capacities. Instead, and as shall become apparent in the course of this 
chapter, Dretske draws the line for mentality on the possession of beliefs.
as their colours, relative location, size, etc. However, at first sight we probably are 
unaware of many of those details and cannot tell exactly  how many children are there 
(over a dozen? around 30?). Even though the information that there are 27 children has 
already been registered, it is still in analog form and needs some filtering in order to be 
available for thought. And the point is not just about phenomenologically  conscious 
thought, but  about cognitive processing in general. Unless some filtering is carried out 
and particular information extracted and encoded in the appropriate format, we simply 
cannot process it beyond our sensory systems. According to Dretske, this filtering 
amounts to digitalisation:
Until information has been extracted from this sensory structure (digitalisation), nothing 
corresponding to recognition, classification, identification, or judgment has occurred—
nothing, that is, of any conceptual or cognitive significance. (p. 153)
 The general idea is, then, that a minimum requisite for having mental symbols is 
to possess a “digital converter” that transforms analog information into a format suitable 
for cognitive processing. This is not to say that sensory  experience should not be 
considered as part of cognition, though. The point is that systems which lack the 
resources to code information in the appropriate digital form lack cognition altogether. 
In Dretske’s words:
[I]n order to qualify as a perceptual state (seeing s) a structure must be coupled to a cognitive 
mechanism capable of exploiting the information held in the sensory representation. (p. 258, 
n. 29)
 This idea should be considered as fairly straightforward insofar as many simple 
artefacts such as a mercury thermometer have the capacity to code analog information 
from the environment, while they clearly  lack mentality. But at the same time, it must 
be noted that not any digital conversion will do for generating mental symbols, since 
digitalisation is also widespread in simple artefacts. Take a mercury  thermometer. The 
position of the mercury column is a continuous variable that registers temperature in 
analog form. But imagine that electrodes are inserted in its tube in such a way that  when 
the mercury reaches 5ºC their contacts are closed and an electric impulse turns on a 
light. Then the light would be carrying a signal with the information that ‘the room is at 
5ºC’, which would be in digital form because it  has only two informationally relevant 
states (on and off). This example illustrates why it is implausible to attribute mentality 
just by virtue of being capable of digitalising information. There are subtleties in the 
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way information is digitalised, which constitute the core of Dretske’s proposal, and will 
be matter for the following section.
4.2 The Digitalisation Process
 From a more orthodox computational viewpoint, digitalisation can be described 
as a computational mechanism that starts with environmental information coded by 
sensory  systems in analog form, that after successive inferential processes is 
transformed into an informational structure. Dretske characterises informational 
structures in general as containing multiple layers of information, one nested under 
another. Each layer conveys a piece of information and more peripheral layers carry 
more specific information about the source, while the inner layers carry information that 
is more general. For example, suppose someone sees a dog that happens to be a brown 
poodle. Among the multiple information coded by her sensory systems is that ‘x is a 
dog’, but also more specific information about the source such that ‘x is a poodle’ and ‘x 
is a brown poodle’ (fig 1a). During the digitalisation process, informational structures 
are coded in such a way that a specific piece of the information it contains is singled 
out. On Dretske’s view, once this information has been “completely digitalised” it 
qualifies as the semantic content of the structure. To reach this level, the informational 
structure passes through processes of coding that involve filtering and selective 
sensitivity. Below I explain them in turn.
 
x is a brown poodle
x is a poodle
x is a dog
! !   Figure 1a                     Figure 1b
Figure 1a shows a multi-layered informational structure that carries the information that ‘x is a 
dog’ but also more general information about the source. Figure 1b illustrates an informational 
structure that has ‘x is a dog’ at its more peripheral layer and therefore carries no more general 
information than this.
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 Filtering: when an informational structure undergoes digitalisation it loses 
information that is irrelevant for the purposes of isolating its semantic content. More 
precisely, information conveyed in the more peripheral layers of the structure is filtered, 
leaving the information corresponding to the semantic content at the outermost layer. 
Therefore, no more specific information about the source is nested in the informational 
structure. Returning to the previous example, imagine that the person that sees the 
brown poodle generates a symbolic structure that has ‘x is a dog’ as its semantic 
content. During the conversion from analog to digital, its sensory information 
underwent a process where information more specific than ‘x is a dog’ was filtered by 
the digital converter, in particular the information that ‘x is a poodle’ and ‘x is a brown 
poodle’ (fig 1b). Therefore, ‘x is a dog’ ended up being at the outermost informational 
layer, viz. as the piece of information in which all other information is nested. 
According to Dretske, that means that this is the information that has been completely 
digitalised, and the one identified with the semantic content of the structure.
 Selective sensitivity: as mentioned above, informational structures have many 
pieces of more general information embedded within them. This information can be 
nomically or analytically nested. Nomically nested information corresponds to pieces of 
information that are entailed by a natural law by  the information carried by a signal. For 
example, if a signal carries the information that ‘x is a dog’ then it must also carry the 
information that ‘x is a mammal’ and that ‘x is an animal’ (fig. 2a). On the other hand, 
analytically nested information is logically  entailed. For instance, if a signal encodes the 
information ‘y is a square’, it must also carry the information that ‘y is a rectangle’ and 
‘y is a parallelogram’ (fig. 2b).
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x is a dog
x is a mammal
x is an animal
y is a square
y is a rectangle
y is a paralellogram
!     Figure 2a                         Figure 2b
Figure 2a shows a multi-layered informational structure that carries the information that ‘x is a 
dog’ and also nomically nested information.  Figure 2b illustrates an informational structure that 
carries the information that ‘x is a square’ and analytically nested information.
 
 While informational structures contain multiple layers of information, as 
explained above after the digitalisation process just one piece of information stands out 
from the rest, which corresponds to the one that has been completely digitalised and is 
situated at the outermost layer. Dretske claims that this is the only piece of information 
that is selectively sensitive (i.e. responsive) to that component of the incoming signal 
that defines the semantic content of the informational structure. In contrast, nomically 
or analytically nested information is not selectively sensitive to the information that  is 
causally responsible for the production of the informational structure, at least not in the 
same way than the one that corresponds to its semantic content. Take again the example 
of a structure that has ‘x is a dog’ as its semantic content. Even though that structure 
also carries the information about the property x is a mammal, only the property x is a 
dog is the one causally responsible for the production of a structure with that semantic 
content. For if x is a mammal had been the responsible for the generation of the 
structure, then its informational structure would had been different, one that has the 
information ‘x is a mammal’ as its outermost layer.
 The notion of selective sensitivity is also useful to tell apart the semantic content 
of a structure from information about the proximal events to which the delivery of this 
information depends. Any perceptual process that carries information about a signal also 
carries information about the means by which that information was produced. For 
example the information ‘x is a dog’ covaries nomically with patterns of light in the 
retinal surface and with electric signals of neurones, and therefore carries information 
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about those properties nested in its structure. But again, it is only ‘x is a dog’ that is 
selectively sensitive to the property of the environment that is accountable for causing 
an informational structure with that semantic content. As Dretske claims, all other 
information associated with its means of transmission depends on the causal link 
between the dog and the information that ‘x is a dog’, while that link does not depend 
on any  particular means of transmission, since multiple inferential routes and sensory 
modalities could had been effective to transmit the information that ‘x is a dog’. 
 At this point it  is interesting to note some similarities with Fodor’s view. First, 
the isolation of a specific piece of information that categorises a distal environmental 
property  and abstracts from the proximal means of its production is equivalent to the 
process that gives rise to percepts. As explained in 3.2, percepts correspond to basic 
representations of distal properties that remain constant however the information that 
originates them is variable and incomplete. What makes those percepts capable of being 
about a distal property is the capacity of perceptual systems to encode information 
coming from that  property and abstract from irrelevant information carried thought the 
coding process (i.e. generate perceptual constancies). 
 A second similarity is between the notion of selective sensitivity and Fodor’s 
asymmetric dependence. According to Dretske’s view, even though the piece of 
information a perceptual state has as its semantic content (i.e. the outermost piece) 
contains more information nomically and analytically nested in its structure, only  the 
information carried by the semantic content is the one that  has been completely 
digitalised. This corresponds to the piece of information that is causally responsible for 
the production of the perceptual state, and the one the perceptual system responds 
selectively to. On the contrary, nomically  or analytically  nested information is not 
selectively sensitive to the information that is causally  responsible for the production of 
the perceptual state, and in this sense the nested information can be said to be 
asymmetrically causally dependent upon information the structure carries as its 
semantic content (cf. Adams, 2003).
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4.3 Dretske’s First line: Digitalisation and Cognitive Structure
 Now I will focus on where Dretske situates the point in which the manufacture 
of informational structures gives rise to genuine mental symbols. An important part  of 
that process corresponds to the encoding of environmental information picked up by 
sensory  systems. As described in the section above, that information goes through 
digitalisation until one particular piece of information about the distal environment is 
completely digitalised. Dretske claims that that piece of information can be regarded as 
having semantic properties. One reason why it can be qualified as genuinely semantic is 
that it has what the he calls higher-order intentionality. Let me explain.
 According to Dretske, first-order intentionality is reached by any  informational 
structure since they do not carry  all the information that is extensionally equivalent to 
the source (see 4.2). But as noted in the previous section, informational structures 
cannot avoid carrying additional information that is nomically  or analytically nested in 
them. Any informational content that carries the information that ‘x is a dog’ will carry 
the nomically related information that ‘x is a mammal’, as well as the analytically 
entailed information of, say, ‘x is a canine’. However, by  delivering a semantic structure 
the digitalisation process “features or highlights one of these components [of the 
incoming information] at the expense of others” (p. 181). As I explained when 
introducing the notion of selective sensitivity, Dretske claims that the piece of 
information that corresponds to the semantic content of a structure is primarily related 
with the source, in the sense that all the other (nomically or analytically) nested 
information depends on its relation to the source in order to generate a state with that 
structure. Then for example, a structure having the semantic content that ‘x is a dog’ is 
sensitive to the property  of being a dog in a way  that grounds any  other relation between 
the structure and other properties of the dog. 
 Then the informational structure reaches what Dretske calls higher-order 
intentionality, insofar as the principle of intersubstitutivity of co-referring expressions 
fails to apply  to that  structure. This happens not just for the case of contingently 
associated information—as it occurs with first-order intentionality—but also for 
nomically and analytically  embedded information. Dretske sees having higher-order 
intentionality as a crucial step informational structures have to take towards the 
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acquisition of genuine mental properties, and indeed claims that “to qualify  for 
cognitive attributes a system must  be capable of occupying higher-order intentional 
states” (p. 172). And this is a consequence of the process of digitalisation, which yields 
structures with completely  digitalised information that corresponds to their semantic 
content. Dretske summarises this idea by contrasting how a television codes information 
with how humans do:
The crucial difference between the human viewer and the instrument is that the instrument is 
incapable of digitalizing this piece of information in a way a human viewer is. The television 
receiver slavishly transforms the information available in the electromagnetic signal into a 
picture on a screen without ever imposing a cognitive, higher-level intentional structure on 
any of it. (p. 183)
 But even if a television is endowed with the capacity  to completely digitalise 
some piece of information, this will not be enough for delivering a mental symbol. To 
completely digitalise a piece of information is a necessary, though not a sufficient 
condition for giving it a cognitive structure. Dretske forcibly  makes this point in the 
following passage:
I believe this is a mistake—a mistake fostered by a confusion of information-carrying 
structures on the one hand and genuine cognitive structures on the other. Even if we grant 
that the output  of these preliminary neural processes has a semantic content, this does not, by 
itself, qualify them for cognitive status. For unless these preliminary semantic structures 
have a hand on the steering wheel, unless their semantic content is a determinant of system 
output ... they do not themselves have cognitive content (p. 200)
 Then what Dretske understands as a genuinely cognitive informational structure 
is one that has semantic content, and at  the same time has this content with a functional 
role within the system that determines behaviour. If an informational structure exercises 
no control over the output, then it does not qualify  as a symbolic structure with any 
cognitive significance, and with that Dretske refers to structures like concepts, beliefs, 
and cognitive states that  characterise thought and knowledge in general. Then I take it, 
by switching to my own terminology, that according to Dretske the lack of functional 
roles also disqualifies a structure to count as mental symbol. 
 An important motivation Dretske has for stressing the need of functional roles 
for having genuine cognitive states is that mere informational structures cannot, even if 
completely digitalised, carry false semantic contents. This can be understood in terms of 
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the disjunction-problem discussed in the context of Fodor in 3.4.2. The problem 
emerges because a genuine mental symbol is supposed to be possibly tokened by 
information coming from environmental properties distinct from the one that constitutes 
its referent. This gives rise to the problem of either defining its content as a disjunct 
denoting all the properties that could possibly token that symbol, or to deny that it can 
be tokened by information other than the one coming from its referent (i.e. cannot 
misrepresent). Both alternatives are implausible, given that mental symbols are 
standardly supposed to denote particular properties instead of a disjunct, and to be 
capable of misrepresenting their referents. 
 In order to account  for misrepresentation, Dretske resorts to the functional roles 
of cognitive structures. Besides their semantic contents, cognitive structures also have 
what the author calls their information-carrying role (p. 192), which corresponds to a 
general type of cognitive structure acquired during a period of development or learning 
(L). During that period, certain information is completely  digitalised and the system 
thus becomes selectively sensitive to that piece of information. Besides, the structure is 
attached to an information-carrying role in the system such as that of discriminating and 
identifying the property of the environment that is the source of that information. The 
outcome of this process is the fixing of a type of cognitive structure with the appropriate 
semantic content, which can then be tokened in new structures that inherit  the same 
structure-type. In Dretske’s words:
Once this structure is developed, it acquires a life of its own, so to speak, and is capable of 
conferring on its subsequent tokens (particular instances of that  structure type) its semantic 
content (content  it acquired during L) whether or not these subsequent tokens actually have 
this as their informational content ... In short, the structure type acquires its meaning from 
the sort of information that led to its development as a cognitive structure. (p. 193)
 Since those subsequent tokens need not carry the information that generated the 
structure type, those tokens can misrepresent. This is because they still count as having 
the same content, in the sense that they are tokens of a structure type with that semantic 
content, even though they might not actually  be carrying information that  corresponds 
to that content. Dretske sometimes uses the term meaning to refer to semantic content, 
as a way to highlight its capacity to be tokened by a structure carrying the wrong 
information or even no information at all (in which case can be said to be carrying 
“putative information”; p. 262, n. 8). For present purposes, though, the important point 
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is that we cannot have genuinely  meaningful symbols without cognitive structures. The 
most that can be delivered from the digitalisation process is a completely digitalised 
informational structure, which might have the appropriate level of intentionality 
required for being semantic content, however it will lack genuine meaning insofar as 
informational structures as such cannot misrepresent. Their contents only become 
semantically  significant when they are tokened in a cognitive structure that derives from 
the right structure-type.
4.3.1 Problems with Dretske’s First Line
 To evaluate how plausible is Dretske’s criterion for drawing a line between 
mental and non-mental computational entities I shall examine whether his criterion 
would safely rule out entities that clearly lack mentality. Let us start by considering a 
simple artefact  such as a refrigerator thermostat. This artefact consists on a mercury 
thermometer with electrodes inserted in its tube, so that when the mercury reaches 5ºC 
their contacts are closed and an electric impulse is transmitted to a cooling system, 
which is turned on until the contacts are opened again. In this way, the thermostat keeps 
the temperature inside the refrigerator constantly below 5ºC. 
 Thanks to the capacity  of mercury  to nomically covary with the thermal 
properties of its immediate environment, the thermometer instantiates analog 
informational structures that carry information about the temperature in the fridge and 
that at least have first-order intentionality. But the artefact is also capable of some 
degree of digital encoding. Imagine that the mercury  column of the internal 
thermometer suddenly reaches the level marked as 6ºC and so an electric impulse is 
generated by its contact with the electrodes that is then transmitted to the cooling 
system. This electric signal carries the information that ‘r is over 5ºC’, which has been 
digitalised from the analog information coded by the thermometer. For even though the 
mercury column of the thermometer already bears the information that ‘r is over 5ºC’, it 
has it  coded in analog form because is nested on the more specific information that ‘r is 
at 6ºC’. What happens is that when this analog signal passes through the electrical 
circuit, the information that ‘r is over 5ºC’ is digitalised since more specific information 
(such as that ‘r is at 6ºC’) is lost and so at this point the circuit does not convey more 
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specific information about how much over 5ºC the room’s temperature actually  is. (cf. 
p. 140)
 So the thermostat could be regarded as a candidate for having semantic content 
since, at least to some degree, it is capable of digitalising a precise piece of information 
about the environment and delivering it to the cooling device. However, Dretske claims 
this is not the case since this piece of information has not been completely digitalised. 
There is digitalisation, since some process of filtering is going on, but the digitalisation 
is not complete insofar as the piece of information picked up by the electrodes and 
transmitted by the circuit is not selectively responsive to the information that should 
correspond to its semantic content, viz. that ‘r is over 5ºC’. Let me explain.
 First, when the information that ‘r is 5ºC’ reaches the cooling device it has not 
been completely digitalised because it is nested in more specific information related 
with the more proximal structures involved in the generation and transmission the 
information-bearing state, such as that the electrodes are in contact, the amount of 
current generated by them, the magnetic field that reaches the cooling system, etc. The 
cooling device is turned on in virtue of receiving information about temperature, but 
also in virtue of receiving information about these more proximal events (cf. p. 187). 
So, the argument goes, the information-bearing state never encodes the information that 
‘r is over 5ºC’ in way specific enough to constitute semantic content. In Dretske’s terms, 
there are larger information layers in which this information is nested, and therefore the 
informational structure never carries the information that ‘r is over 5ºC’ as its outermost 
informational layer. 
 A related reason is that the thermostat is a device that has been built to always 
respond to the same kind of information-bearing state, which, as previously  noted, 
conveys information about the intermediate events by means of which the production 
and delivery of this information depends. So the information-bearing state cannot 
abstract from this more proximal processes to encode a more specific and distal piece of 
information about the world. Entities which produce states with semantic content, on 
the other hand, should be plastic enough to extract the same piece of information about 
the world from a variety of different physical vehicles that may deliver this information, 
in the same sense as cognitive systems can encode the same semantic content from 
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information conveyed by different sensory  modalities (p. 188). Again, the informational 
structure is not selectively  responsive to the information that ‘r is over 5ºC’, because it 
carries that  information in virtue of carrying information about the proximal means by 
which that information was produced and transmitted. That additional information is not 
asymmetrically dependent on the piece of information that has been digitalised, and 
therefore the latter lacks the higher-level intentionality required for qualifying as 
semantic content. 
 Having shown that the thermostat can be safely ruled out from the scope of 
mentality, let us now examine a more complex artefact, a vending machine. I refer to a 
vending machine of the same type as the one described in 3.3.1, when discussing 
Fodor’s proposal. Even though a vending machine is more complex than a thermostat, it 
is also certainly incapable of instantiating any property that would go beyond mere 
information-bearing states, such as semantic or mental properties. To attribute mental 
symbols to vending machines would be to extend the psychological domain far beyond 
what seems plausible.
 As with the thermostat, the vending machine is surely capable of digitalising 
information. It converts information about different features of the coins (i.e. weight, 
size and magnetic content) to an electric signal that  carries information about which 
type of coin was inserted. This last information is coded in digital form because more 
specific information about features of the coin was filtered during the process, leaving 
an informational structure carrying information such as that ‘x is a one pound coin’. 
Now the question is whether the vending machine can carry  a piece of information in 
completely digitalised form, and therefore have an internal state capable of bearing 
semantic content. Can the information that ‘x is a one pound coin’ be selectively 
sensitive to that property of the coin inserted in the machine? Can this information be 
carried by the informational structure in a way that is not dependent on the proximal 
means that mediate its production and transmission?
  If the internal state that bears the information that ‘x is a one pound coin’ is 
completely digitalised then it should be possible for the machine to distinguish it from 
other states that may carry information that matches some of the information embedded 
in the former digital state. For example, the information that ‘x is a coin’ would be 
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embedded in any state which also bears the information that  ‘x is a one pound coin’, 
since the former is (let us say) analytically  nested in the latter. If the machine shows a 
behaviour that is caused selectively by the information ‘x is a one pound coin’ and not 
by ‘x is a coin’, this would provide us with evidence that at least the machine has two 
ways of encoding the information about a coin: one that  digitalises the information that 
‘x is a coin’ and other that  digitalises the information that ‘x is a one pound coin’ (and of 
course also has the information that ‘x is a coin’ nested in its informational structure). 
 I believe it is easy to show that the machine can make this discrimination. First, 
its coin detector can distinguish genuine coins from fake ones and from other objects 
that may fit into the coin slot, through its capacity to measure the weight, size and 
magnetic content of the object. Secondly, every time it is loaded with a valid coin it 
accepts it, thus responding to the property  x is a (UK) coin. But also, it can identify 
different kinds of coins, running from one penny to two pound coins. So besides 
identifying coins, it  can sort one pound coins from that set. This shows that the machine 
can digitalise the information that ‘x is a one pound coin’, since it can instantiate two 
states that  share the information ‘x is a coin’ and sort one of them in virtue of carrying a 
piece of more specific information about the coin.
 However, this still does not show that a piece of information has been 
completely digitalised, since it could be nested in more specific information about more 
proximal events involved in the generation and transmission of the information-bearing 
state. As I explained with the example of the thermostat  and the way it  encodes the 
information that ‘r is 5Cº’, some devices have a fixed architecture that picks up 
information always in the same way. A thermostat cannot abstract certain piece of 
information from information related with its means of production, and so is not plastic 
enough to extract  the same type of information from different kinds of incoming 
signals, something that according to Dretske is one of the main characteristics of 
systems that can encode states with semantic content. I believe that this argument works 
for the case of the thermostat, but I will show that it cannot be applied to the vending 
machine.
 Let us examine how the vending machine encodes the information that ‘x is one 
pound’s worth’. The machine dispenses a beverage selectively when loaded with one 
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pound’s worth, and can produce the same output in response to different possible inputs, 
which could be any of the 4563 possible combinations of coins ranging from 1 penny to 
1 pound that could make for a pound. Moreover, in order to dispense the right change 
the machine can carry out an algebraic operation where one of the quantities stands for 
being one pound’s worth (see 3.3.1). These observations not only suggest that the 
machine is really  instantiating an information-bearing state which carries the 
information that  ‘x is one pound’s worth’, but also that this information can be sorted 
out from a variety of different inputs (and in case you are not satisfied with all the 
combinations of coins, just  imagine a vending machine that can also scan banknotes). 
Therefore it seems plausible to grant the machine with the plasticity  to extract the 
information that ‘x is one pound’s worth’ from a variety of signals, so isolating it  from 
information about more proximal processes related with the input. All this suggests that 
the vending machine carries the information that ‘x is one pound’s worth’ in completely 
digitalised form, and therefore would have an information-bearing state with that 
semantic content. I believe this works as a counterexample to Dretske’s proposal, as 
mentioned above.
4.4 Dretske after 1981
 From the viewpoint of scientific realism, the metaphysical status of mental states 
is vindicated by their causal role in scientific theories that explain behaviour. In other 
words, it is in the context  of psychological theories where psychological notions acquire 
ontological status. Otherwise, if notions such as mental symbols and reasoning 
processes play no role in behavioural explanation, their metaphysical condition appears 
to be close to epiphenomenalism. 
 In his work following 1981, Dretske24  (1988, 1999) adverts to some of these 
ideas and puts behaviour at the centre of his theory of mental symbols. He thus shifts his 
attention from the informational origins of mental symbols, to the causal or explanatory 
role information plays in behaviour. As Dretske (1994) says:
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24  In his 1986, Dretske put forward a somewhat different (teleological) approach, however it was later 
abandoned for his 1988 account.
[I]f information has to do with the nomic dependencies between events, then for information 
to do any causal or explanatory work in the world these dependencies have to do some 
causal or explanatory work in the world. (p. 262)
 This view can be regarded as continuous with his previous work described 
above. On the one hand, Dretske regards mental symbols as originated by the effect of 
digitalised information on the crystallisation of cognitive structures with certain 
information-carrying role. On the other, he still believes that to count  as mental symbols 
it is crucial for internal states to yield some functional role in behaviour. However, 
Dretske now focuses on how to link this informational approach to the origins of mental 
symbols with the role they have in explanations of behaviour. On his present view, what 
characterises the behaviour of mental creatures is that it is the expression of intelligent 
thought and purpose (or is the product  of genuine agency, as he says in 1999). 
Therefore, if information is to be relevant for explaining behaviour, it  must be causally 
linked with the mechanisms that give rise to purposeful behaviour. Let me explain this 
idea through examples.
 Take again the case of the thermostat. According to Dretske’s account, when a 
thermostat switches on a cooling device in response to a rise in the refrigerator’s 
temperature its behaviour is caused by a state with the semantic content of ‘r is over 
5ºC’. Or to use a different example, when I delete some letters that appear in the screen 
of my laptop by pressing the key  DELETE, what causes my laptop to do so is an 
internal state it has that means ‘delete a letter’. But even though the states responsible 
for these behaviours have a content, these are not purposeful actions in Dretske’s sense. 
This is because, he argues, what is relevant to explain the production of these 
behaviours is not the content of the states, but some intrinsic (physical or functional) 
properties of the artefact.
 This is clear from the fact that even if we change the informational contents of 
these states the behaviour of the artefacts would remain the same. For example, we 
could change the thermostat’s state meaning to ‘r is too hot’ or ‘turn on the cooling 
device!’ and it would continue switching the device on in the same way, because what 
really causes this behaviour is that (say) its mercury column reaches the electrodes and 
closes their contacts. And the same applies to the laptop’s key; irrespective of its 
contents, what really  explains the deleting behaviour is an algorithm that runs patterns 
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of zeros and ones in the laptop’s processor. Then the question turns to what makes it 
possible for some entities to have states whose meanings are the real causes of their 
behaviours. Dretske summarises the whole idea in the following passage, suggesting 
that we might find purposeful action in animals:
Machines don’t think, and so nothing they do is governed by what they think, but  their 
behaviour is sometimes controlled by internal states with a meaning remarkably like that 
which controls the behaviour of intelligent agents. Seeing exactly what  is missing in the case 
of machines—why meaning doesn’t actually control their behaviour—will give us a better 
understanding of how meaning gets its hand on the steering wheel in animals. (p. 23)
4.5 The Structuring Causes of Behaviour
 Before going into the details of Dretske’s present account about what makes for 
mental symbols, it is important to introduce a distinction the author formulates between 
two alternative causal explanations of behaviour (Dretske, 1988). When discussing the 
role alternative causal events (C) have in our explanations of certain behaviour (M), he 
writes:
In looking for the cause of a process, we are sometimes looking for the triggering event: 
what caused the C which  caused the M. At  other times we are looking for the event  or events 
that shaped or structured the process: what  caused C to cause M rather than something else. 
The first  type of cause, the triggering cause, causes the process to occur now. The second 
type of cause, the structuring cause, is responsive for its being this process, one having M as 
its product, that occurs now. (p. 42)
 A typical example of triggering cause can be found in the behaviour of artefacts 
described in the previous section, which is properly explained in terms of the proximal 
physical or functional events that take place inside them. By  contrast, the structuring 
cause focuses on the historical events that configured the internal events of the machine 
to have their current structure and behave the way they do. For example, the thermostat 
switches a cooling device on in response to temperature because it was designed, by its 
creator, to perform that way.
 Dretske elaborates this distinction in his analysis of the role of semantic content 
in the causation of behaviour. As previously noted, the thermostat’s state that controls 
the cooling device has a content, but it is not this content which explains the behaviour. 
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This is because the triggering causes of the thermostat’s behaviour are physical events 
which are themselves not sensitive to content. But if we look at the structuring cause 
then we find out that meaning is really  playing a role, because the creator of the 
thermostat was an agent that had the purpose of building the artefact to perform its 
function. Meaningful events inside the head of the creator shaped the structure of the 
thermostat, and thus are responsible, at  least in this historical sense, of its current 
behaviour. But the point is that purposeful action is coming from “outside” since there is 
nothing inside the thermostat, no intrinsic properties of it, that have a meaning with 
causal powers over its behaviour.  
 An intriguing point is that structural causes are not always due to human 
creators. This is the case with biological organisms, whose intrinsic properties were 
designed by (presumably) processes of natural selection where no thinking or agency 
took place. For example, the hypothalamus functions as a thermostat to keep body 
temperature constant at about  37ºC. The triggering causes that explain its behaviour 
involve physical states that register body temperature which, following Dretske, have 
content. However, in contrast to the artificial thermostat the structuring cause of this 
biological thermostat  does not involve purposeful agents but a gradual process of 
natural selection. The mechanisms that govern the behaviour of the hypothalamus are 
not dependent on the purposes of any thinking being. Does this confer on the 
hypothalamus genuine agency and therefore mental symbols?
 Dretske’s response would be no, because the structuring cause of the 
hypothalamus behaviour is still coming from “outside”, this time not from some human 
mind but from a history of selection over the behaviour of previous organisms that 
evolved the hypothalamus. The meanings that may be found in the internal states of this 
biological thermostat have been fixed by processes that happened long before the 
existence of the organism that actually possesses them. As happened with the artificial 
thermostat, nothing internal to the hypothalamus explains why some of its states have 
meaning. These meanings have been fixed through structuring causes that are out of the 
control of the organism who has the hypothalamus, and therefore cannot be governed by 
it to produce purposeful behaviour. As the Dretske (1988) says, even though the cause 
of its behaviour “has meaning of the relevant kind, this is not a meaning that has to or 
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for the animal in which it occurs. That, basically, is why genetically determined 
behaviors are not explicable in terms of the actor’s reasons.” (p. 95)
4.6 Dretske’s Second Line: Learning
 Dretske claims that it is in simple cases of animal learning (viz. conditioning) 
where meaning starts to play a genuine explanatory  role in behaviour. In the following I 
will focus on his paper Machines, plants and animals: the origins of agency where he 
directly  addresses the issue of what makes a creature capable of thought and purposeful 
behaviour. There he gives the example of a foraging bird that learns to avoid a 
poisonous butterfly:
A foraging bird tries to eat a Monarch butterfly. This butterfly has been reared on a toxic 
form of milkweed. Such butterflies are poisonous and cause birds to vomit. After one nasty 
encounter, the bird avoids butterflies that  look like the one that  made it sick. A day later our 
bird sees a tasty Viceroy, a butterfly with an appearance remarkably like that of the noxious 
Monarch. The Viceroy, though, is not poisonous. It has developed this coloration as a 
defence from predatory birds. It  mimics the appearance of the Monarch so that birds will 
“think” that  it, too, tastes nasty and avoid it. Our bird sees the Viceroy and flies away. 
(Dretske, 1999, p. 27)
 Dretske argues that in this case it seems natural to say that the bird avoids 
viceroys because it appears to believe that the bug it sees tastes bad, and thus to regard 
the bird as having agency. It  has an internal (perceptual) state that means (say) ‘M-
looking bug’, and which explains why the bird flies away when it  encounters one of 
these butterflies. But, what distinguishes this example from the case of the thermostats? 
After all, in both the artifactual and the hypothalamic thermostats there is an internal 
state that means that the temperature is too high and that is responsible for activating 
some cooling mechanism. 
 The key  difference is that, as previously noted, in the case of thermostats the 
meaning of their internal state is not responsible for the behaviour since this meaning 
comes from “outside” the entity/organisms that  possesses the thermostat, this “outside” 
been understood as not within the scope of the actual engagements the organism has 
with the environment. So, the argument goes, the structuring cause of the thermostat’s 
behaviour relies on a human creator or natural selection, and nothing inside it has 
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determined the meanings of its relevant internal states. This contrasts with the case of 
the bird. Since this animal is capable of learning, an internal event that has occurred to 
the organism itself (i.e. perception and memory registration) is now implicated in 
behaviour. What makes the difference is that the meaning of the event has been 
structured from “inside” the organism, in contrast  with the case of thermostats where 
meaning had been fixed from antecedent events that were not caused by the entity/
organism itself.
 Of course, the meaning and behavioural role of the internal states of a thermostat 
can be modified at the present time, for example by calibrating its thermometer or by 
adjusting its connections with cooling or heating devices. But these modifications, 
Dretske argues, are due to the designer’s (our) purposes, and the events that 
reconfigured the artefact and thus explain its new behaviour (i.e. the structuring cause) 
were never an achievement of the thermostat. The internal states may be meaningful for 
us, but not for the thermostat  itself. On the other hand, in the case of the bird the fact 
that the structuring cause of its behaviour is the product of its internal responses to past 
experience, makes its internal states meaningful for the bird, and so directly  implicated 
in its behaviour. 
4.6.1 Problems with Dretske’s Second Line
 In the paper under discussion as well as in his 1988 book, Dretske draws the line 
for mental representation at the capacity to learn. His conception of learning is basically 
behavioursitic, in particular operant conditioning. A critique that could be made against 
Dretske is that this kind of learning requires representation (Gallistel, 1990), and 
therefore it begs the question about where representation begins. If the internal states 
that give rise to learning are already representational and thus have meaning, then 
learning cannot be the instance where mental representations emerge (Burge, 2010). 
 I believe this critique is misguided and probably leads to a futile terminological 
dispute about  what is meant by  representation. From his early  writings (e.g. 1980) 
Dretske has been quite liberal concerning the attribution of representations and, indeed, 
the same can be said with the attribution of meaning in his 1999 paper. He regards 
99
internal states that bear natural meaning as meaningful, however he is clear in his 
purpose of distinguishing between these representational states and genuine thoughts, 
the latter understood as (higher-level) internal states with a content of the same kind as 
beliefs. It is thus a mistake to say that Dretske cannot appeal to representational states 
involved in learning processes, since these processes are supposed to give rise to higher-
level representational states which do develop mental properties not present in their 
predecessors. Perhaps it would be convenient to reserve the term representation for 
mental representations, and call other informational or computational states just 
informational structures (as I have been doing so far), but this is just a terminological 
issue that does not undermine Dretske’s attempt to draw the line for mental 
representation at the level of learning. 
 Having said this, I believe Dretske’s proposal is too liberal. If the threshold for 
purposeful action and thus to mental representation is situated at the capacity to learn by 
operant conditioning, then we would have to attribute mental representations to some 
artefacts and animals which intuitively lack mentality. Starting with artefacts, it  is 
certainly possible to program some robots with learning algorithms that make them able 
to develop  behavioural effects similar to classical and operant conditioning. For 
example, the robot Amelia (Touretzky & Saksida, 1997) was designed to “learn” to sort 
objects into bins based on colour. The robot had to be trained by receiving a reward 
signal when its desired response occurred, and after short period it was able to 
discriminate the objects based on colour and to drop  them in bins at certain location, in 
accordance with the desires of the trainers. The experimenters concluded that Amelia 
exhibited most of the hallmarks of operant conditioning. In addition, robots SAIL and 
Dav, based on a connectionist architecture which had not been previously programmed 
for any particular task, have shown to be capable of learning a variety of skills such as 
autonomous navigation and speech recognition (Weng, 2004).
 If we take experiments like this seriously, then we should acknowledge that 
some computational artefacts can develop forms of learning of the sort Dretske 
describes as constitutive of purposeful action. However, this appears to be implausible, 
as Dretske (1999) himself recognises when he states that “machines don’t think, and so 
nothing they do is governed by  what they think, but their behaviour is sometimes 
controlled by internal states remarkably like that which controls the behaviour of 
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intelligent agents” (p.22). We could then interpret Dretske as claiming that  machines 
such as Amelia are just  mirroring genuine learning, and so are a mere simulation of 
purposeful behaviour. But it is wrong to interpret him that way, since he intends to draw 
the line for genuine thought on the capacity to learn and not in some additional 
distinction between machines and animals that would make the former a simulation of 
the latter. 
 As mentioned, a similar counterargument can be put forward by appeal to 
animals. Recall the habituation response of Aplysia presented in section 1.4.3, which is 
a basic form of learning. But most notably for present purposes, Aplysia is also capable 
of associative learning such as classical conditioning (Hawkins & Kandel, 1984) and 
therefore is comparable to the case of learning by the foraging bird presented by 
Dretske (and discussed above). But as shown in 1.4.3, these sorts of learning behaviour 
can be satisfactorily explained in terms of the physical domain, and there is no 
justification to deploy  symbolic and computational processing to account for them. 
Even if we take into account biological organisms such as Aplysia, learning as such 
does not appear to be a safe place to draw the line that marks the origins of mentality. 
4.7 Conclusions
 In the context of informational approaches to representation, Dretske provides 
one of the most detailed proposals about how information could be regarded as the basic 
ingredient for making a mind. He goes deep  into the engineering problem of 
understanding how the gap between informational structures and mental symbols could 
be bridged, certainly deeper than Fodor does. One distinctive aspect of his view (in 
particular the one presented in 4.6) is, however, that  he includes the aetiology of 
symbolic structures as relevant for determining which of them count as mental symbols. 
But irrespective of the particular problems of etiological approaches to mental symbols 
in general (see 2.3.2 and the next chapter for discussion), I have argued that Dretske’s 
proposal draws the line for what makes for mentality too low, and is thus susceptible to 
counterexamples. If his view implies that vending machines and simple animals such as 
Aplysia have mental symbols, then it ends up being too liberal and needs further 
refinements. I believe that those refinements come in the way of adding more 
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complexity to the computational architecture of central cognition, and explaining how 
in that context symbolic structures could play  the functional roles that characterise 
psychological explanations. But this shall be explored in the remainder of this thesis.
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Chapter Five 
Teleological Approach: Burge on Drawing the Line
5.0 Introduction
 Tyler Burge has put forward an alternative way to draw the line for the origins of 
mental representations. His proposal shares the basic tenets of computational and 
informational approaches presented in the previous chapters, and like Fodor he claims 
that percepts can already be considered genuine mental representations. However, he 
adds teleology  to his account, by arguing that  the capacity  of perceptual systems to yield 
mental representations is grounded on what he calls representational functions.
 In the present chapter I review Burge’s view, beginning by  showing how it 
departs from previous informational and teleological approaches, to then present his 
own proposal and raise two objections to it. Overall, I conclude that even though some 
notions he introduces—such that of agency—can be useful for the purposes of this 
thesis, Burge’s notion of representational function is problematic and ends up  drawing 
the line for mental representation too low.
5.1 Burge’s Project in the Context of CTM25
Perceptual representation is where genuine representation begins. In studying perception, 
representational psychology begins. With perception, one might even say, mind begins. 
(Burge, 2010, p. 367)
 In his recent book Origins of Objectivity, Tyler Burge (2010)26  develops an 
account of the minimum conditions for having mental representations. He claims that 
the most elementary  forms of mental representation are already present in perceptual 
systems. He calls these forms objective empirical representations, viz. the 
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25 Parts of this chapter are adapted from my article Is perception representational? Tyler Burge on 
perceptual functions.
26 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to pages correspond to this book.
representation of basic environmental kinds, properties or relations27. Burge presents 
empirical evidence that suggests that perceptual systems appear to be widespread in the 
animal kingdom, even in phylogenetically primitive animals such as arthropods. 
Therefore, the author contends that the line for the origins of mental representation 
should be drawn at a low stage in the evolutionary tree of life.
 Burge grounds his account in scientific work on perceptual psychology  in 
accordance with the cognitive tradition. Accordingly, he agrees with the basic tenets of 
the computational approach to perceptual psychology that I described in 3.2 in the 
context of Fodor’s account. Here is a brief description of it:
The current  Establishment  theory (sometimes referred to as the “information processing” 
view) is that perception depends, in several respects presently to be discussed, upon 
inferences ... And since, finally, the Establishment  theory holds that the psychological 
mechanism of inference is the transformation of mental representations, it follows that 
perception is in relevant respects a computational process. (Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981, pp.
141-142).
 According to this theory (which I shall call computational approach to 
perception) perception is a threefold process composed by transducers, input systems, 
and mechanisms of belief fixation. Information coming from the environment is 
encoded through transducers and then transformed by input systems into perceptual 
categories or percepts, which as mentioned in 3.2 are taken as basic categories of 
properties of the environment. A characteristic feature of percepts is that they can 
represent environmental invariants. This is possible thanks to the mediation of the 
inferential mechanisms of input systems, which constrain the possible interpretations of 
the sensory input in order to yield a constant perception of distal environmental 
properties. As it  was for Fodor, according to Burge this is the stage of information 
processing where genuine mental representations are formed, or in his own terms, 
where objectification occurs. In Burge’s words:
A perceptual system achieves objectification by—and I am inclined to believe only by—
exercising perceptual constancies—given, of course, the background of relations to the 
environment through individual functions just sketched. (p. 408)
 For an explanation of the “individual functions” mentioned in the quote we will 
have to wait until section 5.5. For present purposes, what I want to highlight is that 
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27 To simplify the exposition, in the rest of this chapter I shall just refer to environmental properties.
percepts, viz. the stage of perception where perceptual invariants are detected, are 
considered by Burge as the primary form of mental representation. 
 But even though there are evident similarities, Burge’s view differs from Fodor’s 
in some important  respects. Burge contends that informational approaches to 
representation are deflationary in the sense of being too permissive at attributing mental 
representations. I shall critically present his arguments on this matter in 5.2. Besides, 
Burge goes on to say that to explain the emergence of genuine representations some 
teleological notions have to be added. However, he departs from mainstream 
teleological theories by not relying on a biological notion of function. In 5.4 I discuss 
Burge’s arguments on this respect. When it comes to his positive view, the Burge 
develops a teleological approach to perceptual functions which he calls representational 
functions. I present his proposal in section 5.5 to then raise some objections to it in the 
final sections of this chapter.
 Before passing to the next section, it is convenient to make a terminological note 
regarding Burge’s use of the term “representation”. Contrary to authors such as Fodor or 
Dretske that have no problem with saying that, for example, thermometers can represent 
the temperature in a room, Burge proposes to restrict the use of the term 
“representation” to (scientific) psychological explanations. He grounds his view in a 
form of scientific realism like the one I presented in 1.1.2, thus limiting the use of the 
psychological term “representation” to account for events that are better explained by 
the psychological level. So to facilitate the exposition of Burge’s view, in the remainder 
of the present chapter this term shall be considered as equivalent to mental 
representation or mental symbol. 
5.2 Against Informational Approaches
 As noted above, Burge’s proposal builds upon some principles of the 
computational approach. He also endorses some ideas from informational approaches to 
representation, at  least in the sense that  information-bearing states are precursors of 
perceptual representations. He accuses, however, informational approaches such as 
Fodor’s and Dretske’s of being “deflationary” in the sense that they draw the line for 
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representation too low by describing in representational terms the behaviour of animals 
and artefacts that clearly do not demand a psychological explanation. Following the 
path of scientific realism, Burge contends that in those informational approaches 
“representation is to be assimilated to notions that have no distinctive theoretical 
relation to psychology as it is ordinarily understood” (p. 293).
 Recalling the discussion of previous chapters and along general lines, 
informational approaches are formulated by following the distinction between sensory 
information and percepts. While sensory  information is directly  correlated with 
proximal environmental properties, percepts are inferentially mediated. Some authors 
have proposed that the inferential route that runs from sensory information to percepts 
can be regarded as setting a normative standard for what is an accurate percept, and 
interestingly open the possibility of error. As Fodor and Pylyshyn (1981) put it:
The standard approach to this problem within Establishment  theories is to connect 
misperception with failed inference ... These inferences depend upon generalisations gleaned 
from past experience, and the generalisations are themselves nondemonstrative, and hence 
fallible. (p. 153)
 So the idea is that when a percept is the result of the right inferential process 
then it is accurate, and when this process fails but at the same type the percept is 
instantiated then we have case of misrepresentation (cf. p. 92). One problem with this 
idea is to determine which is the right inferential process without begging the question 
by presupposing what is normatively correct or incorrect. A common way  to develop 
this view is to link perceptual accuracy with some sort of regularity  of statistically 
constant inferential route, thus explaining misrepresentation in terms of statistical 
atypicality. But Burge (p. 299) replies that causal-inferential routes cannot be 
considered right or wrong by themselves, and infrequent or abnormal percepts need not 
be mistaken. It  is perfectly possible, for instance, for a perceptual system to perceive 
accurately certain environmental object even though it  is highly infrequent or even if it 
has never appeared before. According to Burge, the only way to assign normativity to 
perceptual processes is to supplement them with teleology. But before considering this 
idea let us examine how Burge targets the specific informational approaches of Dretske 
and Fodor. 
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 As explained in the previous chapter, Dretske considers learning as a crucial step 
towards the conversion of information-bearing states to mental representations. Dretske 
(1981) describes learning as the (main) way information can be crystallised into a 
cognitive structure capable of misrepresenting, while in later works he highlights that 
only through learning a creature can be regarded as self-determining some of its inner 
symbols and in consequence be ascribed as possessing genuine mental representations. 
 Burge raises several critiques to Dretske’s view. The main one is similar to the 
critique I put forward in 4.6.1, namely that basic forms of learning such as associative 
conditioning are already present in artefacts and animals that clearly  lack mentality. For 
example, Burge writes:
Flatworms and snails exhibit  habituation and trial-and-error association that 
straightforwardly meet  the requirements of this conception of learning. [However,] I think 
that anyone who hoped to draw an interesting distinction between biologically functional 
information-carrying and some more psychologically distinctive kind of representation 
would not draw it just below snails and flatworms. (p. 307)
 Another worry presented by  Burge is that, in a way, learning also draws the line 
for representation too high. This is because nothing appears to rule out, as a matter of 
principle, that a creature who cannot learn but is equipped with innate perceptual 
mechanisms could yield representational states. This argument works for Burge since he 
grounds his view of perceptual representations in their role in (actual) psychological 
explanations and not in the aetiology  of the respective psychological capacities. Then, 
according to him, representational states derive from perceptual mechanisms that fulfil 
certain functions irrespective of whether they are innate or acquired. I shall return to 
these issues in the next section and in 5.5 when presenting Burge’s own positive view. 
Overall, I believe that in general Burge’s critique to Dretske’s proposal is compelling, 
and compatible with my own discussion of this proposal in the previous chapter. Now, 
let us examine how Burge deals with Fodor’s version of informational approaches.
 As described in 3.4, Fodor puts forward a theory of mental representations that 
grounds their semantic properties on nomological relations they bear with their 
respective referents. In order to be genuinely semantic, those relations have to be 
primary, in the sense that any  other nomic relation between the mental representation 
and other environmental properties has to be asymmetrically dependent upon the one it 
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bears with its referent. Burge in a footnote (p. 307) takes issue with Fodor’s view and 
presents two worries. 
 The first is that Burge regards as implausible to claim that there are laws 
connecting “higher” representational states with their referents, and that the only way to 
do so implies formulating those laws or law-like patterns in representational terms. To 
evaluate this critique let us consider Fodor’s own discussion of higher (i.e. abstract) 
representational states such ‘virtuous’ (Fodor, 1990, p. 111). According to Fodor, what 
happens in this case is essentially the same as what happens with the instantiation of any 
other mental representation; the token ‘virtuous’ is caused by  the property  of being 
virtuous. But, is it plausible that being virtuous is a real property  of the environment, to 
which we can bear nomic relations? Fodor would respond affirmatively, by  appealing to 
the (inferential) mechanisms that sustain the relation between mental representations 
and their referents (Fodor, 1998). He contends that properties such as being virtuous 
have a real, however mind-dependent and relational, metaphysical status. They are real 
because there seems to be something like being virtuous, in the same sense than there is 
something like being a dog or a being doorknob. Indeed, Fodor considers it 
preposterous to deny that people can normally tell whether someone or something has 
one of those properties or not. And they  are mind-dependent because to be virtuous “just 
is to have that property that  minds like ours (do or would) lock [i.e. get fixed] to in 
virtue of experiences of typical instances of” being virtuous (Fodor, 1998, p.137).
 Burge does not appear to be satisfied with a response of this kind, and in his 
second worry he points out to the case of uninstantiated properties (e.g. unicorn) to 
show how implausible he finds the appeal to laws connecting those properties with 
representational states. Without getting into the details, the way Fodor (1990) has 
replied to attacks of this sort by formulating his theory  of content in purely nomological, 
and not causal, terms. This allows representations to be about uninstantiated properties 
even if there cannot be causal relations between them, insofar as they  are nomologically 
linked. All he needs is that  the property  in question is nomologically  possible, viz. that 
there are possible worlds where unicorns would cause tokens of ‘unicorn’ in our heads. 
Even though Burge does not address this reply directly, he considers Fodor’s proposals 
unsuitable for a scientific account about mind and indeed “very remote from any actual 
theorising about representational phenomena” (p. 307). 
108
 I believe that instead of constituting a refutation of Fodor’s proposal, Burge’s 
considerations reflect a fundamental methodological difference between his view and 
Fodor’s. Let me explain. Burge endorses a form of scientific realism according to which 
representational contents are individuated by way of being part of relevant explanatory 
distinctions made by perceptual psychology (p. 293). And since scientific explanations 
typically describe causal mechanisms, Burge assumes that the individuation of content 
has to involve causal relations with the environment. When it comes to  representations 
of uninstantiated properties, he claims that those relations are indirect, mediated by their 
associations with other representations that  do engage in causal relations with the world 
(p. 86). For example, ‘unicorn’ would be explained by appeal to its relation to 
representations of horses, horns, etc. 
 Fodor, on the other hand, makes no such commitment to scientific realism, at 
least for the purposes of individuating representational contents. Consider the following 
passage from Fodor (1994):
[C]oncepts aren’t individuated by the roles that  they play in inferences, or, indeed, by their 
roles in any other mental processes. If, by stipulation, semantics is about what  constitutes 
concepts and psychology is about the nature of mental processes, then the view I’m 
recommending is that semantics isn’t part of psychology. (p. 122)
 Fodor individuates mental representations (i.e. concepts) by specifying their 
contents, and since contents are not determined by their roles in scientific theories, they 
are not individuated by appeal to psychology. Of course, Fodor does not deny  that 
mental representations are part of psychological explanations, since he indeed claims 
that psychological laws quantify  over representational contents. But in contrast to 
Burge, he does not circumscribe his account of representational content to (causal) 
psychological theories. Fodor’s theory of content is therefore open to include relations 
between representational states and uninstantiated properties, relations that however are 
metaphysically  possible (viz. in possible worlds), they cannot figure in causal 
explanations of psychology. This is a debatable issue where I shall not enter, however it 
seems that Fodor’s approach is at odds with my  own commitment to scientific realism 
presented in the first chapter. In this sense, Burge’s critique seems plausible, and 
compatible with the critique to Fodor I advanced in section 3.3.2.  
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5.3 Teleology Enters the Scene
 Before addressing Burge’s particular version of perceptual functions and as a 
way of preparing the following discussion, I shall introduce teleological approaches to 
perception in general. Teleological theories attempt to apply the notion of function to 
explain how perceptual systems work. To ascribe a system with a function means to 
understand its mechanisms as aimed at a certain end or goal (telos). A characteristic of 
functional explanations is that they  are normative, in the sense that a functional system 
ought to perform its functions, and failure to perform them is a kind of error. 
 One advantage of ascribing functions to perceptual systems is that they could be 
used to explain the normative character of perceptual states. By ascribing perceptual 
mechanisms with the function of detecting properties of the environment, teleological 
theories attempt to characterise them as having the purpose of instantiating an accurate 
representation of these properties. And in the case that those mechanisms end up 
detecting a different property  than the one corresponding to their function, teleological 
theories describe them as a case of malfunctioning and misrepresentation. 
 Teleological theories typically make use of a biological approach to functions, 
which analyses them in terms of their aetiology, viz. by  identifying the function of a 
system with reference to the reasons why the system has the function it does (Wright, 
1973). Since the mainstream view among philosophers of biology is that the best 
explanation of why systems have functions is natural selection, teleological theories 
normally define functions by appealing to how they evolved by natural selection (Allen, 
2009). For example, they consider that  the function of the heart is to pump blood 
because this function played some role in enhancing the survival and reproduction of 
the organism, and hence the species. 
 This version of teleological approaches to mental representation is what  I shall 
call teleo-biological theories. In addition to giving a naturalistic and mind-independent 
account of function, teleo-biological theories also can distinguish the system’s functions 
from other accidental effects they may eventually have. For example, the heart makes a 
noise that  might be useful to know the mood of a person. However, (arguably) to make 
that noise is not a function of the heart insofar as this played no role enhancing the 
survival of its possessor during its phylogeny. In the same way teleo-biological theories 
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can be used to distinguish between genuine and accidental functions of perceptual 
systems. So it is often claimed that perceptual systems evolved the function of detecting 
certain specific environmental properties, even if sometimes they accidentally  represent 
properties they were not designed to represent. This last case would correspond to cases 
of misrepresentation.
5.4 Against Teleo-biological Theories
 In Origins of Objectivity Burge develops a teleological approach to perceptual 
functions, which he calls representational functions. However, he explicitly puts 
forward his approach in opposition to teleo-biological theories. One reason he gives to 
support this claim is that teleo-biological theories are “deflationary” (as he did with 
informational approaches, see 5.2) in the sense that they lead to the attribution of mental 
representations to simple organisms that do not even have perceptual systems. For 
example, proponents of teleo-biological theories such as Millikan (1989) and Dretske 
(1986) claim that some bacteria can have representations by virtue of having the 
biological function to detect and respond accordingly to certain environmental 
conditions. But as Burge argues, nothing in the way bacteria process information 
suggests that they go beyond mere sensory  registration of information, or that  they 
reach some level of constant detection of distal environmental properties. Moreover, an 
explanation based on purely biological and informational notions (i.e. physical- and 
computational- level explanations according to my terminology) can offer a 
comprehensive explanation of the behaviour of the bacteria, while no descriptive or 
explanatory advantage is gained by the use of representational notions. 
 Although Burge’s critique seems essentially right, it  should be noted that 
proponents of teleo-biological theories often take sensory states such as those of the 
bacteria as having just rudimentary forms of representational content, not comparable to 
those of belief (see Dretske, 1986; Papineau, 1987). But given how Burge understands 
the term “representation”—viz. as it is applied in psychological theories—to use it to 
explain phenomena that just involve sensory  information is certainly misleading. In 
cases like this, a straight biological explanation would suffice, and the notion of 
representation does not  seem to contribute anything relevant. For Burge, psychological 
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and biological explanations constitute different explanatory  levels and he views teleo-
biological theories as futile attempts to reduce the former to the latter. He claims that 
psychological explanations involve distinctive psychological notions such as 
representation and veridicality  conditions, that cannot be reduced to biological 
terminology without losing important explanatory virtues. 
 A second attack Burge makes against teleo-biological theories is directed against 
their supposed pairing between representational accuracy and evolutionary success:
The key deflationist [teleo-biological] idea in explaining error is to associate veridicality and 
error with success and failure, respectively, in fulfilling biological function ... Explanations 
that appeal to biological function are explanations of the practical (fitness) value of a trait or 
system. But  accuracy is not in itself a practical value. Explanations that appeal to accuracy 
and inaccuracy—such as those in perceptual psychology—are not  explanations of practical 
value, or of contributions to some practical end. (p. 301)
 Burge identifies perceptual accuracy  with veridical representation and argues 
that pairing veridicality with biological success is problematic. A common case used to 
illustrate this problem concerns predator-detection systems. For instance, several 
species of birds have evolved systems that respond to aerial predators by eliciting a 
fleeing response (Marler & Hamilton, 1966). Since the main predators during their 
evolution were hawks, a teleo-biological explanation would say  that this system has the 
representational function of detecting hawks. But note that under certain ecological 
conditions it  would have been perfectly possible for these birds to evolve predator-
detectors that were highly inaccurate. Imagine, for example, that the energy consumed 
by the fleeing response is very low, whilst the real occurrence of a predator almost 
always results in being caught. Then even if the predator-detector is highly inaccurate 
and triggers many false alarms (e.g. by  responding to any winged-silhouette), it could 
still have been recruited by  evolution to perform a hawk-detection function. Burge 
offers a variant of this example by  pointing out that fleeing responses to false alarms 
could also have improved fitness by  means of increasing strength and agility, and in this 
way favoured the selection of hawk-detectors even if they misrepresent most of the time 
(p. 302).
 Defenders of teleo-biological views have responded to cases like this by 
accepting that inaccurate perceptual systems could have evolved by natural selection 
(Godfrey-Smith, 1992; Millikan, 1989). According to teleo-biological theories, all that 
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matters is that  hawks were the relevant environmental condition that explains the 
selection of the predator-detector during the evolutionary history of the birds. Even if 
the system was highly  inaccurate and gave rise to many  false alarms, the reason it was 
selected is that the few times it was successful in detecting hawks it  had a significant 
effect in enhancing the survival of the species. Therefore the system has the biological 
function of detecting hawks, and in cases when it responds to any other winged-
silhouette it is just misrepresenting hawks. 
 But Burge replies that views like this are counterintuitive and at odds with 
perceptual psychology, for nothing in the bird’s perceptual computational machinery 
appears to have the capacity to discriminate between hawks and other aerial objects 
with winged-silhouettes. When an aerial predator approaches all the perceptual system 
can probably do is to infer from sensory information the perceptual invariant of a 
winged-silhouette. Then the system would be successful when detecting winged-
silhouettes, even if what explains its evolutionary origin was the detection of hawks. 
Burge takes cases like this to support this claim that “the function fulfilled by 
representational success, by  perceptual veridicality, is not a biological function” (p. 
308). 
 However, I believe his move is too fast, since he misses one possible reply from 
teleo-biological theories. For it could be the case that the bird’s predator-detection 
system has the biological function to detect hawks in virtue of detecting winged-
silhouettes. As Neander (1995) suggests, both functions need not be mutually exclusive 
if we take them to be complementary functions at different levels of description. The 
function to detect winged-silhouettes can be regarded as the underlying mechanism that 
enables the bird to carry out its biological function of detecting predators. Even though 
at the level of early vision this mechanism cannot detect hawks, the fact that it  is a 
crucial part of a larger system that evolved with that  function of detecting predators 
suffices to ascribe it  a biological function of detecting hawks (provided that it was the 
main predator during the evolutionary history of the bird).
 This view seems compatible with both Burge’s account of representational 
functions and teleo-biological theories of perception, and so it is perhaps surprising that 
he gives no attention to it in his book. I shall return to Burge’s critique to teleo-
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biological theories in the final section of this chapter. For now, let us focus on Burge’s 
positive account of perceptual functions.
5.5 Burge’s own Proposal: Drawing the Line on Perceptual Functions
 According to Burge, an essential aspect of representations is that they  bear 
reference relations to a subject matter, such as objects or properties of the environment. 
These reference relations are “established by a person or animal ... by  the way of some 
thought, cognition, perception, or other psychological state or event” (p. 31). 
Paradigmatic forms of representation are propositional thought  and concepts, however 
Burge believes that the “the most primitive form of representation is perception” (p. 9), 
in particular the detection of distal environmental properties carried out by percepts. 
  As it is widely  acknowledged, Burge recognises that any account of 
representation must explain how they could fail to refer to what they are supposed to be 
about. To use a common terminology, they  must explain how misrepresentation is 
possible (cf. Warfield & Stich, 1994). Thus a central issue for Burge’s representational 
account of perception is to explain how percepts could have what he calls veridicality 
conditions, viz. the perceptual analogs to truth-conditions of belief. This normative 
character of percepts that has been troublesome for informational approaches (see 
chapters 3 & 4) and is something teleological approaches have attempted to figure out, 
as mentioned above. 
 Burge puts forward a particular teleological approach to perceptual functions, 
which he characterises as “representational functions” to emphasise the alleged 
representational nature of perception. As I explained in the previous section, he also 
departs from standard teleo-biological theories. His main motivation is that  he believes 
standards of veridicality do not need to mesh with any  practical value and therefore that 
representational functions are essentially independent from biological success. In 
Burge’s words:
Biological functions and biological norms are not  the only sorts of function and norm that 
are relevant to explaining the capacities and behaviour of some animals. Given that 
veridicality and non-veridicality cannot  be reduced to success and failure (respectively) in 
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fulfilling biological function, we must  recognise a type of function that is not biological 
function, a representational function. (p. 339)
 As Burge acknowledges, biological functions28  “are functions that have 
ultimately  to do with contributing to fitness for evolutionary success” (p. 301) and 
“their existence is explained by  their contribution to the individuals’ survival for mating, 
or perhaps in some cases the species’ survival” (p. 326). This corresponds to a standard 
teleo-biological approach that analyses functions in terms of their aetiology, often by 
reference to the process of natural selection29. In contrast, Burge’s notion of 
representational function is consistent with a non-etiological, and often called 
dispositional30, construal of functions, viz. one that does not define their nature it terms 
of aetiology but in terms of their current roles in carrying out some capacities of the 
organism. More precisely, Burge’s representational functions have their metaphysical 
grounds on scientific realism, viz. the idea that we can adopt a positive epistemic 
attitude towards the theoretical components of our best scientific explanations. As 
mentioned in 5.1, this allows Burge to take a realistic stance towards representational 
functions given the assumption that the most successful explanations in perceptual 
psychology constitutively make use of them:
The conclusion that perception has a representational function... derives from reflecting 
on the nature of explanatory kinds in perceptual psychology ... There is extensive 
empirical support for explanations in which the representational aspects of perceptual 
states are explanatorily central ... Such explanations evince the existence of perceptual 
states. So they support  the claim that there are representational states that  have 
representational functions. (p. 310)
 It is important not to read Burge as arguing that  representational functions did 
not evolve by natural selection. On his account he can just remain neutral about 
aetiology  and instead focus on what functions are settled by  our best current 
explanations of how perception works. It  is also interesting to note that a similar 
analysis of functions is commonly adopted by computational approaches to psychology. 
These characterise psychological capacities such as perception, memory or decision-
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28 Biological functions are not always characterised in teleo-biological terms, but for expository purposes 
I shall follow Burge in doing so.
29 Natural selection need not be the only source of aetiology.  Some teleo-biological approaches also claim 
that functions can result from learning or conditioning. See e.g. Papineau (1987).
30  For a good exposition of both opposing theories of functions in the context of psychological 
explanation see Price (2001). Thereafter, I stick to the term “dispositional” to refer to non-etiological 
functions.
making by looking at how they  are actually structured in terms of their input-output 
relations, regardless of their historical origins (e.g. Cummins, 1983; Crane, 1995; for 
discussion on dispositional theories of function see Koons, 1998, and Fodor, 2000).
 Accordingly, Burge believes that several cognitive capacities have non-
biological functions. In addition to perception, he alludes to functions for belief-
formation, deductive reasoning and primitive agency. One peculiar aspect of Burge’s 
proposal is that biological and representational functions actually coexist in the same 
organism, in a way that gives rise to a complex array  of different functions and 
normative constraints. I find this functional picture puzzling, but I shall reserve my 
arguments for the next section and conclude this exposition by trying to explain how 
Burge suggests these functions could be arranged in a whole organism.
 A basic idea behind most teleological approaches is that  functions are identified 
in the context of a functional analyses of the organism, where it is decomposed into 
systems (e.g. circulatory system) which are themselves decomposed into their parts (e.g. 
heart, arteries, veins, etc.). All these subsystems are at least partly  explained in terms of 
their causal contribution to the functioning of the whole organism (sometimes called by 
Burge “individual functions”, as mentioned in 5.1). In the author’s words:
Whole animal function is exemplified by the basic biological activities—eating, 
navigating, mating, parenting, and so on. These activities are functional in the most 
commonly cited sense of biological function ... They are distinctive in being functions of 
the whole individual—not the individual subsystems, organs, or other parts. (p. 326)
 In his book under discussion Burge describes biological functions as coordinated 
sub-systems organised to maximise fitness. But on the other hand, representational and 
other non-biological functions are also compositionally  described. For example, Burge 
points out that perceptual systems deliver accurate representations to belief-formation 
systems which have the function of generating true propositional representations, which 
then interplay with systems of deductive inference, and so forth. 
 But how could both biological and non-biological functions be integrated? At 
this point it  is pertinent to introduce Burge’s notion of agency. He characterises agency 
as the capacity  to generate “functioning, coordinated behaviour by the whole organism, 
issuing from the individual’s central behavioural capacities, not purely from 
subsystems” (p. 331). The author sees agency as a property  of organisms whose actions 
issue from central capacities that coordinate its subsystems, towards the fulfilment of 
whole-animal functions. He sets this sort of centrally-driven actions in contrast with 
typically peripheral movements such as reflexes, or certain processes carried out within 
a cell, which are not imputable to an individual as a whole.
 Interestingly, Burge finds agency  in very primitive organisms, even some which 
lack a central nervous systems. For example, he claims the paramecia’s eating and 
swimming behaviour count as agency. The key  point is that  there is a coordination of 
different anatomical structures stemming from within the organism, that result  in 
activities that at least contribute to the satisfaction of basic biological functions. Given 
that organisms such as paramecia and amoebas have agency but lack perceptual 
functions, a consequence of Burge’s account is that  agency  is more primitive than 
perception. More precisely, he considers agency  as a precondition for the emergence of 
perception and representation. When animals evolved perceptual systems, some of their 
actions started to be guided by representational states, actions attributable to the whole 
individual given that agency  was already  in place. Burge calls this psychological 
agency, and claims that it marks the point in evolution when the first properly 
psychological act was performed. 
 We can now return to Burge’s account of representational function. He claims 
that agency is what makes possible the integration of biological and representational 
functions insofar as they operate in coordination towards the fulfilment  of functions of 
the whole individual. To put it roughly, once agency is present, it is the individual who 
perceives and not just its subsystems. The notion of agency also helps Burge to explain 
why perceptual systems are not just  peripheral, automatic computational subsystems 
such as reflexes, that do not feature in representational explanations. This is because 
cognitive psychology considers perceptual processes within explanations of behaviour 
imputable to the whole-organism and not merely to its computational subsystems. 
Hence Burge believes that what makes percepts genuinely representational is the 
conjunction of having the computational machinery for generating percepts and the 
possession of whole-individual agency, viz. having perceptual systems integrated with 
central cognitive capacities that result in behaviour.
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 So far I hope to have given a comprehensive presentation of Burge’s account. 
Even though in his critique of informational and teleo-biological approaches the author 
makes some insightful points and appears to be compatible with the basic framework of 
this thesis, I believe his final account of perceptual functions is not  convincing. In the 
following sections I shall discuss two problems concerning his account.
5.5.1 Objection 1: Burge’s Mixed Account of Functions is Problematic
 In general terms, the idea that perception and cognition have a functional 
organisation is widely  accepted. Disagreements often hinge on whether cognitive 
functions should be characterised in etiological or dispositional terms, and on other 
issues that arise from this. This seems natural insofar as both teleological theories 
constitute different epistemological and metaphysical approaches towards the ascription 
of functions.
 However, I believe problems begin when Burge combines representational and 
biological functions, since each comes from different teleological approaches that need 
not always agree about how to characterise the same function. For example, suppose 
that our best physiological theories explain how the heart works by ascribing it the 
function of pumping blood. Then from a dispositional approach it  would be a fact that 
the heart has precisely that function. But imagine that research on the evolutionary 
origins of the heart finds out that the heart was not selected because it pumped blood, or 
that it simply did not evolve by natural selection (e.g. as a result  of genetic drift). Then 
from a teleo-biological viewpoint the heart would have a biological function that is 
different from its current one, or worse, no function at all. As proponents of teleo-
biological approaches have pointed out, biological and dispositional attributions of 
functions can be divergent and typically  pursue different explanatory aims, and 
therefore it is recommendable to keep them separate (e.g. Godfrey-Smith, 1993).
 Alternatively, some authors have proposed a pluralist  view where both 
teleological approaches coexist. For example, Preston (1998) claims that etiological and 
dispositional functions can be complementary, and are required to cover the full range 
of functions—from artefacts to natural entities—as well as to account for how functions 
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change over time. This is not the place for a full discussion of pluralist theories of this 
kind, though. My present purpose is to argue that even though Burge’s view could be 
interpreted along these lines, this brings up certain problems with his characterisation of 
perceptual functions. More precisely, combining etiological and dispositional functions 
can generate conflicting ascriptions of representational contents. I elaborate this idea 
below.
 A well known problem associated with teleological theories of representation is 
how to avoid the indeterminacy of content (cf. Fodor, 1990). Recall the example of the 
predator-detection system of some birds and imagine that it responds to flying 
boomerangs in exactly the same way as with hawks. An information-processing 
explanation of how its perceptual system manages to detect environmental properties 
might fit equally well with the bird’s perceptual states having as representational 
content ‘winged-silhouette’, ‘boomerang’, and perhaps some other similar objects. But 
this leads to the problem of determining which of those things the birds actually 
represent. At this point teleo-biological approaches are often called to disambiguate; 
they  can argue that the function of the system is to represent winged-silhouettes, 
because winged-silhouettes and not boomerangs (or other objects) were selectively 
responsible for the evolution of that system (cf. Sterelny, 1990).
 But, of course, this is not precisely Burge’s strategy given that he rejects teleo-
biological theories of perception. However, he adopts a mixed approach where 
dispositional functions of perception are somewhat “constrained” or “framed to fit” with 
biological functions of the organism. In Burge’s words:
the framework for perceptual reference and perceptual representational content  is set  by 
organism’s responses to the environment in fulfilling individual biological functions, in 
the evolutionary prehistory of the perceptual system. (p. 321)
 To see why  this mixed approach to the individuation of content is problematic, 
consider the following scenario. In areas populated by  birds, throwing and catching 
boomerangs becomes an extremely popular game, however associated with an unhappy 
consequence: an important number of birds die because of boomerangs falling over 
them. Eventually, some species of birds manage to scape safely from boomerangs 
thanks to their possession of predator-detector systems such as the one described above. 
The system is recruited, so to speak, to respond to boomerangs and elicit a flight 
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response31. Now, the predator-detector system would be performing the function of 
detecting boomerangs, at least from a dispositional viewpoint. We can even imagine that 
in this particular environment it becomes normal for the birds to avoid boomerangs, and 
therefore our customary explanations of their behaviour would have to incorporate their 
capacity/disposition to respond to boomerangs. Then it turns out that even though the 
system did not evolve for that reason, it happens to be perfectly fit  for detecting 
boomerangs, and from a dispositional viewpoint the perceptual system of the bird would 
have the function of detecting boomerangs (to make the case more dramatic, we let us 
imagine that even though the system evolved as an adaptation for detecting hawks, 
those animals became extinct in the area and the only actual “predators” are 
boomerangs). 
 But recall that Burge’s mixed view of functions also contains an etiological 
factor, where “antecedent interactions between moving bodies and operations of 
perceptual mechanisms are central to the explanation of the kinds (primarily the 
representational content) of perceptual states” (p. 71). These antecedent interactions 
bring us back to evolutionary history  and would lead us to the conclusion that  what the 
birds represent are hawks. Then we end up having at  least three candidates for what is 
the representational content of the perceptual system: ‘hawks’, ‘boomerangs’ and 
‘winged-silhouettes’. I do not see how Burge’s account would help to solve this 
indeterminacy. Depending on whether we give more relevance to a dispositional or an 
etiological approach, the contents we attribute will oscillate between this space of 
alternatives. And given that contents are supposed to be psychological kinds relevant  for 
explaining behaviour, it is hard to see how such a degree of indeterminacy could be 
tolerated.
5.5.2 Objection 2: Passage from Accuracy to Veridicality is not Clear
 Given that Burge rejects purely teleo-biological accounts of perceptual functions 
and that, as I argued above, his mixed account of functions is problematic, perhaps his 
proposal could be improved if framed in straight non-etiological, dispositional terms. 
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31 For the sake of the argument, let us suppose that this is just an ontogenic recruitment, and no adaptive 
modifications to the system have occurred yet.
That is, by assuming that all functions are determined by their current roles at  work in a 
system, as revealed by our best scientific explanations. In this section I argue that even 
if framed in this way, Burge’s reasons for drawing the line at  the level of perception are 
not compelling because they rest on unjustified assumptions, in particular, on the 
premise that perceptual veridicality is entailed by the detector-accuracy  of its 
computational mechanisms. 
 Let us start  by recapitulating Burge’s account. The author submits to the basic 
tenets of computational and informational approaches to the mind, and draws the line 
for the origins of mental representations at the level of percepts. In order to justify his 
account, and in particular to explain the normative character of percepts, he adopts a 
teleological approach. Perceptual systems are supposed to have representational 
functions, which fulfil the role of yielding percepts with veridicality conditions. As the 
following quote shows, Burge parallels veridicality  with accuracy in perceiving 
something:
A veridical perception is a correct or accurate perception. A veridical thought is a true 
thought. Truth and accuracy (correctness) are subclasses of veridicality. (p. 39)
 And also takes veridicality to be an outcome of the representational function of 
perception:
Perceiving is a type of veridical representation. The representational function of a perceptual 
system is to represent veridically. Veridical perception is necessarily and constitutively a 
kind of success for a perceptual state or perceptual system. It  is fulfilment  of a kind of 
function. (p. 309)
 The idea that a perceptual system, that has the function of being accurate in 
detecting a certain environmental property, can generate percepts with veridicality 
conditions appears to be uncontroversial. But to see what is misleading about Burge’s 
account let us step back to the computational domain (without assuming the 
psychological domain) and ask what  would make a computational system, that has the 
function of being accurate in detecting certain environmental property, capable of 
generating percepts with veridicality  conditions. Note that since in this case we are not 
assuming that the computational system is perceptual (i.e. psychological), the capacity 
of being accurate does not entail the capacity of being veridical. What is missing then?
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 Burge’s response would probably be that not any  detector-system actually  makes 
for veridicality, since this is only the outcome of systems endowed with genuine 
representational functions. But I believe this response sounds poorly revealing about the 
nature of representational states, since it just leads to replacing one question (what 
makes certain computational states representational?) with another (what makes certain 
computational functions representational?) without answering either of them. We pass 
from one puzzling notion (mental representation) to another (representational function). 
Thereby, we might ask Burge where representational functions come from. 
 A response to this question has already been advanced in 5.5. A computational 
detector-system fulfils representational functions if its behaviour is best described by 
appeal to psychological-level explanations, which means that its computational symbols 
have to be described as percepts (on pain of trivialising psychological explanations, see 
p. 342). As Burge notes, “such explanations evince the existence of perceptual 
states” (p. 310). According to him, the leading exemplar of psychological theorising in 
the context of perception occurs in visual psychology, and the crucial visual process 
Burge regards as characteristically psychological is one we are already familiar with: 
the generation of perceptual constancies (see 3.2 and 4.2). What this perceptual process 
does is to overcome the problem of underdetermination of the retinal input, viz. to infer 
information about distal environmental properties from proximal sensory information 
that is mathematically insufficient to determine it. Burge also acknowledges that the 
inferential processes that mediate perceptual constancies “are computational ... [and] 
describe quasi-algorithmic, quasi-automatic transitions in the perceptual system in ways 
that enable one to model perceptual systems on a computer.” (p. 356)
 Burge goes on to offer several examples of visual constancy capacities (pp. 
342-366). For instance, one is convergence, which yields constant perception of 
distance, and other is lightness constancy, that delivers constant perception of surface 
lightness. He argues that  these capacities are present in a wide range of animals, from 
arthropods to mammals, and concludes that his examples illustrate
the role of [constancy] formation principles in explaining formations of perceptions. Each 
exemplifies the explanatorily non-trivial invocation of states with representational content 
(and veridicality conditions) that distinguishes psychology from biology. (p. 347).
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 So far, Burge proposes that a characteristically psychological aspect of 
representational functions is their computational capacity of detecting environmental 
invariants. I believe this is unconvincing, since the same capacity can be ascribed to the 
detector-systems of non-mental machines. Recall the example of the coin acceptor of 
the vending machine presented in 3.3.1. Its capacity to sort out the property of being 
one pound´s worth and deliver a signal that is selectively sensitive to it, appears to be 
preserving the constancy of the detection of that property  from a variety  of inputs (i.e. a 
variety of possible coins and values). To consider a more sophisticated kind of artefact, 
take a digital camera. As it is well known, the way cameras capture light is similar to 
how the human eye works, for example in terms of image focusing and light 
adjustment. In both cases, light coming from objects in the environment is reflected 
onto a surface that transforms patterns of light into electric signals. In addition, some 
modern digital cameras have face-detection technology, which basically consists in 
algorithms that scan the image and detect the shape of human faces32. This process 
appears to be comparable to what happens in the input-systems of the visual system and 
thus to be able to deliver a constant detection of faces that  overcomes the 
underdetermination problem of extracting that property  from the information registered 
by the lens.
 I take it  for granted that to ascribe mental representations to the vending 
machine and the digital camera is clearly implausible. Can they count as 
counterexamples to Burge’s proposal then? It seems to me that they do since they are 
rather equivalent to the examples of visual perception offered by Burge. In both cases 
there is a flow of information from the environment that goes through computational 
coding that delivers an informational structure that singles out some particular distal 
environmental property. And importantly, in the case of artefacts the mechanisms that 
mediate detection of environmental properties are fallible, and thus allow the possibility 
of misrepresentation, by the same means used by  Burge to account  for 
misrepresentation in genuine perceptual systems—he claims that misrepresentations can 
be explained as “malfunctions of or interferences with the [computational] system”, due 
to their fallibility under possible (adverse) conditions (p. 346).
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32  However immensely more complex, human perception also appears to be equipped with hard-wired 
algorithms for detecting the shape of faces.
 At his point Burge might resort to the notion of agency, which as explained in 
5.5 is supposed to constitute a prerequisite for the emergence of perceptual systems. 
However, I believe this notion is not of much help. For as Burge understands it, agency 
is a very elementary  capacity of organisms, to some extent equivalent to the definition 
of autonomous agent I presented in 2.3. It precedes perception and psychological 
capacities in general, and as such, does not involve any characteristically  psychological 
properties. I do not see why all autonomous agents capable of detecting environmental 
invariants would have to qualify as possessing mentality, any more than robots such as 
the Mars rovers described in chapter 2 would do. I believe, though, that  the basic idea 
behind the notion of agency can be useful in this case, but it must be one that captures 
distinctively mental categories. In the final chapter of this thesis I develop  a proposal 
along these lines.   
 So I conclude that, overall, Burge is wrong in assuming that there is a clean 
passage from accuracy to veridicality in the case of the computational systems that 
mediate the detection of distal environmental properties in some animals. In these cases 
accuracy  in detection does not entail veridicality. There is certainly not an a priori 
entailment, neither an intuitive connection as can be gathered from the case of the 
artefacts showed above.
5.6 Conclusions
 In this chapter I have examined Burge’s account of perceptual functions and 
argued that it has many problems that weaken his case that mental representations are 
originated at the level of percepts. However, several aspects of his view can be useful 
for, and compatible with, the line of argument I am developing in the present thesis. 
One is his emphasis on scientific realism and the appeal to psychological-level 
explanations to distinguish mental symbols from (merely) computational symbols or 
other informational notions. Another is the notion of agency, in particular the idea that 
typically psychological explanations presume that representational states are guiding the 
behaviour of whole-agents, instead of their (subpersonal or computational) parts. In the 
final chapter of this thesis, I return to those ideas when putting forward my own 
proposal for a criterion for drawing the line between agents with and without mentality.
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Chapter Six 
Bermúdez and Carruthers on Drawing the Line 
6.0 Introduction
 In this chapter I address two more philosophers who have explored the minimum 
conditions for having mentality: José Luis Bermúdez and Peter Carruthers. They 
propose forms of symbolic processing and cognitive architecture that, they claim, 
deserve to be described in psychological terms, and put forward some criteria for 
attributing mentality to animals. 
 After critically presenting the views of Bermúdez and Carruthers, I conclude that 
they  do not offer a satisfactory  criterion for distinguishing computational from mental 
symbols. Bermúdez’s proposal attempts to formulate a framework for psychological 
explanation that does without a standard—inferential—model of psychological 
explanation. However I argue that it has many problems. 
 Concerning Carruthers’s view, he follows a more traditional version of 
psychological explanation and proposes a cognitive architecture that captures what he 
takes to be the core of mentality. I contend, however, that his account does not 
satisfactorily distinguishes mental from non-mental computational architectures. I 
conclude by introducing an alternative framework based on a personal-level approach, 
which aims to do better in capturing what is paradigmatic of psychological 
explanations, and which I shall explain and develop in the next—and final—chapter of 
this thesis.
6.1 Bermúdez on Thinking Without Words
 In his book Thinking Without Words33  José Luis Bermúdez explores how 
psychological explanations could be formulated to account for the behaviour of 
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33 Unless otherwise noted, from this section until 6.3 all page references are to this book.
creatures who lack language, whether animals or human infants34. Even though his 
primary concern is to develop a framework of psychological explanation applicable to 
nonlinguistic creatures, he also deals with what are the minimum conditions under 
which psychological explanations apply. In this sense, his proposal is of particular 
interest for our purposes since it is only when a creature’s behaviour can be explained in 
psychological terms that we are justified to regard it as cognitive, instead of 
nonpsychological or merely mechanistic. As Bermúdez (1995) has claimed elsewhere:
Explanations of behavior, particularly when dealing with the cognitive abilities of non-
linguistic creatures, quite rightly operate with a principle of parsimony. Appeals to 
representational states should be made only where it is theoretically unavoidable, where 
there is no simpler mechanistic explanation of the behavior. (p. 346)
 In general, Bermúdez’s proposal is compatible with the naturalistic and 
computational background put forward in the first  chapters of this thesis, in particular 
with respect  to the symbolic, information-bearing, nature of thoughts. The author 
believes that creatures can be perceptually sensitive to their environments by  means of 
picking up and coding information in a way that singles out particular distal properties 
of their environments. A crucial aspect of this process is that  it manages to represent 
environmental invariants, so that “the most primitive form of categorisation is grounded 
in perceived similarity” (p. 94). Therefore, Bermúdez submits to the standard idea that 
basic forms of perceptual categories are delivered through the coding of perceptual 
constancies (see 3.2). They determine which properties of the environment the creature 
is sensitive to, and also shape under which mode of presentation those properties will be 
represented by each species:
[D]ifferent types of nonlinguistic creature will carve their environment up in different  ways 
as a function of being perceptually sensitive to different object-properties. The essence of 
perception under a particular mode of presentation comes because different  nonlinguistic 
creatures will perceive different types of similarity between these objects*. (p. 95)
  The expression “object*” is intended to denote environmental objects as 
regarded from the particular mode of presentation under which creatures apprehend 
them, instead of according to our own (human) perceptual and linguistic categories. The 
author believes that in this way  it  is possible to determine the “ontology” each creature 
has, viz. the contents by which their symbolic structures carve up their environments. 
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34 Henceforth, just “nonlinguistic creatures”.
 There is, however, one important aspect in which Bermúdez’s approach departs 
from the background presented in the first chapters of this thesis. It  has to do with the 
nature and scope of psychological-level explanations. On the one hand, the author 
accepts that  there is a traditional view of psychological explanation which he calls 
standard belief-desire explanation (compatible with the one presented in 1.4.1). This 
account, endorsed by authors as diverse as Davidson and Fodor, characteristically 
involves the postulation of beliefs and desires, and reasoning processes carried out over 
them. But even though Bermúdez agrees in that this account is suitable for describing 
human behaviour, he contends that it is inappropriate for explaining the behaviour of 
nonlinguistic creatures. Bermúdez then works out alternative types of psychological 
explanation that according to him are required if we want to ascribe psychological states 
beyond the domain of human beings.
 His main motivation for departing from the standard belief-desire model is that 
he regards nonlinguistic creatures as incapable of engaging in genuinely inferential 
symbolic processing. I discuss his arguments for this in section 6.3. For the moment, let 
us focus on his overall view of psychological explanation, to then explore his alternative 
account of psychological explanation that does without the standard belief-desire model. 
To start with, consider two characteristics the author presents as essential to 
psychological explanations (p. 10):
(1) They  serve to explain behaviour in situations where the connections between 
sensory input and behavioural output cannot be plotted in a law-like manner.
(2) They rely on the cognitive integration of different psychological states.
 Each of these characteristics35 serves to rule out from the scope of psychology 
certain alternative forms of behavioural explanation. For example, fixed action patterns 
and most types of associative conditioning fail to meet (1) since their explanations 
basically  reduce to some sort of input-output link, while in contrast, psychological 
explanations typically appeal to inner states that function as intermediaries between 
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35  To simplify the exposition I have omitted a third characteristic of psychological explanations that 
Bermúdez presents in his book, which is that they appeal to psychological states that admit of 
misrepresentation. The omission is innocuous for present purposes since the author endorses a standard 
approach to deal with misrepresentation along information-processing lines (see chapters 3 and 4), and so 
the capacity to misrepresent is assumed to be present in creatures endowed with perceptual systems. 
Indeed, the author gives little attention to this issue in his book.
sensory  input and behavioural output. A related point is that in fixed action patterns or 
associative conditioning no significant interactions between inner states such as beliefs 
and desires are supposed to take place, and so (2) is also not satisfied. It is noteworthy 
that this is consistent with the idea, put forward in 1.4.3, that both fixed action patterns 
and associative conditioning correspond to a nonpsychological, but physical, level of 
explanation.
 Bermúdez then considers another (alleged) alternative to the standard belief-
desire model of behavioural explanation, which he calls minimalistic. Since its most 
paradigmatic version is Gibson’s theory of affordances, and to simplify  the exposition, I 
shall focus on it (Gibson, 1979). This theory  explains behaviour in terms of affordances, 
which are basically perceptual states in which the environment somehow “offers” the 
creature potential actions to carry out. A characteristic of affordances is that, according 
to Gibson, they are directly  picked up by  perceptual systems in the sense that the 
contents of perception themselves present the creature possible courses of action. He 
then explains behaviour in terms of the perception of affordances that directly manifest 
possible courses of action the creature might follow in accordance to its desires and 
needs. Even though in Gibson’s theory there is a sort of cognitive integration between 
perceptual states and desires—and so (2) could be met, Bermúdez considers it 
insufficient to qualify  as psychological explanation because it fails to satisfy  (1). The 
reason why is that in Gibson’s theory behaviour is directly  attached to perceptions of the 
immediate environment, and so the creature cannot go beyond the aforementioned 
input-output link. As Bermúdez remarks, an “action requires psychological explanation 
just if its occurrence could not have been predicted solely from knowledge of the 
environmental parameters and sensory input” (p. 129); and since minimalistic 
explanations always operate over immediate perceptual states, he concludes that they 
cannot provide a framework for psychological explanations. But what alternatives are 
left? As Bermúdez notes, the obvious one is to appeal to inferential capacities:
The natural way to understand what I am calling nonimmediate perception is in inferential 
terms—and this is certainly how it  has been understood by many philosophers who have 
considered the matter. (p. 52)
 According to Bermúdez the resort to inferential capacities amounts to return to 
the standard belief-desire model which, as noted, he regards as not applicable to 
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nonlinguistic creatures. Therefore the goal becomes to find further alternative types of 
psychological explanation that  do without inferences but at the same time are capable of 
fulfilling the requirements for psychological explanation presented above. In the 
following section I present Bermúdez’s proposal on this matter. 
6.2 Bermúdez’s Line for Mentality: Proto-inferences
 As noted above, Bermúdez claims that two essential characteristics of 
psychological explanations are that they are not restricted to the “here and now” of what 
is immediately  perceptible and their reliance on cognitive integration. He then attempts 
to develop a type of psychological explanation that, without resorting to inferential 
capacities, is able to satisfy  these characteristics. His strategy has two steps. The first is 
to account for symbolic structures that can be viewed as beliefs and desires and applied 
to nonlinguistic creatures, and also be capable of denoting states of affairs that are not 
immediately perceptible. The second is to explain how those structures could be 
integrated and engage in decision-making processes comparable to the inferential 
operations performed by linguistic creatures. I explain those two steps below.
 Let us start with Bermúdez’s account of symbolic structures suitable for 
explaining the behaviour of non-linguistic creatures. For this purposes, he develops a 
version of success semantics, where the content of a belief is defined as its utility 
condition and the content of a desire as its satisfaction condition. As the author 
acknowledges, this can be understood as a form of functionalism, where mental states 
are individuated in terms of their functional relations to one another and with behaviour. 
In the following passage he explains this idea in more detail:
Beliefs, according to success semantics, are causal functions from desires to actions. The 
content of a belief is its utility condition, where a utility condition is the state of affairs 
whose holding would result  in the satisfaction of desires with which that belief is associated. 
True beliefs are such as to cause actions that satisfy desires ... A particular desire has the 
content that it does in virtue of its satisfaction-condition, where the satisfaction-condition of 
a desire is the state of affairs whose holding leads to the cessation of the behavior to which 
the desire gives rise. (p. 105)
 The fact that Bermúdez’s approach can be understood in functionalist terms 
might suggest that it is compatible with CTM (see 1.2), but this is not so. Even though 
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he individuates mental states by their functional roles and explains their content by 
information-processing means, his view is not properly  computational because it does 
not structure mental states at the level of their vehicles (pp. 111-116). That is, they lack 
a logical structure from which syntactic operations could be performed over them. As I 
shall explain in section 6.3 this is the reason why, according to Bermúdez, animals 
cannot carry out inferential thought. 
 Now let us see how Bermúdez’s version of success semantics could satisfy  the 
two characteristics of psychological explanations presented in the previous section. 
First, mental states understood in these terms can project from what is directly 
perceivable and so go beyond the “here and now”. This is possible because belief 
contents are defined by appeal to their disposition to satisfy  the desire(s) with which the 
belief is conjoined, and so there is no need of either spatial or temporal contiguity 
between the belief and the state of affairs defined by its utility  condition. Indeed 
something similar occurs with desires, which satisfaction-condition can be a state of 
affairs that is not immediately perceivable. Secondly, in this view there is cognitive 
integration insofar as behaviour stems from the combination between (at least) an 
instrumental belief and the desire to be satisfied by means of the course of action 
specified by the belief.
 Someone might wonder, however, how that integration between mental states 
could be possible without them having vehicles and inferential structure. As Bermúdez 
notes, psychological explanations operate by integrating mental states in processes such 
as decision-making that rationalise the behaviour being explained. But if there are no 
inferences going on, how could mental states combine and interact in a way complex 
enough to account for rational processes? This leads us to the second step in 
Bermúdez’s strategy mentioned in the opening paragraph of this section, which is to 
account for how his proposed symbolic structures could be integrated and engage in 
decision-making processes comparable to those performed by linguistic creatures. For 
this purposes he develops a framework for symbolic processing that can satisfy  minimal 
rational constraints without appealing to inferences. It  is grounded on what he calls 
proto-inferences. For ease of presentation, I shall follow Bermúdez and focus on the 
case of decision-making. In this respect, the author observes:
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What  then is involved in genuine decision-making? The minimal requirement is that  the 
selection of a particular course of action should be made on consequence-sensitive 
grounds ... Deciding is not simply selecting. It is selecting for a reason. (p. 124)
 Then a creature engaged in a process of decision-making has to be capable of 
deciding between two (or more) courses of action by assessing their consequences. This 
involves the explicit representation of alternative contingencies, an evaluation of the 
possible outcome-situations that might result from the actions that  could be performed. 
In terms of Bermúdez’s version of success semantics, those representations correspond 
to instrumental beliefs which utility-condition corresponds to the alternative outcome-
situations that would satisfy a desire. 
 Let us consider one of Bermúdez’s examples by way of explaining his proposal. 
A thirsty  animal approaches a watering hole, in an environment where there are gazelles 
and lions. In order to drink water safely, the animal has to discriminate whether lions 
(viz. predators) are present or not. According to Bermúdez framework, it is plausible to 
assume that the animal can have beliefs such as that ‘the gazelle is not at the watering 
hole’ and ‘the lion is not at the watering hole’. Let A stand for the former and B for the 
latter sentence. The author argues that after perceiving that ‘the gazelle is at  the 
watering hole’ (not-A) it will be possible for the animal to conclude that ‘the lion is not 
at the watering hole’ (B) by reasoning from an excluded alternative in terms of the 
disjunctive syllogism “A or B, not-A, therefore B”. Note that the basic logical 
connectives involved in this reasoning are negation and the material conditional. 
Bermúdez claims, however, that these logical connectives are out of the reach of 
nonlinguistic creatures, since to master them it is required to apply them to complete 
propositions, something that crucially  depends on the capacity to carry  out second-order 
reflection (which in turn depends on language, see 6.3). To sort this problem, Bermúdez 
formulates nonlinguistic, “protological”, analogues of them, which are summarised 
below:
• Protonegation: In contrast with the negation operator, which applies to whole 
propositions, protonegation consists just of a proposition with a negative predicate. So 
for instance the protonegation of ‘the lion is not at  the watering hole’ would be ‘the 
lion is at the watering hole’. According to Bermúdez it is plausible to grant this 
primitive form of negation to nonlinguistic creatures since it  just presupposes the 
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ability  grasp  pairs of symbols that are contraries, e.g. of presence and absence, or of 
safely  and danger, which clearly  appears to be more fundamental than the mastery of 
the negation operator.
• Protocausation: This is supposed to be the precursor of conditional reasoning and a 
primitive form of causal reasoning available to nonlinguistic creatures. Bermúdez 
considers it to be widespread in the animal kingdom since the ability to detect causal 
regularities and to distinguish genuine causal relations from accidental regularities has 
an obvious survival value. Returning to the previous example, protocausation would 
be what makes it possible for the animal to track a causal relationship between the fact 
that a gazelle is at the watering hole and the fact that lions are not present.
 These two protological capacities are supposed to ground primitive forms of 
reasoning Bermúdez takes to be analogous to certain fundamental inference forms. For 
example the disjunctive syllogism “A or B, not-A, therefore B” from the example above 
can be understood in terms of the modus ponens “if not-A then B, not-A, therefore B”. 
Overall, the main goal of Bermúdez’s proposal of protological operations is to 
demonstrate that the beliefs and desires of nonlinguistic animals can engage in primitive 
forms of practical reasoning, even though they lack syntactic structure and cannot take 
part on second-order reflection. In his words:
protoinferences at the nonlinguistic level are not made in virtue of their form. Creatures who 
engage in, for example, proto-modus tollens need not have any grasp of the form of an 
inferential transition as truth-preserving. In fact, they cannot  have any such grasp, since that 
would involve second-order reflection on the evidential relations between propositions ... 
(pp. 148-149)
 After this brief presentation of Bermúdez’s framework for nonlinguistic thought 
and reasoning, let us sum up the minimum conditions under which psychological 
explanations apply according to this view. It seems that the psychological domain is 
appropriate to describe the behaviour of creatures at least capable of:
• Generating symbolic structures that fulfil the functional roles characteristic of beliefs 
and desires, and can stand for states of affairs that are not immediately perceivable.
• Grasping the distinction between two pairs of contrary concepts (protonegation).
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• Distinguishing causal regularities between events from accidental ones 
(protocausation).
• Integrating their symbolic structures to make them engage in processes of 
protoinference that result in adaptive behaviour.
 In sum, Bermúdez’s version of psychological explanation appeals to 
mechanisms that seem basic enough to be present in most nonlinguistic creatures, and 
thus to apply  widely  at least from insects upwards in the animal kingdom. Many animal 
behaviours formerly explained in terms of fixed action patterns or associative 
conditioning, would then be describable as the result of thought and reasoning. I 
believe, however, that  Bermúdez’s version of success semantics has several problems, 
and so is not a plausible alternative to standard psychological explanations. I present my 
objections below.
6.2.1 Objections
 A general strategy  adopted by Bermúdez in his book is trying to understand in 
operational terms how the ascription of psychological states and rationality to 
nonlinguistic creatures could be justified. As explained above, Bermúdez’s version of 
success semantics identifies the content of a belief with its utility condition, which is the 
state of affairs that would have to obtain for the various desires with which it  is 
associated to be satisfied, and the content of a desire with its satisfaction condition, 
which is the state of affairs whose holding leads to the cessation of the behaviour to 
which the desire gives rise. Note that this characterisation of mental states ultimately 
rests on observable behaviour: the utility condition of a belief is understood in terms of 
its disposition to satisfy a desire, which is in turn defined in terms of its disposition to 
cease the behaviour it normally causes.
 Despite the behaviourist flavour that emanates from operational definitions of 
behaviour, Bermúdez is certainly  not a radical behaviourist because he describes beliefs 
and desires as inner states that  cause behaviour. However, his operational approach to 
mental states still resembles some forms of behaviourism, since he ends up  analysing 
beliefs and desires in terms of observable behaviour, just as analytical behaviourists 
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attempted to do (Rey, 1997). As Fodor (2003) points out in his review of Bermúdez’s 
book, this resemblance also makes this approach subject to the same worries raised 
against behaviourism. To illustrate why the use of operational criteria for defining a 
desire does not work, Fodor gives the following example:
Getting food terminates your hunger. Whether it  also stops your hunger behaviour depends 
on the circumstances; notably on what you have in mind. It  won’t  stop your scrounging for 
food if you have in mind not just to do some eating, but also to do some hoarding. (p. 17)
 The point of the quote is that behaviour often underdetermines the mental life of 
the cognitive agent. What is satisfied by getting food is the desire to eat, not the (eating) 
behaviour the desire gives rise to, since for instance the eating behaviour might carry  on 
even if the desire has already been satisfied. As cognitivists approaches often insist, 
what is important for psychological explanation is not the behaviour, but the inner 
processes that may  or may not produce the behaviour. It should be noted, though, that 
Fodor’s example is somewhat misguided for two reasons. One is that if it  is the desire 
for hoarding what motivates the behaviour, then this is not precisely  a case of hunger 
behaviour, but of hoarding behaviour. The satisfaction condition of the desire would 
then simply  be to store up sufficient peanuts—and not getting fed, as the examples 
wrongly assumes. So, there would be nothing misleading with the fact  that scrounging 
for food continues after having eat enough. 
 Secondly, if what Fodor means with the desire for hoarding is a complex mental 
state —such as a second-order one that  suppresses, so to speak, the desire to eat in order 
to get food stored—then Fodor is missing the point. For Bermúdez is aware of some of 
the limitations of his version of success semantics, and explicitly points out that it is not 
purported to apply to second-order desires—which are only available to linguistic 
creatures on his framework. Indeed, he claims that his “model only works for relatively 
simple desires ... [where] There is a very clear sense in which we can identify when the 
behavior associated with the desire for food actually ceases and hence works backward 
to its satisfaction-condition.” (p. 68)
 But having said this, I believe the general critique still works against 
Bermúdez’s view, since its operational character makes it also incapable of accounting 
for some complex forms of animal behaviour. For example, consider the case of 
navigation by path integration present in insects such as wasps and honeybees. As 
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explained in 2.4, path integration involves the integration of information about the 
vectors travelled, and by this means wasps can remember the location of food sources 
and also find their way back to their nests. Imagine that a wasp has a belief that codes 
information about the vector flight that leads to a food source, and that its content is 
something like ‘food is at vector flight  V32’. From the viewpoint of Bermúdez’s version 
of success semantics, that belief content would correspond to “the state of affairs whose 
holding will bring about the satisfaction of desires with which that belief is conjoined”, 
e.g. the desire for food. 
 But this way of defining a belief is insufficient to account for the complexity of 
some of the wasp’s beliefs. Note that the insect’s mechanisms of path integration are 
rather flexible, and allow the wasp to recalculate its location with respect to its 
destination or visible landmarks, and eventually take a new route towards its 
destination, e.g. fly to its nest in a straight line even though its initial route was done in 
zigzag. For that to be possible, along with the belief that ‘food is at  vector flight V32’ 
the wasp would have to possess more specific beliefs about sections of the vector 
travelled, which could be deployed to recalculate the vector flight. One of these more 
specific beliefs could be, for instance, the belief that ‘from the hive to this point the 
vector flight is V21’. Let  us see how this belief could be individuated according to 
Bermúdez’s approach. We would have to start looking for the desire that is supposed to 
be satisfied by that belief. But since the belief could be used in different calculations, it 
might eventually lead to distinct satisfaction-conditions such as reaching food or 
returning to the nest. Then, that specific belief does not seem to be associated with any 
particular desire, such the desire for food or the desire for homing, but to be better 
understood as a belief that takes part in reasoning about navigation. 
 This example shows a case where some beliefs of a nonlinguistic animal do not 
seem to be directly  associated with the satisfaction of any  particular desire or 
satisfaction-condition as Bermúdez’s view requires. Rather, they  appear to be better 
understood in traditional cognitivist terms, viz. as inner processes with the potential to 
generate a variety of behaviours. It should be noted, though, that in his book Bermúdez 
makes efforts to give a more cognitivist character to his account. He admits that since 
success semantics is basically an extensional way of individuating mental states, it has 
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the problem of not saying much about the nature of mental content and its explanatory 
role in generating behaviour. Then Bermúdez acknowledges that his
version of success semantics needs to be further supplemented by showing how it can 
capture the mode of presentation under which its utility and satisfaction conditions are 
apprehended. (p. 92) ... [The content-constituents of thoughts] must be capable of 
performing genuine explanatory work when embedded in different  thoughts in different 
contexts. (p. 97)
 With the notion of “content-constituent” the author attempts to capture the 
particular mode of presentation the content of beliefs or desires have, and as the quote 
suggests, he also sees as a requirement for his account that those content-constituents 
have cognitive significance, viz. that they translate into some difference in behaviour. In 
this way, Bermúdez works towards making the individuation of content more fine-
grained than standard versions of success semantics, allowing, for example, beliefs with 
the same utility condition to have different content-constituents. To explain this idea let 
us return to the example of wasps. In addition to their capacity to navigate using path 
integration, wasps can also guide themselves by  relying on landmark cues. In terms of 
success semantics, we might ascribe the wasp with the belief that food is in a certain 
location, a belief whose utility  condition would be the state of affairs (i.e. getting food) 
whose holding would satisfy the desire to feed. Now, considering the two navigational 
systems of the wasp, we could add that it has two ways of coding the location of food: 
one in terms of the vector flight required to reach it, and other in terms of its spatial 
relation with landmarks. These would correspond to alternative content-constituents for 
the same belief described above, and interestingly for Bermúdez’s purposes, can be 
shown to have cognitive significance. For even though they have the same utility 
condition, depending on which navigational system the wasp is using its frame of 
reference will change and this will have consequences in its behaviour. And this could 
be empirically  tested, for example, by manipulating the relevant parameters such as the 
location of landmark cues, of after capturing a wasp and releasing it in a place where its 
previous vector flight is no longer useful. 
 But even though according to Bermúdez’s refined version of success semantics 
mental contents are described as playing a significant role in determining behaviour, the 
explanatory  framework the author presents to account for them is, I contend, still 
unsatisfactory. Note that if a belief, with certain content-constituent, is to interact with 
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desires in order to fulfil their satisfaction-conditions, there must be some mechanism 
that explains how behaviour comes up from that interaction. Bermúdez’s proposal in 
this respect, is to appeal to Gibson’s theory. Let me explain why it does not work.
 As mentioned in the previous section, Bermúdez claims that genuine decision-
making involves acting on consequence-sensitive grounds, that is, by being sensitive to 
the information available about the likely outcomes of each possible course of action. 
According to the standard belief-desire model, this decision-making process takes the 
form of an expected utility  calculation where the payoffs of (some of) the different 
outcomes associated with each course of action are explicitly  represented and 
compared. But of course, according to Bermúdez this sort of decision-making is not 
available to nonlinguistic creatures, and at this point is where he resorts to Gibson’s 
theory. The general idea is that “the instrumentality of a particular course of action is 
manifest in the content of perception—and of course a single perception can reveal 
different potential courses of action” (p. 135). He adds that even though the contents of 
perception contain information about the likely  outcomes, that “is not necessarily 
registered as information about likely outcomes. The animal just sees what to do by 
comparing [the relevant perceptual contents]” (pp. 137-138).
 But how precisely is it that the information about the relevant outcomes is 
“manifest” in the contents of perception in a way that the animal can “just see what to 
do” by looking at them? Sometimes Bermúdez appeals to Gibsonian terminology as a 
way of making sense of these ideas:
Gibson’s theory is that perception is not  neutral. It  is not just  a matter of seeing various 
objects that  stand in spatial relations to each other. It involves seeing our own possibilities of 
action—seeing the possibilities we are “afforded” by the environment. If this is right then we 
can see how a given behavior might be selected from a range of alternatives in a way that 
does not involve a process of [standard] decision-making. (p. 121)
 The problem is that it is not clear at all that the theory is right. Moreover, and as 
many authors from the cognitivist tradition have pointed out, the appeal to Gibson’s 
theory  does not help much to clarify the mechanisms that allegedly make possible to 
link the contents of perception with desires and action schemas, without any inferences, 
memories or calculations involved in that  process (e.g. Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1981). For 
example, it  is hard to imagine how a wasp released in a remote site could opt to fly 
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straight to its nest without relying on a stored representation of the vector of the route 
between nest and feeder, their relation to local landmarks, and on the capacity to carry 
out calculations over these information.  
 In sum, it seems that Bermúdez’s attempt to develop a type of psychological 
explanation that does without structured content vehicles and inferences is 
unsatisfactory, and incapable to account for complex but however widespread forms of 
animal behaviour. He draws elements from the behaviourist and Gibsonian traditions in 
order to develop a mentalistic version of them, however their help is limited since his 
view inherits well-known problems associated with those traditions. 
 The upshot at this point is that Bermúdez’s framework of psychological 
explanation for non-linguistic creatures does not provide an adequacy criterion for 
drawing the line between agents with and without mentality. Besides, it is interesting to 
note that when it  comes to the standard-belief desire model of explanation—which 
roughly matches what I have called the psychological level—, Bermúdez contends that 
it can only be applied to language-using creatures. So if we assume the failure of his 
mentioned alternative framework of psychological explanation, Bermúdez’s view could 
be interpreted as drawing the line for mentality at the level of language-using creatures. 
In the next section I shall argue that his arguments for this are also unsatisfactory, 
however. 
6.3 Language and Second-order Thoughts
 As mentioned above, Bermúdez assumes that the standard belief-desire model of 
psychological explanation cannot apply  to the behaviour of nonlinguistic creatures. The 
reason for that is that he regards language as necessary for developing thoughts with 
syntactic structure and capable to engage in inferences. He emphatically writes:
[W]e have no theory at  all of formal inferential transitions between thoughts that do not have 
linguistic vehicles. Our models of formal inference are based squarely on transitions between 
language sentences (as codified in a suitable formal language). (p. 111)
 The central idea is that without the provision of natural language it is not 
possible to develop inferential forms of thinking. This idea rests on two assumptions: 
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(1) inferential thinking requires the mastering of logical operators, such as tense 
operators and modal operators, which in turn demand metarepresentational capacities 
(i.e. thinking about thoughts), and (2) metarepresentational capacities are only possible 
when thoughts are linguistically vehicled. In the reminder of this section I argue that 
both assumptions are flawed, and therefore that Bermúdez’s main claim that 
nonlinguistic creatures cannot perform inferences does not follow. 
 Let us start addressing (1). Sometimes in the course of thinking we apply a rule 
over some thoughts we previously had. This certainly  involves the metarepresentational 
capacity to use one (higher-order) thought to target some other (first-order) thoughts. A 
straightforward example is the use of a rule of conditional inference, such as modus 
ponens, to manipulate some of our thoughts according to that rule. Bermúdez claims 
that to be able to carry out logical reasoning of that  sort we need to master logical 
connectives, such the material conditional, which involves picking up, so to speak, two 
thoughts and manipulating them according to the rule of modus ponens so as that the 
second thought will be recognised as true if the first is recognised as true. But even 
though the process of picking up and manipulating symbol structures certainly involves 
the metarepresentational capacity of recognising and targeting them from a higher-order 
level of processing, it  is not clear that this is required for a process to be recognisable as 
modus ponens (or any other rule of inference). For a first-order sequence of symbolic 
processes might have the structure of modus ponens and, as Carruthers (2004b) points 
out, there is no reason to believe that to run such a process requires engaging in 
metarepresentational thinking at the same time. 
 Moreover, as I explained in chapters 1 and 2, the computational theory of mind 
precisely provides a framework for understanding how inferential processes could be 
carried out by nonlinguistic creatures and even machines. All that is required for a 
system to be regarded as implementing an inference is for it to possess symbolic 
structures with representational properties and a syntactic component capable of 
mechanising algorithmic processes in an autonomous way. The debate about whether 
those inferences could be taken as genuine often focuses on whether the 
representational component of computers has intrinsic content or not, and on whether 
the computational level of explanation maps onto an autonomous natural domain. But 
the debate hardly relates with the capacity of computers to develop  higher-order levels 
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of processing, such as having symbols that target other symbolic structures. Instead, that 
capacity appears to presuppose, but not to be necessary  for, the ability to carry out 
inferential operations in general.
 The second assumption of Bermúdez’s argument mentioned above is that 
metarepresentational capacities are only possible when thoughts are linguistically 
vehicled, that  is, that public language sentences are the only  possible kind of vehicle for 
thoughts that can be the objects of higher-order thinking. The main argument Bermúdez 
puts forward to defend this claim is grounded on introspective evidence. He uses 
reflective thinking, viz. evaluating evidential and inferential relations between thoughts, 
as an example of “thinking that will paradigmatically involve a direct and conscious 
cognitive access to the target thoughts” (p. 159). He claims that every time we engage in 
conscious reflection over our propositional thoughts they have the form of sentences of 
public language, and that therefore language appears to be the only possible vehicle for 
metarepresentational thinking.
 There are several problems with this argument. One is that reflective thinking 
does not appear to be the only form of metarepresentational thought, and so even if 
reflective thinking always involve public language, this does not deny that there could 
be other forms of thinking about thoughts that  do not depend on language (Carruthers, 
2004b). This could be the case, for example, in certain metacognitive forms of thinking 
such as hypothesis testing or belief revision that occur at a subpersonal, unconscious 
level of symbolic processing. Another worry with Bermúdez’s argument relates with his 
use of evidence from introspection. As Fodor (2003) contends, introspective reports are, 
at best, partial accounts about what goes on inside our heads. It could be perfectly 
possible that some forms of reflection over thoughts which are not vehicled by 
sentences in public language take place well below the level of conscious awareness.
 Finally, Bermúdez does not convincingly rule out alternatives to public language 
as vehicles for thought that could allow for metarepresentation. He discusses two 
alternatives: pictorial models of representation and the language of thought hypothesis 
(LOT). Briefly, pictorial models claim that mental states represent environmental 
properties by virtue of resembling or having a structural isomorphism with them. 
Following most authors within the cognitive tradition, Bermúdez points out that  even 
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though pictorial models can have a structure (e.g. in the case of mental maps), they  lack 
the expressive power to represent propositional contents, or the relations they might 
bear with one another. For instance, consider how we could possibly represent the 
difference between relations we express using the words “and”, “or”, “if”, in terms of 
pictures (see Crane, 1995, and Cummins, 1989, for standard critiques to pictorial 
models). Bermúdez concludes that since pictorial models cannot provide the vehicles 
for expressing propositional contents, their transitions and relations, pictorial 
representations lack structured elements capable of becoming the objects of higher-
order mental processes.
 Now let us turn to LOT36, the alternative to which Bermúdez gives more 
attention, and not surprisingly given that it proposes that thoughts can have the structure 
of sentences, however they do not correspond to public-language sentences. Firstly, 
Bermúdez takes issue with this view by  employing the introspective argument sketched 
above, stating that conscious thinking characteristic of reflexive thought is based on 
public-language sentences instead of LOT. But as mentioned, this argument is feeble 
both because of the weaknesses of introspective arguments themselves and for the fact 
that most of thinking according to LOT is supposed to occur at a subpersonal level, 
inaccessible to introspection. And this last point is relevant to Bermúdez account given 
that his view of perception appears to assume that some sort of symbolic processing is 
carried out by  perceptual systems situated at a subpersonal level (e.g. early vision, see 
1.4.2). And as the following passage shows, he acknowledges that unconscious 
symbolic processing might happen elsewhere:
It  might well be the case that  certain types of hypothesis testing and refinement  do take place 
at  the subpersonal level. Something like this happens, according to Fodor, when we learn a 
language. Nothing that I say is incompatible with that proposal, since my claim is simply 
that such processes would not count as instances of second-order dynamics [i.e. 
metarepresentations]. (p. 159)
 But why cannot processes carried out in LOT be instances of 
metarepresentations? Recall that  LOT is basically  a computational theory of mind that 
is explicit on its claim that the syntactic structure of thought has an expressive power 
equivalent to that of any other language, and as I explained in the first chapter, this is 
supposed to be achievable by means of symbolic structures and computational 
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36 Following Bermúdez, here I focus on Fodor’s version of this view. See Fodor (1975, 1987).
transitions. Why cannot there be computational systems with hierarchical structures, 
that take first-order symbolic structures as objects for higher-order algorithms? Nothing 
seems to rule out that possibility, and Bermúdez does not provide reasons why this is to 
be ruled out as a theoretical alternative to his account. 
 So far, I have given a review of Bermúdez’s proposal regarding whether and 
when psychological explanations can be applied to explain the behaviour of non-
linguistic creatures. I conclude that the framework of psychological explanation he 
advances for non-linguistic creatures is too problematic to provide the basis for making 
a distinction between agents with and without mentality, and that even his criterion for 
applying the standard belief-desire model of psychological explanation is misleading. In 
what remains of this chapter, I shall address the view of another philosopher who 
explored the grounds for ascribing mentality to non-human agents. 
6.4 Carruthers’s Line for Mentality: Core Cognitive Architecture
 In a series of writings, Peter Carruthers (2004a, 2006) has suggested that the line 
for mentality should be drawn at an unexpectedly low level in the evolutionary tree of 
life, since what he takes to be the essence of the mind is supposed to be present in a 
wide range of animal species, starting from arthropods. Contrary to Bermúdez, though, 
he grounds his approach on what I have been calling the standard belief-desire model of 
psychological explanation. As a first  approximation to his view, consider the following 
quote from Carruthers (2004a):
What  does it  take to be a minded organism, then? We should say instead: you need to possess 
a certain core cognitive architecture. Having a mind means being a subject  of perceptual 
states, where those states are used to inform a set  of belief states which guide behaviour, and 
where the belief states in turn interact with a set of desire states in ways that depend upon 
their contents, to select  from amongst an array of action schemata so as to determine the 
form of behaviour. (p. 207)
 It should be noted that Carruthers is strongly  committed to the computational 
theory  of mind (see 1.2), and therefore the “core cognitive architecture” he describes 
has to be understood in this context, viz. as involving symbolic structures that process 
and transform information about the environment and interact causally  according to 
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algorithmic processes to generate behaviour. This core architecture is schematised 
below.
environment and interact  causally  according to algorithmic processes to generate behaviour. This 
core architecture is schematised below.
   Figure 1: Carruthers’ core architecture of the mind (adapted from Carruthers, 2004a).
So according to Carruthers’ view, minded creatures must have perceptual systems capable of 
transmitting information about the environment to belief-generating systems and to desire-
generating systems that also receive information from bodily  states. Beliefs and desires are 
supposed to be symbolic structures capable of interacting causally one with another following 

















     Figure 1: Carruthers’ core architecture of the mind (adapted from Carruthers, 2004a).
 So according to Carruthers’ view, minded creatures must have perceptual 
systems capable of transmitting information about the environment to belief-generating 
systems and to desire-generating systems that also receive information from bodily 
states. Beliefs and desires are supposed to be symbolic structures capable of interacting 
causally one with another following algorithmic procedures commanded by action-
planning systems. These systems are informed by  beliefs and motivated by desires to 
generate action schemata, which are finally carried out by  motor-control systems. 
Actually, Carruthers believes that animals typically possess several of these (belief/
desire-generating, action-planning, etc.) systems, which have been designed by  natural 
selection to deal with different  circumstances relevant for the animal. However, I shall 
not be concerned with these complexities here and instead focus on his fundamental 
claim that the core cognitive architecture depicted above is sufficient to make for a 
mind. Let us now focus on the arguments he puts forward to support his proposal.
 First, Carruthers appeals to common sense to rule out what he regards as too 
demanding conditions for having mentality. For example, he describes Davidson’s 
proposal that mental states must have contents specifiable in terms of public language, 
and that  the only way to possess those contents is to be an active participant in a 
linguistic community  (Davidson, 1984). Carruthers also mentions McDowell’s claim 
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that to have a mind we need to be capable of evaluating the normative force of our 
reasons for believing and acting (McDowell, 1994a), and concludes that “common 
sense has little difficulty  with the idea that there can be beliefs and desires that fail to 
meet these demanding conditions. This suggests, at least, that those conditions are not 
conceptually necessary ones” (Carruthers, 2004a, p. 205).
 Then Carruthers turns to the opposite end of the spectrum and claims that it is 
also implausible to ascribe a mind to creatures whose actions are just driven by  innate 
motor schemes or acquired habits learnt through some form of conditioning. In this 
respect the author is in line with the idea I put forward in chapter one that behavioural 
explanations just  based on fixed action patterns or associative conditioning can be 
described from the physical level without there being any justification of using 
psychological vocabulary  in them. And clearly, Carruthers’s core cognitive architecture 
is more demanding than this. According to his view, symbolic structures informed by 
perception have to be capable of interacting in a flexible manner, and causing behaviour 
in way that reflects their representational properties.
 A second line of argumentation takes the form of inference to the best 
explanation. Carruthers contends that many  cases of animal behaviour that had 
previously  been described in terms of innate or conditioned action patterns, actually 
demand a psychological explanation. He cites many cases of animal behaviour in 
support of his claim. For example, the capacities for navigation of bees and Tunisian 
desert ants, memory and learning in food-catching birds, and planning in jumping 
spiders and rats. Carruthers convincingly argues that these capacities cannot be 
explained by  fixed action patterns or by associative mechanisms “unless those 
mechanisms are organised into an architecture that is then tantamount of algorithmic 
symbol processing” (2004a, p. 209), i.e. the core architecture put forward by him. Most 
of Carruthers’ examples come from arthropods, and not without a reason. He believes 
that if he manages to demonstrate that various arthropods possess the mentioned core 
computational architecture, then it would be indeed very  plausible to propose that this 
architecture is rife in the animal kingdom.
 Let me briefly present the case of honeybees—Carruthers’ leading example—to 
illustrate his proposal. As I have mentioned elsewhere in this thesis, honeybees have 
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notable navigational capacities that  make them able to fly from their hives to sources of 
food and return. These capacities have been studied in detail by several scientists using 
techniques such as harmonic radar, which permits tracking the fly-paths of individual 
bees (Menzel et al., 2012). They have revealed that honeybees rely on landmarks and 
the position of the sun (as expected at a given time of the day) to orientate, and that they 
can use this information for dead reckoning (calculating their position by  estimating the 
direction and distance travelled). This allows the insects to reach their destination by 
using  a route they have never flown before, something that cannot be explained by 
appeal to fixed action patterns or associative conditioning. 
 In addition, honeybees can communicate their findings to other honeybees by 
performing a sort of dance inside the hive. Some features of the dance such as the angle 
of movement as measured from the vertical, and the number of “waggles” they  make at 
some point, convey information about the expected angle relative to the direction of the 
sun for the time of the day and the distance to the food source. The bees in the hive are 
not just able to integrate this information and fly to the food, but also to evaluate it 
along a number of dimensions. For example, they  are less likely to fly to distant sources 
of food, and show preference for rich sources of food. These findings suggest that 
honeybees are able to encode, store and perform calculations over different kinds of 
information, to then use it flexibly to reach their goals. Thus it seems plausible to 
conclude that the best explanation for these complex behaviours is that honeybees can 
carry out computational processes over causally efficacious and structured 
representations (see also Gallistel, 2009; Tetzlaff & Rey, 2009).
6.4.1 Objections
 On first  consideration, Carruthers’s proposal appears to be intuitively plausible. 
It would certainly be chauvinistic to claim that to have mentality it is necessary to have 
the same complex psychological capacities we have, such as language or the ability  to 
reflect about our own decisions. As Carruthers says, it  is possible to conceive minds that 
are simpler than ours. But when he appeals to how limited are explanations based on 
innate or conditioned action patterns to account for complex forms of animal behaviour, 
as a means to justify  his claim that mentality is widespread in the animal kingdom, I 
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believe he falls into a false dilemma in the sense explained in 2.2. That is, Carruthers 
fails to appreciate that psychological explanations are not  the only alternative to innate 
or conditioned action patterns, for there is an alternative explanatory framework for 
animal behaviour that corresponds to what I  have been calling the computational level.
 To illustrate the point, it can be useful to look at some passages where Carruthers 
admits that some non-psychological forms of behaviour can be rather complex and 
allow some degree of variation. For example, he sets forth the mating behaviour of the 
male cricket. Crickets typically sing to attract mates, however sometimes this can also 
attract predators and parasite flies. So some crickets adopt the alternative strategy of 
staying silent  near a singing cricket, and try  to mate with the females attracted by the 
song. Interestingly, this strategy is flexible since the same cricket that  stayed silent, 
when not nearby  a singing cricket, can switch to the strategy  of singing. Then, 
Carruthers (2004a) comments:
Admittedly, such examples suggests that something like a decision process must be built  into 
the structure of the behavioural program. There must  be some mechanism that  takes 
information about, for example, the cricket’s own size and condition, the ratio of singing to 
non-singing males in the vicinity, and the loudness and vigor of their songs, and then triggers 
into action one behavioural strategy or the other. But computational complexity of this sort, 
in the mechanism that  triggers an innate behaviour, isn’t  the same as saying that the insect 
acts from its beliefs and desires. The latter is what mindness requires, we are assuming. (p. 
212)
 Indeed, the cricket’s computational capacities are limited. Although they can run 
algorithms that ramify  onto alternative courses of action, their operations are otherwise 
rigid in the sense that they cannot be altered, for example, by further evidence the 
animal might obtain through perception. But Carruthers is wrong in assuming that what 
comes next, in terms of computational complexity, is the mental domain. The next step 
is, instead, just to be a computer. The reason is that what makes the cricket’s mating 
mechanism so modest is that it cannot instantiate a universal machine, viz. it  lacks the 
resources to perform the fundamental set of operations that  characterise a computer (see 
2.3). The computational capacities of the cricket are on this respect equivalent to those 
of the electronic calculator mentioned in 2.3; it has in-built mechanisms that can 
perform certain basic algorithmic procedures, but it cannot, even in principle, be 
programmed to run any other algorithm. Then, to repeat, Carruthers appears to be 
omitting a level of explanation that is between the physical (i.e. fixed innate patterns 
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and associative conditioning) and the psychological level of explanation: the 
computational level. And since as I argued in chapter 2 there is no reason for assuming 
that all computers have mentality, Carruthers seems to be committing the mistake of 
overlooking the possibility of animals being non-mental computers.
 Someone might object  to this critique by claiming that it wrongly  assumes that 
any computational architecture that could in principle be realised in a machine, since it 
would then be explainable from the computational level, cannot make for mentality. 
Following this assumption, for example, it could be argued that Carruthers’s proposal is 
mistaken simply  on the grounds that it is possible to imagine his proposed core 
computational architecture being implemented in a robot. But this assumption is 
certainly misleading since it would lead us to reject  that even humans have a mind, 
provided that we are committed to CTM and therefore accepting that we have a mind 
precisely because our brain is running the right computer program.
 But I am not making this assumption, though. My point is not that Carruthers’s 
proposal is unconvincing simply because it is possible to realise his core computational 
architecture in a machine, but because it is not at  all clear that this core architecture is 
the right criterion to draw the line for what qualifies as a mind. Sometimes Carruthers 
regards his account as highly commonsensical, however this is open to question. Recall, 
for instance, the examples of the Mars rovers given in previous chapters. They are 
programmed with symbolic structures capable of representing aspects of the 
environment, and interacting with other structures that can motivate and guide action. 
Those machines appear to be running something like Carruthers’ core computational 
architecture, however commonsense is certainly  not aligned with the idea that they have 
mentality.
 Perhaps what the Mars rovers lack is the capacity to carry out genuine reasoning. 
Indeed, Carruthers defends his view by  pointing out that on his proposed cognitive 
architecture there are practical rules at work—such as a practical syllogism—and 
claiming that they correspond to exercises of practical reasoning. But note that if we are 
intended to differentiate between computational processes that count or not as 
reasoning, then to look at the logical form of their inferences is not of much help. For 
we can perfectly imagine a merely computational agent being commanded by an 
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inferential mechanism with the form of a practical syllogism, involving the 
manipulation of representational and motivational states, however without being 
compelled to describe it as a genuine reasoner.
 I believe the same idea applies, for instance, to the navigational module inside a 
honeybee. The fact that they compute inferential processes that mediate between input 
and output mechanisms does not seem to be sufficient to describe them as genuine 
reasoning. It could be replied that human beings presumably also possess computational 
modules inside their heads—often described from a subpersonal level of explanation—
and that there is nothing wrong in characterising them as instances of reasoning, and so 
we should do the same with the modules inside a honeybee. But I believe this reply does 
not work because Carruthers’s core computational architecture in which the honeybee 
module is supposed to be embedded is significantly different from the cognitive 
architecture of human beings. As I shall explain with more detail in the final chapter, 
human computational modules can be described as subpersonal processes, that is, as 
part of a broader system that is properly described from a personal level of explanation. 
But this is something that  does not happen with the honeybee module. It cannot be 
considered as subpersonal processing, because the overall computational architecture of 
the honeybee is not up  to the mark for being captured by personal-level explanations 
(see the next chapter). Then, the core computational architecture put forward by 
Carruthers appears, however, at least as an incomplete attempt to account for what is 
paradigmatic of mentality. As I shall argue below, personal-level explanations provide a 
better framework for the purposes of capturing what  is essential of psychological 
explanation.
 In some passages Carruthers defends his criteria for mentality  by appeal to the 
usual practice of cognitive scientists and comparative psychologists of describing 
animal behaviour in psychological terms. Carruthers (2004a) notes that the scientific 
literature on animal cognition “is replete with talk of information-bearing 
conceptualised states that guide planning and action-selection (beliefs), as well as states 
that set the ends planned for and that motivate action (desires)” (p. 206), and argues that 
this constitutes a good reason for taking the ascription of a belief/desire psychology to 
animals seriously, even if it clashes with some philosophical views. As Carruthers 
(2006) points out:
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The main point  is that when science and philosophy come into conflict, it is generally the 
philosophers who should give way. For all that  such non-empirically minded philosophers 
have to guide them is their ‘intuitions’. And why should those count for much when set 
against the scientists’ data and careful theorising? (p. 67).
 However, Carruthers is misleading when he resorts to scientific practice to 
defend his view. On the one hand, it is possible that many scientists are also falling into 
a false dilemma when justifying the ascription of a belief/desire psychology to animals 
by appeal to the insufficiency of fixed action patterns or associative conditioning in 
explaining their behaviour. And on the other, some comparative psychologists actually 
recommend abstaining from attributing mental representations to animals. For instance, 
Chater and Hayes (1994) contend that the evidence obtainable from animal behaviour 
often underdetermines the nature of their inner structures, and that to describe them by 
using our own linguistic categories can barely be justified. Indeed, the authors conclude
that advances can be made in the study of animal cognition by making pragmatic, flexible, 
and as far as possible, minimal assumptions about  the content of animals’ representational 
states. (p. 239; see also Shettleworth, 2010)
 Carruthers might partly agree with this conclusion in the sense that we should 
remain neutral about the precise contents of animal representations, since those contents 
could, in fact, not be specifiable by means of our linguistic categories. He claims that, 
instead, we should better characterise them “from the outside, by means of an indirect 
description” (2004a, p. 206), thus making few commitments about their precise 
contents. But the problem with this external characterisation of the animal’s inner 
symbolic structures is that it  is, again, assuming that those structures have mental 
properties. The capacity  to discriminate and categorise environmental properties and 
behave in an intelligent way  that reflects those discriminations, can sometimes be 
explained from the computational level without the help of psychological notions. Some 
creatures might process information through complex computational architectures such 
as Carruthers’, but do so by means of computational symbols, not mental symbols. 
6.5 Conclusions
 In this section I have discussed the proposals of of Bermúdez and Carruthers 
concerning what are the minimum conditions for having mentality. Both authors start 
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from a rather conventional cognitivist  viewpoint, however Bermúdez develops an 
alternative model of psychological explanation that attempts to do without inferential 
processes. I have argued, though, that several tenets of Bermúdez’s account are 
problematic and that his model of psychological explanation ends up being insufficient 
to explain some complex forms of animal behaviour. 
 Concerning Carruthers, he argues that the standard model of psychological 
explanation actually  applies to most animal species, since they implement a 
computational architecture that can be described as a belief-desire system that causes 
behaviour. I contended that his reasons in defending this criterion for mentality are 
unsatisfactory, and sometimes rest on dubious appeals to commonsense and scientific 
practice. His proposed core cognitive architecture does not  seem to capture what is 
paradigmatic of having a mind, or at least does it in a way that is incomplete in 
comparison with what in the next chapter I shall characterise as a personal-level 
approach to psychological explanation. In the following—and final—chapter of this 
thesis, I shall develop  this idea and adapt it  for the purposes of explaining the behaviour 
of non-human entities. 
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Chapter Seven 
The Agent Level: A Proposal Towards Drawing the Line 
7.0 Introduction
 In this last chapter I will conclude this thesis by putting forward my own 
hypothesis on the correct way to draw the line that separates computational agents with 
and without mentality. My strategy will consist in identifying the contrast between 
psychological- and computational-level explanations with what is known as the 
personal-subpersonal distinction, by  arguing that it  provides an especially satisfying 
way to distinguish what are the main aspects of a properly psychological explanation. 
 After introducing the main tenets of the personal-subpersonal distinction, I 
attempt to vindicate the plausibility of adopting a realistic approach towards personal-
level explanations by expounding how they can satisfy the requirements of explanation 
and supervention. Finally, I develop a non-human analogue to the personal level called 
“agent-level” and explore what constraints it imposes to the  possibility of finding 
mentality in non-human computational agents.
7.1 The Personal-subpersonal Distinction
 The personal-subpersonal distinction was first  proposed by Daniel Dennett in 
1969 and has been widely used and debated by philosophers of mind and psychology. In 
this section, I introduce the personal-subpersonal distinction focusing on Dennett’s 
characterisation of it, to then in the following sections advance towards a more general 
formulation of this distinction. According to Dennett  (1969), when studying the human 
mind and behaviour our explanations normally take place at a personal level of analysis, 
that is, in terms of activities and states that belong to a person. However, the same 
phenomena can also be approached from a subpersonal level, which instead of focusing 
on persons goes deep into the underlying cognitive or neural mechanisms that enable a 
person to have the mental or behavioural properties under scrutiny. He suggests that 
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once we understand the contrast between personal- and subpersonal-level explanations, 
we can appreciate how they  can become complementary levels of inquiry about the 
mind. 
 Dennett gives the example of pain. This is a paradigmatic mental state that 
corresponds to a personal level of analysis, since explanations related to pain are 
typically formulated in terms of how they occur to people. By contrast, Dennett 
observes, knowing the subpersonal processes associated with pain will not enhance our 
understanding of how people experience or discriminate their pains. Moreover, he goes 
on saying that if we want to study what underlies a personal level explanation of pain, 
then
we must abandon the explanatory level of people and their sensations and activities and turn 
to the subpersonal level of brains and events in the nervous system. But when we abandon 
the personal level in a very real sense we abandon the subject matter of pains as well. (1969, 
p.95)
 This is not to say that a subpersonal account of pain cannot shed light on the 
nature of pain and its characteristic behaviour, though. Dennett’s point is that when we 
shift to the subpersonal level we no longer have pain within the scope of our theoretical 
vocabulary, however we get further theoretical tools to explain the operations and 
mechanisms that make possible the phenomenon of pain. Thus understood, it is natural 
to associate the personal-subpersonal distinction with the idea of multiple levels of 
analysis depicted in chapter 1. Consider the example of an enzyme catalytic reaction. 
We can study  this biochemical process from the viewpoint of basic physics, and in this 
way reveal the atomic interactions that happen during the enzymatic process. This 
explanation can undoubtedly enhance our understanding of the catalytic reaction itself, 
even though the term enzyme might not be present at this physical level of analysis. So 
the point  is that it is possible to study certain phenomenon from the theoretical level 
(downwards) where it supervenes, even if that implies abandoning the vocabulary of the 
level where the phenomenon was initially described. 
 One controversial aspect of Dennett’s example of pain, however, is that it alludes 
to a conscious mental state and thus may lead to the conclusion that personal level 
phenomena are always picked out  in terms of consciousness. But Dennett understands 
the personal level in a more fundamental way, grounded not on whether mental states 
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are conscious but on their capacity to provide intentional explanations of people’s 
behaviour (which indeed match psychological-level explanations, see 7.2.1). So from a 
more general viewpoint, personal-level explanations consist on those that can be 
properly ascribed to intentional systems, which Dennett (1979) defines as follows:
An intentional system is a system whose behaviour can be (at  least  sometimes) explained 
and predicted by relying on ascriptions to the system of beliefs and desires (and other 
intentionally characterised features—what  I will call intentions here, meaning to include 
hopes, fears, intentions, perceptions, expectations, etc.). (p. 271)
 Dennett claims that when an agent exhibits behavioural patterns that can be 
satisfactorily explained and predicted by  adopting an intentional stance, then we can 
qualify the agent as an intentional system and ascribe mentality to it. And even though 
alternative explanations can in principle account for the same behaviour (e.g. 
subpersonal-level explanations), the intentional stance arguably offers an advantageous 
explanatory  approach when dealing with agents with minds (I shall say more about 
these explanatory advantages in 7.3.1). Intentional explanations can also be conceived 
as properly situated at a personal level; they make intelligible how a person could 
perceive and generate beliefs about the world, think and act on reasons.37 
 As is suggested by the term, the subpersonal level is commonly  defined as 
concerned with the parts, or sub-systems, of people. In Dennett’s words, “subpersonal 
theories proceed by analysing a person into an organization of subsystems ... and 
attempting to explain the behavior of the whole person as the outcome of the interaction 
of these subsystems” (1979, p. 153). The idea that personal-level explanations are 
properly  attributed to a person as a whole, while subpersonal-level explanations 
describe the functioning of its parts, has become the most common way to draw the 
personal-subpersonal distinction.
 To complete this initial depiction of the personal-subpersonal distinction, it must 
be noted that personal-level explanations characteristically have a normative dimension 
concerned with rational norms. Broadly speaking, behaviour is supposed to be governed 
by normative principles of (instrumental) rationality, which constrain how the person’s 
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37 A note of caution is in order here. In accordance with what I have said throughout this thesis, I adopt a 
realistic reading of the personal-subpersonal distinction, understanding it as mapping onto real natural 
domains of inquiry. But as it is well known, it is not clear whether Dennett would agree with that. His 
view sometimes oscillates from interpretativism to mild forms of realism (cf. Dennett,  1979, and 1991, 
for both extremes).
beliefs and desires come together to bring about actions, in order to satisfy its desires 
and goals. According to Dennett’s particular approach, as a result of being constrained 
by rational norms, personal-level explanations proceed by ascribing beliefs and desires 
a person ought to have in order to satisfy its goals, according to rational standards such 
as consistency and coherency. In 7.2.4 I shall argue that this idealised conception of 
rationality is misguided, however, and present an account of rationality more suitable 
for the present thesis.
 This sort of normativity is supposed to constrain the behaviour of a whole 
rational agent, and thus not  be operative at  the subpersonal level. Even though 
subpersonal-level explanations can have a normative dimension—in particular when 
computational capacities are understood teleologically and therefore aimed at certain 
ends or goals—this normativity is concerned with the functioning of particular 
subsystems and not with explanations that rationalise how a (whole) person attains its 
desires and goals. I will say  more about why ascriptions of rationality demand a 
personal-level approach in 7.4.3.
 By way of summary, the main ideas behind this preliminary  characterisation of 
the personal-subpersonal distinction are contrasted in the table below. In the following 
sections of this chapter I delve more deeply  onto these ideas, to then conclude with a 
revised version of personal-level explanations attempted to map neatly on what I have 
called the psychological domain. 
Personal level Subpersonal level
Subject 
matter
Behaviour and cognitive capacities 
attributable to a whole person
Mechanisms and subsystems that make 
personal level capacities possible
Theoretical 
vocabulary
Couched in terms of commonsense 
psychology




Standards of rationality apply No place for rational standards
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7.2 Specifying the Distinction
7.2.1 The Personal-subpersonal Distinction and Hierarchical Levels of 
Explanation
 In the first chapter of this thesis I delineated the common picture of 
distinguishing three hierarchical levels of explanation for the mind, viz. the 
psychological, the computational and the physical level. A natural way of extrapolating 
this analysis into the personal-subpersonal distinction presented above, is to identify the 
psychological level with the personal level, and the computational and physical with the 
subpersonal level. Let me explain with more detail.
 The psychological level as presented in 1.4.1 deals with the subject matter of 
personal-level explanations and deploys the same theoretical vocabulary. Both levels 
attempt to make understandable the behaviour of a cognitive agent taken as a whole, 
and proceed by ascribing it propositional attitudes governed by norms of reason. Their 
explanations roughly coincide with the categories of commonsense psychology, and 
generally  strive to legitimise their vocabularies and generalisations under a the light of 
science. Subpersonal-level explanations, on the other hand, can be identified with both 
the computational and the physical levels, given that the two are situated “below” the 
level of whole persons. 
 Take again the case of pain. We have two ways of elucidating this personal level 
phenomenon. One could be properly computational, and proceed by analysing how 
information coming from nociceptors is coded and categorised though different 
computational stages of processing. On the other hand, an alternative explanation could 
consist on a straightforward physical account describing, for instance, the neural 
pathways and regions of the brain that are activated during painful experiences. Both 
computational and physical level explanations can be regarded as complementary, but it 
is worth pointing out that in the context of cognitive science it  is customary to situate 
the computational level as the one immediately “below” the personal level. Then 
following common usage, and for the purposes of mapping the personal-subpersonal 
distinction onto the standard threefold analysis of the mind already mentioned, I will 
identify the subpersonal level with the computational level. 
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7.2.2 Subpersonal-level Explanations are not Purely Syntactic
 In section 2.3.1 I argued against the view that computational-level explanations 
just correspond to a formal or syntactic description of the computational operations 
performed by mental creatures. A similar view is sometimes adopted by  defenders of the 
personal-subpersonal distinction, and can be tracked back to Dennett (1982) and his 
assertion that while the mind is a semantic engine, when we look at the brain all we find 
is a syntactic engine. John McDowell (1994b38)—another prominent defender of the 
personal-subpersonal distinction—pushes this idea forward when he writes:
we have inside us something that  is not intelligent at  all (it  knows nothing and understands 
nothing); even so, we can be enormously helped in finding it  comprehensible how we can be 
intelligent, [by means of subpersonal-level explanations] .... That makes it possible to 
understand how this mindless internal control system enables us to do what it takes to 
display genuine mindedness, namely to live competently in an environment. (p. 200)
 McDowell concedes that the subpersonal level is an invaluable approach to 
make sense of the mental phenomena that figure at personal-level descriptions, since it 
can show us the computational mechanisms that “enable” us to possess mentality. 
However, he suggests that we should distinguish this enabling explanation from a 
“constitutive” one, that is, from explanations about what literally  grounds or fully 
explains the phenomenon under study. According to McDowell, the enabling conditions 
described at the subpersonal levels are concerned with the syntactic component of the 
mind, leaving the representational component completely outside the scope of 
subpersonal-level explanations (indeed, according to McDowell any ascription of 
representational contents at the subpersonal level must follow an “as if” fashion).
 I believe this way of framing the personal-subpersonal distinction is misleading, 
though, for the following reasons. First, the way  it relates both levels is unclear and 
inconsistent with a scientific picture of hierarchical levels of organisation, where all the 
processes at a higher level are supposed to be implemented by processes situated at the 
next level down. And McDowell’s notion of “enabling explanation” does little to clarify 
how the personal and subpersonal levels are related, and ends up being too weak to 
account for inter-level relations. Something can be the enabling condition for certain 
phenomenon, in the sense of explaining how it can be possible, but be just a partial 
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38 All page quotations in this section correspond to this paper.
account of what underlies that phenomenon. This could be the case, for instance, of the 
relation between a power supply and a the sounds emitted by a radio. The power supply 
enables the radio to emit sounds, but much more than the power supply is needed to 
account for what grounds that phenomenon. In contrast, the subpersonal level is 
supposed to offer a complete account of what underlies personal-level explanations, and 
therefore is not just an enabling but also a constitutive condition for the mind. In one 
part (p. 203) McDowell tries to shed light on the notion of enabling condition by 
associating it with a causal explanation, but this only further distorts the picture. Higher 
levels do not stand in a causal relation with lower ones, but in a relation of 
supervenience. And if supervenient levels do not constitute the metaphysical ground for 
the levels situated “above”, then those higher levels remain as a floating mystery. 
 Another way of showing why McDowell’s view is unsatisfactory, can be to 
consider his claim that “a brain knows nothing and understands nothing” (p. 201). The 
rationale behind this assertion is that the brain is normally studied from a subpersonal 
perspective, one of computation and information-processing where terms such as 
knowing and understanding do not exist. But even though in some sense this is true, it  is 
just a consequence of the division of labour proper of the scientific approach of multiple 
levels of analysis, not a fact about the nature of the brain. Take the analogue case of the 
assertion “human bodies cannot feel the ambient temperature”. Even if it would be right 
to say the the theoretical vocabulary  that properly describes bodies (say, physiology) has 
no place for the term feel, this does not mean to say that bodies cannot feel. Bodies do 
feel, but how we describe this phenomenon will depend in which level of analysis we 
adopt. Therefore, brains do understand, however this assertion has to be understood as 
formulated from one particular level of description.
7.2.3 The Personal and Subpersonal Levels do not Collapse into a Single Level
 Some philosophers, in particular some who endorse psychological 
functionalism, tend to assimilate explanations couched at the personal level with 
subpersonal-level explanations. A common motivation behind this has to do with the 
attempt to legitimise commonsense psychological explanations by  analysing them at a 
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functional level that is somewhat continuous with a rigorous and scientifically grounded 
functional description of the workings of the nervous system.
 One consequence of a straightforward personal-subpersonal assimilation can be 
the elimination of personal-level explanations altogether. That would happen if the 
personal level ends up playing no distinctive explanatory  role and the phenomena it was 
purported to explain is totally  redescribed in subpersonal terms. Even though this is not 
the place for assessing arguments for this sort of eliminativism, it is worth mentioning 
some reasons for resisting it. One is that the personal level does have its explanatory 
merits, which I shall defend in section 7.3.1. A further reason for preserving this level 
can be deduced by looking at the term subpersonal; it  is conceptually tied to the notion 
of personal level, which it is supposed to elucidate. But the point is more than just 
terminological. Personal-level descriptions are required for isolating the relevant 
subpersonal processes we need to explain human behaviour, and without an explanatory 
vocabulary that includes personal-level categories such as perception, decision-making 
and action, we would be left without a way of telling apart computational agents with 
and without mentality. I expand this idea in section 7.3.2.
 Some philosophers who follow psychological functionalism have attempted to 
preserve something like a personal-subpersonal distinction, however I believe they have 
done so in a misleading way  (see below). They concede that there is a relevant 
distinction to be made between a description of a whole person’s behaviour and a 
functional analysis of its capacities in terms of subsystems, but according to their view 
personal-level explanations just correspond to a subset of subpersonally characterised 
computational processes39. One example of this view is the approach of Braddon-
Mitchell and Jackson (1996, ch. 14), who defend a version of commonsense 
functionalism that distinguishes between personal and subpersonal levels40. According 
to them, both levels correspond to a functional description of how an agent picks up, 
transforms, and processes information in a way that  yields intelligent behaviour. But on 
their view, the relation between personal- and subpersonal-level explanations is 
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39  This way of characterising the personal-subpersonal distinction was also suggested by Stephen 
Laurence (in conversation).
40  It must be noted that the authors do not employ a personal-subpersonal terminology, but distinguish 
between psychology and a functionalist account of the workings of the nervous system. Since that 
distinction roughly matches the personal-subpersonal distinction discussed here, and to simplify the 
exposition, I present their proposal in personal-subpersonal terms. 
equivalent to “the relation between limited explanations and one or another underlying 
complete explanation” (p. 259). 
 So according to Mitchell and Jackson, the personal level constitutes a partial, 
limited version of the full story of information processing that the subpersonal level is 
in principle capable of conveying. And instead of being a limitation, they claim this 
constitutes an advantage because personal-level explanations are supposed to include 
the main causal generalisations and counterfactuals that matter for the purposes of 
explaining behaviour (e.g. by including the necessary conditions required for the causal 
generalisations to obtain). So even though explanations couched at the personal level 
are incomplete and restricted in comparison with subpersonal-level explanations, the 
former are vindicated because they capture the essential part of the story that matters for 
our understanding of the phenomena under study.
 Take for example an explanation of the space shuttle Challenger accident. A 
complete explanation of what caused the accident would involve a massive amount of 
detail about the physical structure of the rocket booster that initially exploded, the 
chemical constitution of its propellant, the flow of gases inside and outside it, the 
aerodynamic forces impacting the spacecraft, etc. In contrast, a more concise 
explanation could be that what caused the accident was a failure in one of the 
mechanical gaskets of the right rocket booster, which produced a escape of high 
temperature gas that lead to the breakup  of the spacecraft. These two explanations (the 
complete and partial) can be viewed as an example of the contrast between subpersonal- 
and personal-level explanations, respectively. Even though the latter has much less 
detail and precision, it is preferred because it captures the most relevant events that 
matter for our understanding of the accident.
 In this sense, we might say that subpersonal-level explanations give a complete 
account of the computational processing of information in the brain, while the personal 
level offers a partial version of the same story but focused on processes that are more 
relevant for the purposes of explaining human behaviour. One obvious critique to this 
approach is that in the context of scientific realism we are looking for the best 
explanation, and not just for the most easy or tractable one. Even if a complete 
subpersonal account is hard to understand, or even if we are incapable to formulate it 
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given our current state of scientific knowledge, these are not good reasons for preferring 
a shortened version of it. We want the theory  that best explains how the world is, not the 
one that is more convenient for our particular purposes.
 Braddon-Mitchell and Jackson are aware that their proposal cannot  be grounded 
solely  on this sort of epistemic advantage, though. They argue that the partial (personal-
level) explanation can provide us with a language with the “resources” to describe “in a 
non-trivial manner” the relevant counterfactuals that make clear why the behaviour 
under study actually happen to be the case. They  go on to claim that, in this sense, the 
explanations couched at the personal level might be regarded as autonomous from other 
explanatory levels. 
 I believe their arguments do not support the autonomy of personal-level 
explanations, though. If they constitute just a partial account of what goes on at the 
subpersonal level, it is not  clear why personal-level explanations could be regarded as 
having a distinctive theoretical vocabulary, or as offering more resources to deal with 
counterfactuals than subpersonal-level explanations. Returning to our example of the 
Challenger, the shortened version of the story of the accident can clearly  be helpful for 
purposes of understanding or communicating it, but it can hardly be defended that  it has 
more resources than the complete explanation. And even if the short story proves to be 
more useful for grouping the relevant data and for describing it in a more concise 
manner, it would still be formulated in the same theoretical vocabulary and following 
the same laws of the complete explanation, and thus cannot be conceived as being 
formulated at  a different level of organisation in the way the personal level is supposed 
to be.
7.2.4 Normativity does not Imply Radical Autonomy
 So far in this thesis, I have introduced two senses of autonomy. One is that of an 
autonomous agent (see 2.3), which corresponds to an embodied machine or animal 
capable of self-governing and self-organisation. The second is the autonomy of levels of 
explanation in science. As explained in 4.1, mental agents are normally studied in terms 
of three hierarchical levels of organisation: the psychological, the computational and the 
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physical levels. Each level is supposed to be autonomous in the sense of having its own 
theoretical vocabulary and predictions, however that autonomy  is constrained in the 
case of higher-levels since their processes must supervene, and therefore be determined 
by, the processes of the next level down. Psychology, qua the top level of scientific 
explanation of the mind, is autonomous in this second sense.
 One controversial aspect of psychology—understood as personal-level 
explanation in the present context—is that it has a normative dimension. This has been 
considered as the source of another sense of autonomy, which I shall call the radical 
autonomy of psychology. This is the view that psychology has an explanatory method 
that is fundamentally  distinct from that of other scientific theories, to the extent that its 
explanations are radically incommensurable with respect to subpersonal levels of 
explanation (Crane, 1999). The basic idea is that normative principles of rationality 
apply  at the personal level and constrain its explanations in a way that makes them 
prescriptive rather than descriptive. The point is clearly put by  McDowell (1985) in the 
following passage:
[Psychological] explanations [are those] in which things are made intelligible by being 
revealed to be, or to approximate as being, as they rationally ought to be. This is to be 
contrasted with a style of explanation in which one makes things intelligible by representing 
their coming into being as a particular instance of how things generally tend to happen. (p. 
389).
 In sum, according to radical autonomy the personal-level explains people’s 
behaviour in terms of the mental states they ought to have in case they  were ideally 
rational, and not according to behavioural data gained through empirical discovery. This 
is certainly  at  odds with the scientific picture of levels of organisation presented in this 
thesis, since radical autonomy opens an unbridgeable gap between the personal and 
subpersonal levels (see also Dennett, 1987; Davidson, 1980). In the remainder of this 
section, I argue that radical autonomy does not follow from the assumption that 
psychology conforms standards of rationality, and that personal-level explanations can 
be safely kept within our naturalistic framework.
 The line of argumentation followed by the aforementioned authors is, at least in 
an important respect, transcendental: compliance to ideal standards of rationality is 
considered a presupposition for the very possibility  of psychological explanation. In this 
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sense we cannot expect to predict human behaviour without starting from the ascription 
of beliefs and desires the person ought to have according to rational norms such as 
coherency and consistency. One problem with this approach relates with its idealised 
conception of rational norms. When discussing Dennett in 2.1.1, I argued that the 
imposition of ideal standards in our interpretation of behaviour is poorly  revealing about 
the nature of cognition in general, because cognitive capacities simply lack an optimal 
design and normally perform below standards of full rationality. As Samuels, Stich and 
Faucher (2004) suggest, perhaps what the psychological evidence is suggesting is not 
that people are systematically irrational, but instead that the idealised standard used as a 
benchmark against which people’s reasoning is evaluated has been wrongly  conceived. 
For example, they have proposed to develop a “resource-relative” conception of 
rationality where the normative standards are relativised according to the cognitive 
resources people actually have, as a way to avoid imposing standards that go beyond 
human capacities. I return to this idea at the end of this section.
 A second misguided motivation for radical autonomy relates to the alleged 
indeterminacy of psychological explanations of behaviour. The claim is that 
psychological evidence is characteristically insufficient for explaining the causes of 
behaviour, and that  therefore a large rational pattern of mental states has to be assumed 
for the purposes of explanation. This would make personal-level explanations 
prescriptive, given that those patterns have to be framed by the interpreter in 
compliance with standards of rationality. In words of Davidson (1980), “we must warp 
the evidence to fit  this frame” (p. 36). In section 2.1.1, I tackled a similar argument put 
forward by  Dennett, according to whom since there is an unavoidable degree of 
indeterminacy  in psychological explanations, we must presume rational patterns of 
mental states in order to make sense of behaviour. In response I argued that even though 
a certain degree of indeterminacy might always be present, it is often possible to collect 
a reasonable amount of behavioural evidence in order to make psychological hypothesis 
scientifically respectable and susceptible of further empirical verification. And even if 
in some cases a lack of evidence makes it  hard to formulate strong psychological 
generalisations, it could correspond just to a case of epistemological rather than 
metaphysical indeterminacy (Bermúdez, 2005). So there appears to be no a priori reason 
for denying that psychological hypotheses could be verified in the long run after 
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appropriate experimental techniques caught up, overcoming our current epistemic 
limitations.
 But what is the place of rational norms in pscyhology, then? The goal for present 
purposes is to account for a naturalised notion of rationality that does not lead to radical 
autonomy, and is at the same time compatible with a personal-level approach. At a 
minimum, a person’s behaviour is described as rational when it is the result of a process 
of thinking (i.e. involving beliefs and desires) that satisfies certain normative principles 
of reasoning. When we try  to specify  the nature of those principles, however, we might 
wonder where those standards come from and in what sense they normatively constraint 
psychological explanations. I tackle these issues in the remainder of this section.
 As explained above, it is problematic to impose idealised standards of reasoning 
that go beyond human cognitive capacities. This happens, for example, when those 
standards are derived from formal theories such as classical logic and probability theory. 
But instead of prescribing ideal standards on a priori grounds, it is much more sensitive 
with the psychological evidence on human reasoning to relativise those standards to 
human cognitive capacities and limitations, along the lines of the aforementioned 
resource-relative conception of normative standards (cf. Cherniak, 1986).
 When it comes to determine how those resource-relative standards apply  to 
psychological explanation, it is important to distinguish them from psychological 
generalisations. The latter correspond to lawful connections between people’s mental 
states and behaviour, which allow psychological explanation and prediction. Standards 
of rationality, instead of attempting to predict behaviour, enter in psychological 
explanations as part of the story we tell about what mental states could underlie the 
generalisations we have previously established empirically  (Fodor & Lepore, 1995). 
They  permit us to evaluate whether people’s mental states and behaviour constitute a 
rational means for attaining their goals, and also open the possibility  of mistakes when 
those means are instrumentally irrational. We would expect, of course, that those 
rational standards also give us some predictive power; after all, they  are supposed to 
reflect the strategies people actually follow in order to satisfy their desirable goals. 
However, the key idea is that rational norms do not override the descriptive nature of 
psychological generalisations.
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 It might be objected that at the very moment we start  talking about standards we 
are imposing some sort of idealisation, leaving out from the scope of psychology cases 
of systematically irrational behaviour, which even though abnormal or pathological, are 
actually possible. But this idealisation is innocuous insofar as the standards are not fixed 
a priori but result from empirical research about cognition, and behaviour that is not up 
to those standards can be regarded as exceptions to ideal conditions under which 
scientific theories normally operate. For example Fodor (1974) has compared 
psychology with other special sciences such as geology, whose generalisations are 
typically ceteris paribus, that is, they admit potential exceptions, which are normally 
only statable in the vocabulary of more fundamental sciences (which they  supervene 
on). These ceteris paribus conditions correspond to a form of idealisation, however they 
are ubiquitous in most scientific disciplines (Rey, 1997, ch. 10).
 In section 7.4 I shall return to this discussion and explore how this normative 
dimension characteristic of the personal level could be adapted for the purposes of 
differentiating agents with and without mentality.
7.3 Assessing the Distinction
 So far I have introduced and explained the personal-subpersonal distinction, 
with the aim of identifying it with the distinction between the psychological and 
computational levels of explanation (identifying for present purposes the subpersonal 
level just  with the computational, and not with the physical level, as explained in 7.2.1). 
This involves the assumption that personal- and subpersonal-level explanations 
correspond to autonomous levels of organisation, and that they form part of our 
scientific picture of agents endowed with mentality. This idea, however, needs some 
tiding up in the way of showing the legitimacy of the personal-subpersonal distinction. 
In the following sections I evaluate its plausibility, and for that purpose I discuss how 
the psychological level can satisfy two requirements for being a plausible top level of 
explanation of the mind (adapted from Devitt, 1991):
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• Explanation Requirement: The personal level must perform an explanatory task 
that is not performed by  subpersonal levels, and thus give us additional explanatory 
power.
• Supervention Requirement: The personal level must supervene on the subpersonal 
level in a way that makes plausible its implementation on levels lower down in the 
hierarchy.
 Some comments on these requirements. The explanation requirement has to be 
understood in the context of scientific realism presented in 1.1.2.  According to this 
view, what vindicates the personal level as a genuine metaphysical level is that is 
constitutes the best scientific explanation we currently  have to account for certain 
behaviour. Even though in principle any mental phenomenon could be given a 
subpersonal description, the personal level is supposed to provide us with a theoretical 
framework capable of capturing generalisations linking mental states and behaviour that 
would otherwise be missed from a strict subpersonal-level viewpoint, and increase our 
predictive power.
 The supervention requirement, on the other hand, is a constraint from naturalism 
(see 1.1.1). In order to be compatible with the metaphysical picture of hierarchical 
levels or organisation, personal-level states and processes need to supervene on the 
states and processes at the subpersonal level, in a way analogous to the way that 
computational states are implemented in physical devices. A consequence of the 
supervention requirement is that the autonomy of the personal level as a special science 
is not unrestricted. In order to justify  the ascription of the personal level, there must be a 
plausible way of implementing it in the subpersonal level.
 At this point it shall be useful to introduce the distinction between horizontal and 
vertical explanations (Bermúdez, 2005). Suppose we ask for an explanation for an 
enzymatic reaction that catalyses the conversion from molecule X to molecule Y. An 
explanation from chemistry would say, for example, that an enzyme binds molecule X 
and lowers the activation energy that this molecule requires to reach a transition state in 
which it is transformed into molecule Y. This is an example of horizontal explanation 
insofar as it describes a causal series of events between entities couched by  the 
vocabulary of chemistry and subsumed by  chemical laws. The same enzymatic reaction, 
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though, could be explained from the level of physics. In this case, we would have an 
horizontal explanation involving causal generalisations holding between entities 
described by  the vocabulary of physics, such as those involving sub-atomic 
components. 
 Notably, there is a gap  between both horizontal explanations. Each can run 
rather independently, in the sense that physics and chemistry constitute autonomous 
disciplines, however some relation must exist between them in order to make the whole 
picture of levels of organisation plausible. More precisely, there must be a way in which 
both horizontal levels are related, an account of how chemistry  could be grounded in 
physics. This need of inter-level explanations corresponds to the supervention 
requirement, or what Bermúdez (2005) has called the interface problem. He has 
proposed that this inter-level relation is provided by vertical explanations, which 
explain how entities and processes of higher-level theories could hold at more 
fundamental lower-level theories. Returning to our example, a vertical explanation 
related with the chemical reaction could be a description of the sub-atomic structure of 
molecule X, or a quantum-mechanical account of the  chemical process through which 
the enzyme accelerated the catalysis. 
 As can be suggested by the previous example (involving physics and chemistry), 
the limits between horizontal explanations are not always sharp, and when it comes to 
explain complex phenomena such as the mind it  is common that explanations oscillate 
among multiple levels. Consider the case of a computational-level explanation of visual 
perception. It  would certainly  include an account of how patterns of intensity  and 
changes in light are computed through a series of informational structures that end up 
generating a 3-D object-centred representation (see 1.4.2). However, note that a 
complete subpersonal explanation of vision typically includes elements from lower and 
upper levels. First, the input informational structure is the product of transducers, which 
convert light energy onto neural signals, a process described at the physical level. And 
at the other end of the computational process, the 3-D representation correspond to the 
activity of seeing an object on the part of a whole agent, something normally couched in 
personal-level terms.   
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 This multi-level character of explanation does not contravene the idea of there 
being a hierarchy  of autonomous levels, though. The point  is that it is often useful—and 
perhaps necessary—to explain certain complex phenomenon by appeal to aspects of the 
same phenomenon couched from different explanatory levels. And note that this 
practice is not peculiar of explanations of mental agents, but also customary  in 
neurobiological sciences in general (Craver, 2007).
7.3.1 Meeting the Explanation Requirement
 In this section I compare how personal- and subpersonal-level explanations 
account for certain characteristic mental and behavioural phenomena, with the purpose 
of supporting the claim that personal-level explanations can satisfy the explanation 
requirement. More precisely, I attempt to show that (1) some explanations couched in 
personal-level terms are substantially different from an alternative subpersonal-level 
account of the same phenomenon, and that (2) often subpersonal-level explanations 
involve details that  are largely irrelevant for grasping the phenomena described at the 
personal level. I present my arguments in the context of the three main stages of 
personal level explanation, viz. perception, reasoning and action-systems. 
 Suppose that John is on holidays visiting a city he does not know very well. At 
some point he is wandering through a street  and sees the face of an old enemy. He then 
suddenly turns around and starts walking in the opposite direction, heading back to his 
hotel. After a while, however, he feels a bit lost, and decides to stop and figure out 
which direction to take. Even though he cannot recognise any known landmark in his 
surroundings, after a while he believes he is not  far from the hotel, but just a few streets 
north. In fact he was right, and after taking a route south he manages to find his hotel.
 This explanation incorporates facts about John’s perception, in particular his 
capacity of generating a perspective of his surroundings, and focusing on particular 
features of it. Many philosophers, going back at least to Kant, have found appealing to 
say that  this capacity is the one of the most distinctive features of the mind. For 
example, Crane (2001) asserts that what distinguishes minded from non-minded 
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creatures is that only the former are capable of generating “a point of view on things” or 
a “perspective” (p. 4). But what does such a perspective consist of? 
 As a first approach, to have a perspective is something more complex than to 
passively  re-present the immediate environment, in the way  a screen connected to a 
videocamera might be able to do. It also involves identifying elements (such as a face) 
in the visual field and keeping track of them. This is somewhat achieved by the 
perceptual capacity to represent environmental invariants, which as I explained in 
previous chapters many authors have identified as a hallmark of mentality. But as I have 
argued, the capacity  to maintain an informational link with certain environmental object 
can easily be ascribed to non-minded computational agents. To get an idea of what is 
missing, consider what appears to be essential of having a perspective: the ability to find 
out the place where one is situated. As the previous example shows, John is not just 
identifying a face, but also situating it within certain frame of reference. This is 
certainly more demanding than keeping track of individual objects, and involves 
simultaneously  identifying several objects and their spacial relations. Evans (1982) 
formulates the idea neatly in the following paragraph:
A perceptual input—even if, in some loose sense, it encapsulates spatial information 
(because it  belongs to a range of inputs which vary systematically with some spatial facts)—
cannot have a spatial significance for an organism except in so far as it  has a place in such a 
complex network of input-output connections. (p. 154) 
 The perspective proper of a minded agent then appears to consist in an integrated 
space of representation, from where the agent can identify  and take elements for further 
cognitive use (for a development of this view, see Proust, 1999). 
 Now let us examine how this general account of perception could be explained 
from a subpersonal-level approach. Consider the process of seeing and recognising a 
human face. From a subpersonal viewpoint (and returning to Marr’s standard example 
of a computational theory of vision), this process involves extracting information about 
an environmental invariant, and coding it through a series of computational stages 
involved in the formation of a 3-D representation of a distal environmental object. 
Among these intermediate computational stages, information about the human face first 
goes though an analysis of local geometrical structure called primal sketch, that is then 
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passed through a second stage called 2!-D sketch where the visible surfaces of the face 
are represented (see 1.4.2 for more details).
 When comparing this subpersonal-account with that of the personal level, it  soon 
becomes clear that the former has a different focus and involves information that  is 
largely irrelevant for the personal-level explanation. Beyond doubt  this subpersonal-
level analysis permits us to gain a deeper understanding of the computational operations 
underlying the representation of a face, however to include a primal or 2!-D sketch of 
the face in our explanation of why  John turned around would clearly be otiose. The 
theoretical vocabulary of personal-level explanations describes how John gains access 
to its environment as a rather immediate process, and its implementational 
informational-processing details are left out of the personal-level story. In a slightly 
different context, Dretske (1981) makes a similar point:
Information about angles, lines and gradients is obviously used in the production of a 
perceptual belief (e.g. a truck passing by), but  this information is (or may be) systematically 
eliminated in the digitalisation process by means of which a final semantic structure is 
synthesised. (p.200)
 To repeat, this is not to say that informational structures such as a primal sketch 
are irrelevant for the purposes of explanation. For present purposes, the point is that 
structures of this kind do not take part in personal-level accounts involving seeing, 
believing, and the like. What seems more appropriate is to say that structures such as a 
primal sketch correspond to a subpersonal level of description, which provides enabling 
conditions that ground perceptual processes, in the way of vertical explanations 
connecting the personal and subpersonal levels. In any case, the moral is that the 
personal-subpersonal distinction reflects the existence of two genuinely  explanatory 
levels of analysis.
 To make another personal-subpersonal contrast, let us return to the idea that  a 
personal-level explanation of John’s perspective appeals to a dynamic and integrated 
space of representation. To find a subpersonal-level correlate of this explanation we can 
look at accounts of the computational processes that implement spatial orientation. A 
prominent example of this approach has been put forward by Gallistel, who claims that 
most animals have a complex system of navigation based on a cognitive map, defined as 
follows:
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A cognitive map is a representation of (at least some) geometric relationships among a home 
site, terrain surrounding the home site, goals to be visited and the terrain surrounding those 
goals (Gallistel and Cramer, 1996, p. 211)
 According to this subpersonal-level account, a cognitive map is built by the 
combination of body-centred and earth-centred vectors, in the way of a map of 
coordinates and geometric relationships. It permits creatures to orientate themselves and 
navigate by path integration, which involves the ability to record and compute vector 
trajectories previously travelled and to calculate the vector to take in successive 
displacements. This job is probably carried out by domain-specific navigational 
capacities, and appears to be rife in the animal kingdom (see chapter 2 for path 
integration in wasps and honeybees).
 Can this subpersonal-level explanation subsume the personal level explanation 
given for John’s trip back to his hotel? I think here again we find a case where both 
explanations run separately. A personal level explanation involves something like the 
capacity to generate a mental map of his surroundings, including the relative position 
and distances between objects and places. When John figures out where he is and comes 
up with the belief that  he is a few streets north of his hotel, he simply reaches that belief 
out from his navigational abilities, in the same way  as the visual perception of an object 
appears in the visual field after opening the eyes in front of it. There is no clear way of 
justifying this belief by appeal to anything beyond his navigational abilities. The vector 
integration and calculation that underlies these capacities do not appear to be 
attributable to John in the same sense as we ascribe him the decision to walk back to his 
hotel. Those computational operations seem in fact to involve informational structures 
that never reach the level of belief, and instead happen in a deeply automatic and 
domain-specific fashion. 
 To conclude this defence of the distinctive character and explanatory virtues of 
personal-level explanations, let us abandon the example of John and focus on a 
pathological condition known as blindsight perception. Due to a lesion in the primary 
visual cortex, patients lack visual awareness of certain region of their visual field. But 
surprisingly, they remain visually  responsive to light stimulus presented in the blind 
area of their visual field, even thought they  report having not seen anything. For 
example, patients are asked to press a response key when are exposed with a visual 
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stimulus. When the investigators present stimulus in their blind area, there is a 
significant increase in the pressing response, demonstrating the existence of implicit 
processing of the unseen stimuli (Stoering, 1999).
 The act of pressing a key in response to visual stimuli is a certainly  a case of 
non-reflexive, complex behaviour, susceptible of a personal level description. However, 
something puzzling with these experiments is that it  seems wrong to give a personal-
level explanation to this, given that the relevant stimulus does not appear in the visual 
field, nor to integrate what we might call the perspective the subject has of its 
surroundings. And this does not seem to be just a matter of conscious recognition, since 
the stimulus does not appear to be possibly  retrieved or to affect  the perspective of the 
subject in any way (of course, it could affect the subject’s representational space after 
being informed about the results of the experiment, however that would not be a 
consequence of the perception of the stimulus itself). Indeed, the stimulus in question is 
not considered by the subject in making a decision to press the key. In contrast, a 
subpersonal-level account appears to be much more appropriate, probably offering some 
detail about the damaged brain structures responsible for such as case of abnormal 
behaviour.
 I believe that cases of blindsight can serve to highlight the personal-subpersonal 
distinction, by showing how what under normal conditions would be a typical personal-
level phenomenon, has to be explained in the radically  different language of the 
subpersonal level (in this case probably in neuroscientific terms). The case of blindsight 
is an abnormal case of behaviour, where the ceteris paribus character of psychology is 
notorious; it constitutes an exception to personal-level explanations, where we have to 
abandon the level of the whole-person and turn to its functional and neural components. 
In sum, the blindsight example supports the idea that the personal level does a different 
explanatory  job from that performed by  subpersonal-level explanations, and that  it is 
convenient to keep this distinction to account for pathological cases where what would 
normally be typical personal-level behaviour has to be given a subpersonal-level 
account.
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7.3.1 Meeting the Supervention Requirement
 In 7.3 I explained how personal and subpersonal levels map onto parallel 
horizontal explanations, and that part of what is understood by satisfying the 
supervention requirement is to account for vertical explanations linking both levels. So 
far, I have already mentioned some ways in which those inter-level relations could be 
formulated. One can be by providing the grounds of certain personal level states. For 
example, what makes it possible seeing and recognising an object could be spelled out 
through a vertical explanation of the computational stages involved in the formation of 
perceptual constancies and the integration of percepts coming from different sensory 
modalities. Alternatively, if accounts of conceptual content such as prototype theories 
are correct, a concept we single out at the personal level might not be grounded in a 
single informational structure, but in an interconnected set of informational structures 
(e.g. Rosch, 1978).
 Another example of vertical inter-level relations can be found in processes of 
reasoning, which from a personal-level approach correspond to inferential transitions 
between thoughts that  figure in causal explanations of behaviour. These inferences have 
a formal dimension that is subject to rational norms, and which individuals are often not 
even aware of. The way those inferences are implemented at the subpersonal level is by 
means of computational process, which allow us to explain how the transitions between 
thoughts could be mechanised. They provide a vertical explanation that unveils the 
mechanics for a process that when couched in the personal-level terms simply describes 
inferential transitions carried out in virtue of their form41. Again, there need not be an 
isomorphism between the personal and the subpersonal level, since the machinery  for 
what from personal level viewpoint is a single transition might in fact be instantiated in 
a larger series of computational steps. 
 A final case of vertical explanation, relates to abnormal conditions such as the 
case of blindsight explained in the previous section. The basic idea is that the 
generalisations captured by personal-level explanations are ceteris paribus in the sense 
of being forged within certain idealised conditions. That means that they admit 
exceptional situations where their purported predictions do not apply, in particular when 
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41 A similar example is put forward by Davies (2000). Contrary to my approach, however, Davies takes 
the subpersonal level to be purely syntactic, in the sense described in 7.2.2.
it comes to pathological conditions such as blindsight. In those cases, subpersonal-level 
explanations fill the gap, so to speak, left by these exceptional situations that our 
personal-level explanations are unable to account for. 
 Something suggested by these examples of inter-level relations is that personal-
level processes can be implemented in different configurations of subpersonal-level 
processes. This opens a way of spelling out the relation of supervenience that holds 
between both levels, by appeal to the notion of multiple realisation, the claim that 
processes couched in higher-level theories can be realised by  many distinct processes 
described by  the lower-level theory where the former theory supervenes. It  is widely 
accepted by  philosophers that the argument of multiple realisation has vindicated the 
metaphysical status of a functional (or computational) level of explanation, leaving it as 
an autonomous level of theoretical investigation about the mind (Kim, 1988). 
 Many authors have proposed that the notion of multiple realisation can also be 
applied to explain the relation between (what I am calling) personal- and subpersonal-
level explanations (e.g. Horgan, 1992; Putnam, 1988). A good way  to see the 
plausibility of this proposal can be to appreciate that something similar happens with the 
programming languages of some computers. In those cases, higher-level programming 
languages can be compiled in lower-level ones, with the possibility  of their being 
various programs nested between them in a way that resembles a hierarchical 
organisation of explanatory levels. Higher-level programming languages, so the 
argument goes, can be realised in different compiled languages (which are directly 
implemented in the physical machinery of the computer) and thus be multiple realisable. 
A problem with this idea, though, is that again we appear to be situated within a single 
general computational level of description, which, however having multiple nested 
levels of programming, does not necessarily imply that at the top of the hierarchy  we 
have a level compatible with a personal-level description.
 One way to justify the ascription of a personal-level of description at the top of a 
hierarchy of multiple realisable functional levels can be adapted from what is known as 
homuncular functionalism (Lycan, 1995; see also Dennett, 1979). According to this 
view, explanations at all levels are analysable from a functional viewpoint. For instance, 
bodily  organs such as the kidney  have a function that can then be analysed in terms of 
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its sub-systems, which serve more specific functions. And if we deepen into still lower 
layers of analysis we find that cells are functional structures that are constituted of 
smaller cooperating organelles that fulfil even more specific functions. The same idea 
runs for subpersonal-level explanations. Computational processes can be analysed in 
terms of sub-processes that realise them, which can then be broken down into further 
nested sub-processes, and so on. Thus, according to this view, our mind consists in a 
continuum of levels of organisation that encompass both the computational and the 
physical. Moreover, this analysis also includes what we have been calling the personal 
level:
To characterise the psychologist’s quest  in the way I have is to see them as first noting some 
intentionally or otherwise psychologically characterised abilities of the human subject  at the 
level of data or phenomena, and positing—as theoretical entities—the homunculi or sub-
personal agencies that are needed to explain the subject’s having those abilities. (Lycan, 
1995, p. 40)
 Then, we can see that according to Lycan’s approach we might distinguish the 
personal from the subpersonal level by focusing on their place in a functional analysis 
of the mind. The mental capacities that figure in personal-level explanations are 
supposed to be situated at the highest level in the functional hierarchy, while 
subpersonal-level explanations account for the underlying sub-processes that  realise 
those capacities. Given that higher-levels involve a more abstract teleological 
description than lower ones—which get closer to a structural or implementational levels 
of analysis—Lycan claims that teleology comes in degrees. Then, the personal-
subpersonal distinction can in principle be understood in terms of degrees of teleology. 
He is skeptical, however, in that a definite line could be drawn between them. These 
ideas are put clearly in the following passage:
(i) At  least  for single organisms, degrees of teleologicalness of characterisation correspond 
rather nicely to levels of nature. And (ii) there is no single spot either on the continuum of 
teleologicalness or amid the various levels of nature where it  is plainly natural to drive a 
decisive wedge, where descriptions of nature can be split neatly into a well-behaved, purely 
“structural”, purely mechanistic mode and a more abstract and more dubious, intentional, 
and perhaps vitalistic mode—certainly not any spot that also corresponds to any intuitive 
distinction between the psychological and the merely chemical, for there is too much and too 
various biology in between. (Lycan, 1995, p. 45)
 We might add that  there is also too much computation between personal and 
subpersonal-level explanations. But even though the relation between levels is one of 
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continuity  rather than sharp division, it is clear that this approach states that there is 
such a distinction. Namely, the personal level is the most teleological level in the 
hierarchy, and the one that  describes typical mental capacities or functions, such as 
perception, memory and decision-making.
 A problem with this account is how to spell out what is meant by having more 
teleology. Lycan acknowledges that he leaves this term rather unexplained, however he 
roughly characterises it in two ways. One is that more teleological means “more 
abstract” in the sense that it is far from the “grittily concrete” and “purely mechanical” 
realisation reached at the bottom of the subpersonal level. Secondly, he subscribes to the 
notion of teleology normally used by philosophers of biology, which in turn understand 
teleological capacities as biological mechanisms that have certain functions. So, and 
leaving evolutionary considerations aside, Lycan’s notion of teleological capacity  is that 
of abstract mechanisms that  are aimed to satisfy  functions which are typically ascribed 
to minded creatures.
 But where should we draw the line then? I believe that the right level of 
abstraction is the one that allows us to formulate a proper personal-level explanation. 
The main goal of this chapter so far has been precisely to characterise personal-level 
explanations, and vindicate them in terms of their explanatory advantages and plausible 
insertion in a metaphysical picture of hierarchical levels of organisation. In the 
following sections, I attempt to put the personal-subpersonal distinction to work, with 
the purpose of stating some conditions we would expect  computational agents would 
have to satisfy in order to realise a personal level of organisation.  
7.4 The Agent Level: A Proposal Towards Drawing the Line
 In this section I attempt to use the personal-subpersonal distinction examined in 
this chapter to spell out the distinction between (merely) computational- and 
psychological-level explanations, and in this way present a proposal about how to draw 
the line between computational agents with and without mentality. The key  claim is that 
we are justified in ascribing mentality to agents who instantiate computation when their 
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behaviour can be properly  explained from a personal-level perspective, which is 
equivalent to what I have called the psychological level of explanation. 
 The term personal-level is problematic for present  purposes, though, because it 
is conceptually associated with humans (i.e. persons) whereas our aim is to apply 
personal-level explanations to non-human animals and even to machines. Looking for a 
better term, I propose to use the term agent level in place of personal level. I believe that 
this denomination is general enough to encompass what I have called autonomous 
agents (viz. embodied computing systems capable of self-governing and self-
organisation) and that can be tailored to capture the basic features of the personal level. 
In the remainder of this section, I elaborate the notion of agent level by discussing how 
it can accommodate the three characteristics of the personal-level put forward in section 
7.2, viz. its subject matter, theoretical vocabulary and normative dimension. 
7.4.1 Subject-matter
 In the way that  the objects of study of the personal level are whole-persons, 
agent-level explanations are about whole-agents, and so it would be a mistake to 
identify agent-level descriptions with one component or module of a computational 
agent. Then agent-level explanations have to be formulated with a degree of generality 
appropriate for being attributable to the agent  as a whole and not merely to its parts. 
This certainly restricts which computational architectures could be candidates for agent-
level descriptions, given that not just any  complex assembly of multiple computational 
systems can be properly described as a genuine agent. 
 In this context, genuine agent-level explanations should be distinguished from 
“as if” ones. What I mean with the latter are explanations that talk about whole-agent 
behaviour in a metaphorical fashion, often for pragmatic purposes, without the intention 
of ascending into a higher (metaphysical) level of explanation. For example, Marr’s 
theory  of vision (Marr, 1982) adopts the strategy of first defining a higher-level of 
description about “what the device does and why”, concerned with the tasks carried out 
by the visual system in order to extract information from the environment and the 
constraints under which it operates. He sees this higher-level description of the task 
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performed by  the visual system as an unavoidable step towards exploring in detail how 
it is carried out through informational structures and algorithms. It would be mistake, 
though, to interpret Marr’s higher-level description as equivalent to a personal-level 
approach. As McClamrock (1991) suggests, Marr’s approach to the visual system is 
centred on a computational (i.e. subpersonal) level of analysis, and so this higher-level 
(which he indeed calls “computational”) works more as a means to elucidate the 
computational details of the system rather than to map onto an autonomous higher-level 
of description. 
 The same principle can be applied to the study of artefacts. Suppose an army 
captures a weapon from its enemy and sends it to a group of scientists for study. It 
would certainly be useful for them to start figuring out “what  the device does and why” 
before going into its internal machinery. But this should be considered just an heuristic 
strategy and not to involve the attribution of agency. The machine is not supposed to be 
capable of doing things in the way of agents, any more than a vending machine is 
supposed to sell beverages or to give the right change. Therefore, a non-trivial agent-
level description is supposed to map onto a particular domain of entities, that satisfy 
certain constraints that make them accountable as agents. But what are those 
constraints?
 A first constraint can be advanced in the context of the whole-part distinction. It 
seems natural to say that part of what makes an assembly of multiple computational 
systems an agent, is that those systems are integrated and function in a coordinated way 
towards achieving goals that  concern the agent as a whole. Recall the example of the 
digger wasp mentioned in chapter 2. A particular characteristic of this insect is that even 
though it exhibits sophisticated and flexible navigational capacities, at the same time the 
way in which it drags food back to its nest is rather rigid and stereotypic. As it seems to 
be the case of most insects, its computational capacities are highly domain-specific and 
modular in the sense of not being transferable to other domains. Then it  appears that the 
wasp, after deploying its navigational module for flying and reaching its nest, switches 
onto a non-computational system to drag the food into the nest. Given that both systems 
are not integrated, and indeed their processes are couched from different levels of 
explanation (i.e. the computational and the physical, respectively), it  would be odd to 
describe the transition in the wasp’s behaviour from an agent-level perspective. It would 
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be more appropriate to say that the wasp passed from one subsystem to another, rather 
than to situate the transition at the same whole-agent level of description. Of course, we 
could give a general description of the food-gathering tasks performed by  the wasp, 
describing it from a higher-level perspective of an integrated agent. However, as noted 
above, this talk would be metaphorical, and not revealing of the instantiation of a 
genuine agent-level in the wasp.
7.4.2 Theoretical Vocabulary42
 Since with the agent level we intend to map onto the natural domain of mental 
entities, we have to adopt the theoretical vocabulary of psychology  as it figures in 
personal-level descriptions. As explained in 1.4.2, even the simplest version of 
psychology is characterised by the use of mentalistic concepts such as beliefs and 
desires. They conform some of the basic elements for being a thinker, and must interact 
causally to produce behaviour. It is widely recognised that thoughts are structured by 
recombinable parts, called concepts. The basic idea is that when an agent thinks about X 
in different ways, e.g. believing that X is big and believing that X is white, it is 
entertaining the same concept X. As Fodor (1994) points out—reflecting the standard 
view of CTM—“concepts are the least complex mental entities that exhibit 
representational and causal properties; all the others [e.g. beliefs, desires, etc.] ... are 
assumed to be complexes whose constituents are concepts” (p. 96).
 Concepts, then, are an integral part of the vocabulary of agent-level 
explanations. But which animals have concepts? It can be tempting to identify  concepts 
with the informational structures described by computational-level explanations, 
however, as I have argued throughout this thesis, there is no reason for supposing that 
all informational structures could fit  the bill. Many of them appear to be deeply 
entrenched at subpersonal stages of processing that do not figure at all in agent-or 
personal-level explanations. In addition, concept possession also presupposes mastering 
certain cognitive abilities. For example, pigeons can be trained to sort pictures into 
categories of tree or person, but these findings do not warrant the conclusion that they 
have concepts. Pigeons may be just grouping together common visual elements into a 
178
42 Parts of this section are adapted from my article Do honeybees have concepts?
single internal representation, without being able to make further recognitional 
distinctions and inferences that are characteristic of possessing abstract concepts such as 
those of a tree or a person (Allen & Hauser, 1996). A common way to frame this idea is 
by stating that to possess concepts an agent must satisfy  the generality constraint, which 
was first formulated by Evans (1982) as follows:
We cannot avoid thinking of a thought about  an individual object x, to the effect  that it  is F, 
as the exercise of two separable capacities; one being the capacity to think of x, which could 
be equally exercised in thoughts about x to the effect that  it is G or H; and the other being a 
conception of what  it  is to be F, which could be equally exercised in thoughts about other 
individuals, to the effect that they are F. (p. 75)
 The main idea is that genuine thinkers should be capable of producing and 
entertaining an unbounded set of novel well-formed combinations of concepts. This 
capacity is closely  related with the so-called systematicity and productivity  of thought, 
which have been proclaimed by proponents of the computational theory  of mind as 
elemental features of thought (Rey, 1997, ch. 8). Then it appears that to be couched in 
agent-level terms the computational capacities of an agent must satisfy the generality 
constraint. 
 This immediately  appears to be problematic for modular cognitive architectures. 
As in the mentioned case of the wasp, the computational capacities of many animals, 
including rats and birds, appear to be massively modular (see Shettleworth, 1998, for a 
review). For instance, they have been studied in arti"cial environments that offer 
limited kinds of information that can be used by them to orientate. In those experiments 
animals proved to be able, not only  to use these different environmental clues to 
navigate, but to deploy them in a way that requires computation. However, some kinds 
of information appear to be perceived and used independently, without the capacity  to 
integrate them with other visual clues. All this suggests that they process the various 
kinds of spatial information by dedicated cognitive modules, that exhibit the hallmarks 
of domain-speci"city, computational processing and isolation43. Interestingly, robots 
built  by AI researchers also have modular architectures (Carruthers, 2006, ch. 1). In 
fact, the Mars rovers I put forward in previous chapters have their total computing 
systems divided up amongst task-specific modular structures (Cichy, 2010). But if 
informational structures between modules are not  combinable with one another, how 
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43 The classic definition of a cognitive module comes from Fodor (1983).
could animals and other computing agents satisfy the generality  constraint and be 
considered genuinely conceptual? In case they cannot, many animals would be out from 
the scope of agent-level explanations. 
 Carruthers (2009) has addressed this issue and argued that even though they 
have a massively modular architecture, most animals are capable of conceptual thought. 
To justify his claim, he formulates a “weak” version of the generality  constraint where 
all that matters is to be able to make at least some combinations between the concepts 
an agent  possesses, while the capacity to make all possible combinations of thoughts 
constitutes an ideal, he suggests, that perhaps only  humans can get close to achieving. 
Carruthers contends that something like the weak version of the constraint actually 
appears to be satisfied inside the workings of single modules, as for example in those 
involved in navigation in honeybees and other insects. For example, imagine that 
certain navigational module of honeybees has among its domain-specific repertoire of 
representations those of colours green and yellow, while they also possess a module for 
flower recognition that besides representations of green and yellow, also incorporates 
representations of red. So even though a honeybee cannot have thoughts involving 
elements from both modules, as would be to entertain ‘the hive is red’ from the 
navigation module, the fact that within this module it  can think ‘the hive is green’ and 
‘the hive is yellow’ shows the insect has the basic capacity to recombine its concepts, 
and therefore at least in such a modest way can satisfy the weak generality constraint.
 But, should we accept this weak version of the generality constraint? Is it too 
modest? I believe it  is, partly because it is not up  to some more fundamental aspects of 
concept possession the generality constraint is supposed to reflect. Following its 
original formulation, the generality  constraint is intended to ensure that when a creature 
really has the concept F, we are committed to the view that  when it  has any thought that 
deploys this concept (e.g. Fa, Fb, etc.) it is exercising the same conceptual capacity (see 
Evans, 1982, pp. 101-105). However, this does not seem work with honeybees. Let me 
explain this with an example. 
 Recall the previous example of the two modules for flower recognition and for 
navigation. The honeybee would be able to think ‘the flower is yellow’ in the first 
module, while ‘the hive is yellow’ in the second. Contrary  to what the generality 
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constraint proclaims, the conceptual capacities deployed to think about the concept of 
YELLOW in both cases are different, thus raising doubts about whether the insect is 
really able to entertain the concept of YELLOW. It could be argued that both modules 
share the same conceptual capacities, but the nature of cognitive modules seems to 
count against this idea. Cognitive modules are often conceived as “mental organs” in 
analogy with the organs of the body, since they evolved functionally  specialised 
mechanisms in same way as the heart or the lungs (Pinker, 1997). It is a natural 
consequence of this specialisation that the functions performed by these organs 
correspond to distinct biological capacities, not recombinable with one another. If 
cognitive modules are also highly  specialised, both in terms of the symbolic structures 
they  can process and in the processing mechanisms (i.e. programming languages) they 
use, it can be called into question whether they  combine their symbolic structures by 
exercising equivalent processing capacities. Ultimately, it is an empirical matter to 
determine how compatible the computing mechanisms between modules are. However, 
the present critique at least shows that this compatibility should not be taken for 
granted, and that further research is required to determine whether certain massively 
modular systems could meet the generality constraint required for agent-level 
processing.
7.4.3 Normative Dimension
 Rationality has traditionally been conceived as a rather demanding notion. Many 
follow the idea that genuinely rational agents entertain their thoughts within a space of 
reasons, which is (roughly) a framework of logical relations that allows us to weight 
reasons and decide what to do (McDowell, 1994a). These logical relations typically 
involve constraints of consistency and coherence between thoughts. But as I have 
argued in 7.2.4, to impose such high standards as a benchmark for judging whether an 
agent is rational is mistaken, given that even human cognitive capacities normally 
perform below those standards. It is much more plausible to formulate a resource-
relative conception of rationality, relativised to the cognitive capacities and limitations 
of the agents under scrutiny and allowing that we can be rational without complete 
consistency and coherence.
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 There is a danger of a slippery slope here, though. How inconsistent  and 
incoherent can a rational agent be? Clearly  there have to be certain margins. As Block 
(1994) notes, “the attribution of irrational beliefs cannot go on without limit; eventually, 
one loses one#s grip on the content of what one has attributed” (p.111). Indeed, the point 
relates with the foundations of CTM itself. Part of what makes a computing system 
capable of performing certain task is that its computational operations have the right 
inferential structure—i.e. program—situated within certain margins of internal 
coherence. An adding machine, for example, succeeds as such insofar as its program 
can preserve the numerical values of its symbols and manipulate them according to 
adding functions. If minor alterations are made to the program, it  might still be possible 
for the machine to perform its job, however if the alterations accumulate they will reach 
a point when the machine fails in performing its adding function for any numerical 
value. As a result, it would not be an adding machine anymore (cf. Haugeland, 1981; 
Cummins, 1989). 
 An analogue case can be made for the mind. Its capacity to think depends on its 
having the right inferential structure, which can perform rational operations insofar as 
its structure is kept within certain margins of internal coherence. A computing system 
that can no longer carry out the cognitive functions that characterise the mind (e.g. 
computing symbols standing for conclusions from symbols standing from premisses), 
would then cease to possess mentality. And with respect to the opposite end of the 
spectrum, a computational mechanism might be fully logical (e.g. consistent) in the 
sense of manipulating symbolic structures in conformity  to logical rules, however be 
merely computational—i.e. lack mentality. In other words, not all autonomous agents 
capable of performing inferences are capable of reasoning (see chapter 2). 
 In any case it  seems plausible to assume that  rationality could come in degrees, 
and that it largely depends on the possession of inferential-computational capacities. 
What remain as open questions are the extent of internal coherence and the cognitive 
architecture that could make genuine rationality possible. Hurley (2003)44  has 
formulated a proposal that deals with these issues. She claims that it can be possible for 
some animals to have rational capacities that are context-bound, in the sense that they 
are not transferable from one task to another, however these capacities must satisfy 
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44 Unless otherwise noted, all page quotations in this section correspond to this paper.
some minimum requirements such as holism and normativity. With holism Hurley 
means an integrated network of relations between perceptual and central cognitive 
states, such that the animal has available certain space of representations of possible 
means to attain its goals. What makes this network context-bounded is that it could be 
realised in domain-specific cognitive systems, which would still count as holistic 
because, at least within the domain-specific system, means and ends are related in a 
flexible and transferable way, for example allowing the animal to alternate different 
means to satisfy  certain desires. In the words of the author, they form “islands of 
practical rationality”, bounded to specific cognitive domains that do not generalise (p. 
238).
 After arguing that  this sort of holism is sufficiently  general to support reasoning 
processes, Hurley  goes on to account for how normativity could come about in domain-
specific cognitive systems. She sees as a defining feature of normativity the “possibility 
of mistake”, in the sense that there must be a way of judging certain processes and 
courses of action as right or wrong according to standards of rationality. At this point, 
she appeals to complexity and teleology:
Normativity admits of different kinds and levels and degrees. But the kind of mistake 
possible for a relatively complex and flexible, teleologically embedded system seems to me 
adequate to meet the normativity condition for correctly attributing practical reasons to an 
intentional agent ... (p. 244)
 With the requirement of complexity the author means processing (or we might 
say computational) sophistication, such as the capacity of yielding flexible responses 
and exerting feedback control over its own processes. But as the author acknowledges 
(and concordantly with my own proposal), complexity of this sort can be possibly found 
in certain machines (e.g. robots) to which we should not ascribe rationality, and so even 
though complexity appears to be important it is not itself sufficient for the sort of 
normativity at stake here. As mentioned in the quote, the next requirement is teleology. 
The kind of teleology Hurley  has in mind corresponds to an etiological notion of 
function, which defines functions in terms of their history (typically how they evolved 
by natural selection). 
 I believe that this move to teleology weakens Hurley’s proposal. As mentioned 
in section 2.3.2, an etiological notion of function is problematic, at least for present 
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purposes, since it would rule out the possibility that a human-built robot  could ever be 
endowed with mentality (or normativity, in the present context). And even if we 
understand cognition in teleological terms, the most plausible approach to functions 
according to the present  naturalistic framework would be dispositional instead of 
etiological, with functions being defined in terms of their current roles in our best 
scientific theories of how the mind works (cf. 5.5.1 where I discuss further problems 
that emerge from situating etiological and dispositional functions within the same 
account of the mind). However, by adopting a dispositional approach to functions 
nothing would prohibit us from ascribing teleology to subpersonal-level processes, as 
for instance to the face-detection mechanisms run within a cognitive module. Therefore 
what is at issue does not seem to be whether there is normativity, but what could make 
certain normative processes genuine cases of reasoning. So, contrary to Hurley’s view, I 
suggest that it is not teleology  but computational sophistication that can give us the key 
for understanding what sort of computational architecture might possibly realise 
cognitive capacities accountable from an agent-level perspective (see below).
 An interesting thing to note regarding Hurley’s view is that she recognises that 
we are only justified in attributing rationality to an animal when that  attribution is 
formulated from an agent-level perspective (which she calls the “animal-level”). In 
other words, if an agent is described as acting for reasons, they must correspond to the 
agent’s own reasons, whereas to ascribe reasons to its subsystems would lead us 
nowhere. But when it comes to clarifying what requirements computational processes 
would have to meet in order to be attributable to an agent as a whole, Hurley’s proposal 
is disappointing. Apart from appealing to certain degree of holism (see above), she 
argues that what a cognitive process requires to qualify as reasons for an animal is that 
they  explain action in the context set by “at least primitive forms of practical 
rationality” (p. 233). Therefore, she situates having reasons as a precondition for being 
accountable from an agent-level perspective, leaving unexplained what is required for 
the agent-level in the first place. I propose, in contrast, that it is the capacity  to realise 
an agent-level cognitive architecture that makes possible the emergence of rationality, 
and not the other way round. 
 Let me conclude this discussion of how the normative dimension could be 
adapted to an agent-level approach by  focusing on cognitive architecture. A key  point is 
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whether modular—“island-like”—domain-specific computational systems could be 
accountable for reasoning. One might answer affirmatively  to this, by appeal to the 
computational sophistication of some of these modular systems. Note that animals can 
be very smart in certain specific domains. In addition to the examples of insect 
navigation given elsewhere in this thesis, another could be the scrub-jays’s capacities of 
encoding and retrieving temporal information about caching. These birds can not only 
retrieve information about where and when they stored food, but also selectively 
retrieve food items depending on their decaying time (that the birds had previous 
learned) and the time elapsed since they were stored (Clayton & Dickinson, 1998). 
Cases like these sometimes match and even outstrip  human cognitive capacities. But the 
same could be said of artefacts such as chess-playing computers, or the automatic pilots 
of some airplanes. Something all these computational systems have in common is that 
they  are highly task-specific, and there operations cannot generalise to new situations or 
tasks. This makes controversial that the behaviours they trigger are attributable to the 
whole-agent, instead of their modular subsystems, making them poor candidates for 
being the locus of the agent’s reasons. 
 To see further why domain-specific computation is problematic to account for 
reasoning recall that both animals’ and computers’ inner architectures typically  consist 
in multiple modules. This opens the possibility  that their operations come into conflict, 
in the sense of leading to inconsistent sets of conclusions. Then it becomes controversial 
to consider each of these modular operations as contributing with reasons that serve the 
goals of a whole individual, since such a disunited set of operations and goals can 
hardly  support the ascription of instrumental rationality  to a whole agent (Saunders & 
Over, 2009). Indeed, modular processes appear to make more sense from an 
evolutionary  perspective, in particular as serving the biological goals of survival and 
proliferation of our genes, rather than as the actual reasons of an agent. Stanovich and 
West (2000) make the same point by appeal to the distinction between evolutionary 
adaptation and instrumental rationality. According to them,
The key point  is that  for the latter (variously termed practical, pragmatic, or means/ends 
rationality), maximization is at  the level of the individual person. Adaptive optimisation in 
the former case is at the level of the genes. In Dawkins’s (1976; 1991) terms, evolutionary 
adaptation concerns optimization processes relevant to the so-called replicators (the genes), 
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whereas instrumental rationality concerns utility maximization for the so-called vehicle ... 
which houses the genes. (p. 660)
 Stanovich and West propose that what makes plausible the ascription of 
rationality to an agent is its possession of a domain-general processing system capable 
of overriding domain-specific predispositions and integrating them, pursuing the 
interests of the agent taken as a whole. This domain-general system constitutes a level 
of abstraction that makes it possible to carry  out inferences about domain-specific 
mechanisms in a causal-logical fashion, in a way attributable to the whole agent. This 
metacognitive ability thus appears to be required for yielding genuine instrumental 
reasoning, and interestingly, according to a recent review (Penn & Povinelli, 2007) there 
is no conclusive evidence that non-human animals are capable of such a metacognitive 
capacity45.  
7.5. Conclusions
 I have argued that the personal-subpersonal distinction offers a plausible 
framework for determining what makes certain computational systems capable of 
mentality. After exploring how the main aspects of agent-level explanations could be 
realised in a computational architecture, it becomes apparent that the notion of agent-
level points in the direction of cognitive access, generality and integration. These 
constraints should be operative in explanations involving rational links between 
perception, central-cognition and actions systems, as well as those processes dealing 
with multiple modular structures. Thus, animals having a massively  modular 
computational architecture (as is presumably  the case of arthropods, for example) 
should be considered poor candidates for being accountable from an agent-level 
perspective, and so it  would be unjustified to ascribe mentality  to them. However, to 
further explore what kind of computational architecture would make it for an agent-
level description goes beyond the possibilities of this thesis. 
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45  This metacognitive ability is closely related with a dual-process cognitive architecture, which is 
claimed to be have evolved much more recently than modular—domain-specific—architectures, and 
thought by most theorists to be uniquely human (see Evans, 2003, for a review). To go into the details of 
the dual-process approach to reasoning goes beyond the scope of this chapter, though. 
 My purpose in this chapter has been to make a comprehensive characterisation 
of the personal-subpersonal distinction, and to adapt this distinction to the case of non-
human entities through the notion of agent-level. I have articulated a certain 
philosophical perspective on this notion, and however I used examples from animal 
cognition and artificial intelligence as support to my arguments, it has only  been my 
purpose to illustrate an important distinction that  could be adopted to draw the line 
between computational agents with and without mentality. Further revision of 
ethological data and empirical work may well be needed to determine whether agent-




 The aim of this thesis has been to explore the minimum conditions 
computational agents have to meet in order to possess a mind, and to put forward an 
adequacy criterion for drawing the line between agents with and without mentality. 
After contextualising the debate within the framework of naturalism and the 
computational theory  of the mind, in chapter 2 I argued that computational explanations 
of behaviour do not entail mentality. On the contrary, explanations couched from the 
computational level are appropriate for non-mental computers and thus capture a natural 
domain that is distinct from—however overlapping with—the domain of mental agents. 
A consequence of this idea is that we have to count the computational level as an 
alternative, autonomous level of explanation, on pain of falling into a false dilemma in 
case of considering psychology as the only alternative to proper physical-level 
explanations of behaviour. I then undertake an exhaustive critical survey of the existing 
proposals about the minimum conditions computational agents have to meet in order to 
be explainable from the psychological level.
 Chapters 3 & 4 tackled the informational approaches of Fodor and Dretske. They 
are part of the standard account of how computational agents pick up and transform 
information into a structure suitable for thought and reasoning. In particular, Fodor 
attempts to specify the informational relations that symbolic structures must have with 
their referents. I argued that  his view was poorly  revealing of the minimum conditions 
under which those relations hold, and therefore was not very useful for the present 
purposes. Dretske, in turn, proposes that the key for understanding what makes certain 
computing systems capable of mentality lies in the way information from the world is 
coded into a symbolic structure. I contended that even though this coding process is 
important, it does not suffice as a minimum condition for possessing mental symbols. 
Overall, I conclude that the capacity to develop symbolic structures bearing 
informational relations with the environment (of the sort described by Fodor and 
Dretske) does not seem to be something exclusive to mental agents. What these 
informational approaches describe as constitutive of mentality appears to be just part of 
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the computational processes that enable a system to possess mental symbols, but not the 
whole story. 
 Chapter 5 discussed the view of Burge, who adds teleology in his account of 
perceptual systems. But contrary to what he proposes, I argued that the capacity  of 
certain information-gathering systems to accurately detect  distal environmental 
properties is not necessarily  a psychological  (i.e. genuinely perceptual) capacity. Even 
if characterised in teleological terms, these detector-functions might still be ascribed to 
a merely  computational agent. Consequently, Burge’s view becomes susceptible to the 
same counterexamples as the informational approaches mentioned above. Though 
centred on perception, Burge also attempts to give a more holistic flavour to his 
approach by characterising perceptual functions as serving the purposes of a whole 
agent. But despite being on the right  track, his proposal fails due to complications with 
his overall picture of dispositional and etiological functions merging within the same 
organism.
 Chapter 6 addressed two distinct proposals about minimal forms of 
psychological explanation. Bermúdez attempts to do without the standard—inferential
—model of psychological explanation and puts forward a version of success semantics 
that defines mental symbols in operational terms. But besides inheriting problems 
traditionally  associated with operational accounts (such as behaviourism), his view fails 
to provide the causal mechanisms required for explaining complex animal behaviour. 
Carruthers, on his side, follows a more traditional version of psychological explanation 
and proposes a cognitive architecture that  captures what he sees as the core of mentality. 
I believe Carruthers is right in situating the burden of psychological explanation within 
a whole-agent  perspective, however I argue that his view is unsatisfactory  as an account 
of what is paradigmatic of mentality, or is at least incomplete in comparison with what I 
characterise as a personal-level approach to psychological explanation. Indeed, 
Carruthers’ core cognitive architecture also becomes an easy target for the 
counterexamples of mindless machines given in several parts of this thesis.
 The final chapter developed a proposal towards an adequacy criterion for 
drawing the line between agents with and without mentality. My strategy consisted in 
identifying the contrast between psychological- and computational-level explanations 
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with the distinction—well entrenched in the philosophical literature—between personal 
and subpersonal levels of explanation of the mind. I spelled out what a personal-level 
approach consists of, explaining that it takes whole agents as their subject matter, uses a 
distinctive theoretical vocabulary, and is constrained by norms of rationality. I argued 
that this approach is compatible with a naturalistic framework, and that it  provides an 
especially satisfying way of identifying the paradigmatic aspects of psychological 
explanation. 
 My proposal can be understood as a top-down approach, which takes 
psychological explanations of human behaviour as the paradigm for judging whether 
other computational agents have minds. In order to avoid anthropomorphic concerns 
related with defining the mind in terms of persons, I developed an agent level of 
description that focuses just on the essential aspects of the personal-level approach, so 
as to adapt it for the purposes of explaining the behaviour of animals and even 
machines. By means of this agent-level approach I attempted to explore the minimum 
conditions a computing system requires for possessing a mind. Paramount among those 
conditions is the possession of symbolic structures that function in a coordinated way 
towards achieving goals that concern the agent as a whole, that satisfy the generality 
constraint, and that take part in metacognitive processes that integrate different domain-
specific areas of the agent. 
 As any account committed to scientific realism, my  proposal is a blend of 
epistemology  and metaphysics. It assumes that it is through our best psychological 
theories that we can gain (observer-independent) knowledge about the nature of the 
mind. More precisely, I contend that the agent-level approach provides the most 
convenient way to formulate psychological explanations and, therefore, that it can 
reveal to us the main features and constraints a computational agent must comply to 
possess mentality. Admittedly, this thesis presents a first pass through those constraints. 
However, my purpose has been to show that the agent-level approach has advantages 
over other criteria offered by the literature, and I have given concrete examples of the 
sort of computational architecture a mental agent is supposed to have. A further task 
would be to explore in more detail the particular computational architectures of the 
different animal species in the evolutionary  tree of life, and figure out which of them 
appear to be the most basic ones that could be the target of agent-level explanations.
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